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1. SEEKING A BALANCE? 
1.1. Introduction  
The American College of Healthcare Executives awarded the 2005 James Hamilton 
book of the year prize to Fred Lee (2004), author of If Disney Ran Your Hospital: 9 
½ Things You Would Do Differently. The advantage of running a hospital according 
to the principles of Disney is that it creates an environment “where people feel they 
are working with friends who share a common dream of making communities and 
patients their loyal fans” (Lee, 2005). Though certainly a positive scenario, to what 
extent can hospitals be compared to amusement parks? And to what extent is it 
desirable for hospitals to be run like businesses in countries with public health care 
services? Is there a blueprint for increasing the performance of the health care 
sector? This dissertation approaches these questions from a political science 
perspective, focusing particularly on what role institutions and actors play in the 
emergence of new hospital payment systems, which introduce principles from the 
private sector, in this case New Public Management (further NPM).  
 The title, ‘seeking a balance’, refers to several aspects of health care policy 
reform. First, it refers to specific health care goals: (universal) accessibility, quality 
and cost containment. As will be outlined in Chapter 2, new hospital payment 
systems likely change the balance between these goals. Second, it refers to 
questions about the involvement of the state and the market in the health care 
sector. Implementing NPM in new hospital payment systems affects the role of the 
state in health care policy. Third, changes in the former balances alter the interests 
of actors in the health care and political domains.  
 This first chapter sets the scene for the dissertation. It provides the 
background for the research question by describing the health care sector and by 
comparing how ‘shifts in governance’ – including NPM - are studied in different 
research traditions, i.e. law, public administration and political science. I argue that 
health care policy is a particularly sensitive political issue, as it deals with matters 
concerning life and death. Governments must constantly strive to reconcile quality 
and costs. Moreover, introducing NPM is likely to change the balance between 
health care goals and the role of the state according to its degree of ‘stateness’ 
(Nettl, 1968). For this reason, studying the emergence of NPM in health care policy 
from a political science perspective is relevant. Finally, this chapter outlines the 
plan of the book.  
1.2. The health care sector  
Blank and Burau (2004: 13-14) distinguish three types of care in health care policy: 
primary care, chronic care, and curative medicine. Primary care includes visits to 
general practitioners and ambulatory care, as well as health education and 
promotion. Chronic care includes long-term facilities, nursing homes and home 
care. This dissertation focuses solely on the third type – curative medicine. This 
Seeking a balance!? 
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covers acute/hospital care, outpatient clinics, technical specialists and intensive 
care. Reforms in curative medicine provide an excellent avenue of research for 
three reasons. First, curative medicine encompasses the main institutional settings 
and actors of the specific health care systems (i.e. health insurers or other 
organizations that purchase health care services, hospitals, the medical profession, 
patients and the state). Second, it accounts for the bulk of governmental and 
medical professional activity in health care (Freeman, 2000: 120). Finally, curative 
medicine is directly connected to ‘life and death’ issues, which are relevant to all 
citizens.  
 Three general sorts of health care systems can be distinguished in western 
countries: private insurance systems (e.g. in the United States), public(-regulated) 
insurance systems (e.g. in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany) and 
national health services (e.g. in the UK, Norway, Sweden, Spain). Specific types of 
actors and organizational relationships characterize these different health care 
arrangements. In particular, the form and degree of stateness varies across health 
care systems. For example, the state acts mainly as a regulator in public health 
insurance systems, while in national health services the state takes on a more 
active/visible role. In addition, there is a sharp distinction between the public and 
private health care sector.  
 Some of the cross-country differences in financing can also be explained by 
considering the different health care systems. National health services are financed 
by taxes, while insurance-based systems have insurance schemes funded by 
employers and employees. In addition, countries have organized the financing of 
the health care subsections in different ways. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
curative medicine is completely financed from the basic insurance and from 
additional voluntary insurances, while primary care is paid partly from the basic 
insurance (e.g. in the case of visits to general practitioners) and partly from the 
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (further AWBZ) (e.g. in the case of health 
education). Chronic care is fully financed from the AWBZ1. In Germany, all health 
care is reimbursed from the statutory insurance (sickness funds) or from voluntary 
insurance schemes. In the UK, all health care is paid from taxes.  
 The different institutional health care settings likely result in different 
outcomes of similar reform initiatives, since the form of stateness determines a 
specific starting point and specific relationships between actors. Consequently, this 
study takes into account the political and health care institutional settings. I argue, 
however, that neither the political nor the health care system determines variation 
in health care reforms. Rather, it is the interactions between actors and these 
institutional settings that is most relevant. I contend that the institutional setting 
determines the room to maneuver for actors, but not the eventual outcomes.  
                                                        
1
 This is the situation in the Netherlands at the end of 2008. There are plans to reform the financial 
structure.   
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1.3. Health care and welfare state reforms 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were debates about the size and the role of 
the state in public sector provision. Inspired by a particular set of economic theories 
and values mainly focusing on enhancing efficiency, NPM emerged as a reform 
movement to address such questions (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001). The new 
pressures on the welfare state have led to the widely held belief that current levels 
of social provision are unsustainable (Giaimo and Manow, 1999). The welfare state 
reforms that occurred during the last decades have been the source of extensive 
research (cf. Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 1994, 2001; Starke, 2006).  
 The studies have usually dealt with welfare state retrenchment and less often 
with welfare state restructuring. I define retrenchment as changes which cut back or 
reduce social entitlements by, for example, reducing benefit levels, tightening 
eligibility rules or shortening entitlement periods (Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002; 
Green-Pedersen, 2007). Another type of welfare state reform, welfare state 
restructuring, is defined as changes in the institutional rules surrounding a scheme. 
These can be changes in the administration or the funding of benefits, but also 
shifts in the principles which govern the calculation of benefits, e.g. changes in the 
scope of means-testing (Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002; Green-Pedersen, 2007).  
 The cost of health care has emerged as an important policy issue. The reason 
for this is two-fold: first, health care costs grow faster than GDP (OECD, 2006) 
and, second, depending on their hospital payment system, countries were 
confronted with increased public costs (e.g. Germany) and/or waiting lists (e.g. the 
Netherlands and the UK). Like other western countries, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK introduced comparable types of payment systems to increase the 
performance of the health care sector in the period 2002-2006. These new hospital 
payment systems were not developed to redress welfare entitlements (cf. Clayton 
and Pontusson, 1998; Green-Pedersen, 2001); rather, they were meant to enhance 
performance. I argue, however, that new hospital payment systems are at the very 
least a form welfare state restructuring and that they eventually may lead to 
retrenchment. The rationale for such a statement is that by emphasizing cost 
containment, other health care goals, as for instance quality, are affected.  
 In this dissertation, I study NPM to understand the variation in new hospital 
payment systems in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom2. Many 
public sector studies deal with NPM, but it is seldom linked to welfare state 
reforms (see for an exception, Green-Pedersen, 2002b). Interestingly enough, 
                                                        
2
 Due to devolution in the United Kingdom, reforms in the NHS do not necessarily occur 
simultaneously in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England. The new payment system is not 
implemented in the Scottish and Welsh NHS. Since this study deals with the extent to which NPM has 
emerged in new hospital payment systems based on DRG, only the reforms of the English NHS are 
considered. For this reason, this dissertation refers to the British political system as a whole, but to the 
English policy plans and the English hospital payment system in particular. 
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however, NPM is addressed in health care policy studies (cf. Dawson and Dargie, 
2002; Dent, 2005).  
1.4. NPM in health care reforms: a political science perspective 
NPM emerged as a reform movement  and tends to be viewed as either a major 
breakpoint in public sector management, the most recent paradigm change on how 
the public sector is governed (Lane, 2000) or a new international administrative 
orthodoxy (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001: ix). It is defined as lessening or 
removing differences between the public and private sector and shifting the 
emphasis of governance from process accountability towards greater accountability 
in terms of results to improve the performance of the public sector (Hood, 1995; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 8). In NPM, elements such as increased competition, 
devolution, managerialism and the use of contracts occur simultaneously (cf. 
Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; Hood, 1995; Lane, 2005). Like organizing health 
care according to the principles of Disney, NPM is frequently presented as a 
blueprint for solving public sector problems, as if it would be applicable in every 
situation.  
 The use of Diagnosis Related Groups (further DRG) types of payment 
systems became more prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s and has taken on a variety 
of forms (Fetter and Freeman, 1986; Leister and Stausberg, 2005; Lungen and 
Lauterbach, 2000). The rationale behind all such systems is that hospitals earn 
money if they treat patients for less than the (DRG-)tariff (cf. Fetter and Freeman, 
1986). In some cases, the systems have been mainly symbolic and included little 
actual change in the way the hospital sector is governed, while in other cases they 
have provided the basis for privatization of the hospital sector (Leister and 
Stausberg, 2005). An important assumption of this dissertation is that NPM may 
emerge in DRG based systems but that this is not a forgone conclusion. It is 
possible to introduce a DRG based payment system without the aims and measures 
characteristic of NPM. The systems are assumed to support specific policy 
objectives, which are not necessarily NPM (Leister and Stausberg, 2005: 47). This 
dissertation does not explain NPM, but uses its prevalence in DRG payment 
systems to study variation in health care reforms.  
 NPM is often related to governance literature. Governance is a widely used 
catchall phrase (cf. Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1996; Van Kersbergen and 
Van Waarden, 2004), which takes on more specific meanings when referring to 
countries and organizations. According to Rhodes (1996), for instance, at least six 
meanings of governance can be distinguished: ‘the minimal state’, corporate 
governance, NPM, good governance, socio-cybernetic networks and self-
organizing networks.  
 Governance is a common research topic in several scientific fields, e.g. law, 
public administration and political science. The main differences among the 
disciplines concern the types of questions that are examined. Law scholars address 
Seeking a balance? 
5 
 
‘shifts in governance’ from a legitimacy3 and legal perspective. Important 
contemporary legal questions include: whether it is legitimate to let societal actors 
choose the most efficient means to address a policy goal, who decides which 
aspects must be taken into account in a particular governmental policy, whether 
specific performance standards can be laid down, how citizens are legally protected 
and whether performance indicators for public policy can be established by non-
democratic actors (Mackor, 2008; Michels, 2001). Legal scholars also consider the 
consequences that the changing role of the government has in the public and private 
domains and how this role should be formalized in a changing society (e.g. Vonk, 
2003). 
 Scholars in the field of public administration study the implementation and 
organization of policy. They focus on questions regarding how NPM has emerged 
in the public sector and on the effects of the implementation of NPM on the 
performance of the public sector (cf. Christensen and Laegreid, 2002; Dunleavy 
and Hood, 1994; Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Public administration 
scholars are particularly interested in descriptive and normative questions (cf. 
Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003). Moreover, several studies analyze the impact of 
NPM, i.e. whether convergence can be observed and whether it should be 
considered a paradigm (cf. Gow and Dufour, 2000; Pollitt, 2001). 
 Political science is often defined as the study of ‘who gets what, when and 
how’ (Lasswell, 1958 [1936]). The implementation of NPM in new hospital 
payment systems addresses the questions: who governs health care – the state 
and/or the market; for what ends - (universal) accessibility, quality and cost 
containment; by what means – public governance, private governance or NPM? 
Studying how NPM has emerged in health care from a political science perspective 
starts from the idea that outcomes of political processes are useful for 
understanding variation in reforms. Such a perspective should shed light on what 
political obstacles might stand in the way. In addition, political processes do not 
take place in a vacuum, but in a specific institutional setting that affects the choices 
of political actors. Here institutions are defined as structural features that lead to 
patterned interactions (Peters, 2005: 18). I contend, therefore, that it is necessary to 
take the specific setting in which political processes occur into account to explain 
the variation of a similar policy initiative (i.e. a new hospital payment system) in 
different countries.  
 
 
                                                        
3
 Legitimacy is used differently in political science and law. In the former, it is considered the capacity 
of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that political institutions are the most 
appropriate institutions in a specific society (Lipset, 1963 [1960]: 64). In law, legitimacy is based on 
the Weberian perspective and defined as the general readiness to accept governmental rules and 
decisions regardless of the specific content (e.g. Schwitters, 2000: 12). Hence, in law the legal basis of 
governmental authority in health care is discussed, while in political science legitimacy is used as a 
variable to explain institutional change or stability.  
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1.5. New institutionalism: actors in their institutional context   
To some extent one could see the emergence of new institutionalism as a reaction 
to theories of rational choice and behavioralism, which were a reaction to the ‘old’ 
institutionalism that studied institutions in a more (constricted) formal way (cf. 
March and Olsen, 1989; Peters, 2005; Weingast, 2002). Within new 
institutionalism several approaches can be distinguished, some of which are more 
or less compatible with the individualistic approaches of political science (e.g. 
rational choice) than others (Peters, 2005: 2). The core assumption of all forms of 
new institutionalism is that rules and systems of rules not only organize and 
regulate social behavior, but also make it understandable and – in a limited 
conditional sense – predictable for those sharing knowledge of the rules (Scharpf, 
1997: 40).  
 Several specific forms of new institutionalism have developed that differ in 
their definitions and assumptions about the role of institutions. In rational 
institutionalism, institutions are systems of rules and inducements in which 
individuals attempt to maximize their own utilities (cf. Keman, 1999b; North, 
1990; Peters, 2005; Weingast, 2002). In sociological institutionalism, institutions 
that provide the ‘forms of meaning’ guiding human action, are not just (formal) 
rules, procedures or norms, but also symbols, cognitive scripts and moral templates 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 947). In historical institutionalism, institutions are, like in 
sociological institutionalism, more than just formal rules. In addition, they are seen 
as the outcomes of struggles between actors with unequal resources (Pierson and 
Skocpol, 2002: 706). 
 New institutionalism does not provide concrete hypotheses about how 
institutions and actors affect outcomes; rather, it offers guidelines in search of 
explanations (Scharpf, 1997: 37) as well as a theory driven framework of reference 
that enables the researcher to interpret empirical developments, as regards behavior, 
within a set of formal and informal rules. Scholars of the specific forms of new 
institutionalism agree that the interactions between institutions and actors are 
relevant for explaining outcomes, but they start from different assumptions about 
how and to what extent these are important for explaining outcomes (cf. Keman, 
1998). Since new institutionalism provides several ideas about how actor 
preferences and interests might interact with the institutional setting, it provides 
useful frameworks for explaining variations in hospital payment systems, as will be 
outlined in Chapter 2.  
 Immergut (1992a; 1992b) has provided one of the earlier and influential 
studies linking new institutionalism and health care policy. In her work, she 
discusses the outcomes of the development of health care systems in relation to 
institutionalist theory. She sees institutions as establishing a strategic context for 
the actions of political actors (Immergut, 1992b: 83). Her study concludes that 
institutions only become relevant in strategic calculations about the best way to 
advance a given interest in a particular system. Moreover, her findings indicate that 
the goals and interests of actors, who are socialized by institutions, do not depend 
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on a specific institutional structure (Immergut, 1992b: 84/85). Immergut’s work has 
shown that more than one course of action is possible in institutions and that events 
depend just as much on historical accident as on the inventiveness of actors 
(Immergut, 1992b: 84/85).  
 Pierson (2004: 64) offers a somewhat different perspective, arguing that 
initial steps in a particular direction may encourage further movement along the 
same path. From his viewpoint, courses of actions are more restricted than 
Immergut (1992a; 1992b) suggests. Hence, change can occur, but it is partly 
explained from the specific context and the specific ‘path’. 
 According to Hacker (2004: 722), an important puzzle in the study of health 
care reforms is the notion of ‘reform without change and change without reform’. 
Hacker places much weight on specific institutional structures to explain reforms. 
He concludes from a review of the literature that market reforms tend to occur more 
often in centralized political and health care systems, while governments in 
decentralized systems expand the role of the state. In addition, Hacker argues that 
countries which introduced market-based reforms in health care often have brought 
the state back in, in essence reversing the original change. Overall, though scholars 
agree that contexts seem to limit choices for actors, they do not agree on how this 
mechanism works.  
 The movement of a pendulum provides a useful illustration of these different 
ideas about reform. According to Hacker (2004) and Pierson (2004), a specific 
course of action is more likely than a random course of action. However, seeing 
processes as swings of a pendulum implies that actors’ choices in specific 
institutional settings do not matter; the pendulum will always swing in the same 
direction in similar circumstances. This is in contrast to considering health care 
reforms as outcomes of political conflict; movements in this case are a result of 
political conflict between actors in specific institutional settings. Although actor 
preferences are affected by the specific context, the direction of the reform is not 
determined by this context. Hence, more courses of action are possible when one 
takes into account the interaction between actors and institutions.  
 This dissertation explores to what extent health care reform can be seen as a 
result of a specific blueprint or as a result of political conflict. The study does not 
start from a particular form of new institutionalism but uses it as framework of 
reference to explore the relationship between institutions, actors and policy output 
and to interpret the outcomes (Scharpf, 1997). The following research question 
guides therefore this dissertation:  
 
To what extent is the variation between new hospital payment systems of Germany, 
the Netherlands and the UK a result of preferences about NPM, related behavior of 
political parties and medical bodies, and institutional characteristics of the 
political and health care systems? 
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 This study covers one comparable policy reform in three countries that 
represent distinct political institutional contexts and health care systems: Germany, 
the Netherlands and the UK. By studying how NPM has emerged in new hospital 
payment systems in three cases representing meaningful variation in their 
institutional context, it is possible to obtain explanations that are useful for 
contemporary welfare state literature. In the subsequent chapters, I show that 
variation is not determined by specific contexts or path-dependency; instead, 
explanations for the emergence of NPM are to be found in to what extent actors can 
further their preferences about NPM elements in their specific institutional setting.  
1.6. Plan of the book  
Although this dissertation sets out from a comparative case studies design, the 
chapters are devoted to specific topics rather than to the specific cases. Chapter 2 
further outlines the theoretical framework by discussing the development of health 
care regulation in the three cases. With the  literature about principal-agent theories 
and ‘shifts in governance’, the chapter illustrates why and to what extent NPM 
represents a public-private shift in health care. It also introduces the actors and 
specific institutional settings that are taken into account in this study. Subsequently, 
the chapter describes the research design. It argues why a small-N design is useful 
for this dissertation and explicates why Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom are considered diverse cases, i.e. cases that represent maximum variation 
with regard to important independent variables (Gerring, 2007; Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008) Finally, Chapter 2 briefly outlines the methodological 
considerations of the analysis.  
 Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of the various ways and degrees to 
which NPM has emerged in the new hospital payment systems. It formulates 
several institutional hypotheses about how NPM might emerge in new hospital 
payment systems and analyzes whether variation in the way NPM has emerged can 
be explained without taking ‘politics’ into account. The starting point is the 
assumption that NPM should emerge to a large extent in the UK, to a moderate 
extent in the Netherlands and to a small extent in Germany. The chapter shows that 
the variation between the cases cannot be fully understood from formal institutional 
settings or path-dependent characteristics. 
 In Chapter 4, I examine the role that political parties have played in the 
emergence of NPM. Specifically, I study the interaction between actors and 
institutions by comparing party positions – in the election phases and the decision-
making phases - in the three countries. The role of health care issues in these phases 
is linked to theories about political competition, e.g. whether health care is a 
valence or a positional issue (Stokes, 1963) and how parties compete for voters 
(Downs, 1957; Lewis and King, 1999; MacDonald and Rabinowitz, 1998). The 
chapter shows that there is a relationship between the attention governmental 
parties give to NPM and variation in the hospital payment systems. Moreover, it 
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demonstrates that political processes are affected by specific institutional settings: 
the importance of health care as political issue varies across countries.  
 Chapter 5 further explores the interaction between institutions and actors by 
focusing on the strategies of medical bodies in the policy process. It considers the 
relationship between preferences, institutions, strategies and outcomes. I show that 
the preferences and the strategies of the medical bodies and the new hospital 
payment systems can be only understood if the specific institutional position of the 
bodies is taken into account.  
 The final chapter outlines the contributions that this research makes to 
contemporary comparative welfare state studies, new institutionalism and the 
literature on NPM. The specific institutional settings or ‘paths’ in a specific policy 
domain are relatively decisive for how – in this case – NPM can be given shape by 
actors into policy. Moreover, actor preferences and behavior are crucial features to 
understand the specific emergence of an ideational feature into policy. 
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2. NPM AS PUBLIC-PRIVATE SHIFT IN HEALTH CARE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework and research design of the 
dissertation. I outline the characteristics of NPM to fully understand why variation 
is expected among the DRG-based payment systems. In addition, the chapter 
conceptualizes how NPM emerges in health care reforms and how it is related to 
preferences of actors, i.e. political parties and the medical profession. It is outlined 
why a new institutionalist framework is useful for interpreting how actors and 
institutions will account for the variation in the new hospital payment systems and 
why the effects of institutions and actors are probably different in comparison to 
other welfare state sectors.  
 The main argument of this chapter is that NPM is given shape in health care 
policy by the interaction of actors and specific institutional settings. The theoretical 
framework and research design presented in this chapter explicate how the next 
chapters address the specific sub-questions that are derived from the main research 
question: To what extent is the variation between the new hospital payment systems 
of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom a result of actor preferences 
about NPM of political parties and medical bodies, related behavior and 
institutional characteristics of the political and health care system? 
 In NPM, elements such as increased competition, devolution, managerialism 
and the use of contracts occur simultaneously (see Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; 
Hood, 1991, 1995; Lane, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). There is, however, no 
agreement in the literature on a precise definition of NPM. It is, on the one hand, 
seen as a ‘management hybrid’ with a continuing emphasis on core public values, 
but expressed in a new way (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, and Pettigrew, 1996). 
On the other hand, it is considered a market-based ideology invading public sector 
organizations (cf. Laughlin, 1991). This chapter conceptualizes NPM in a way that 
allows for a comparative analysis. The sub-question: To what extent and how has 
variation occurred in the emergence of NPM elements in the new hospital payment 
systems of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? cannot be answered without a 
well-founded conceptualization of NPM.  
 Several researchers emphasize the role of specific state traditions and 
institutional settings for understanding the different ways in which NPM has 
emerged (cf. Dent, Howorth, Mueller, and Preuschoft, 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004). As argued in Chapter 1, it is questionable whether formal institutions are 
useful in explaining reform outcomes. This argument is developed further in this 
chapter. Chapter 3 will verify that actor preferences and related behavior need to be 
taken into account to explain the variation in the new hospital payment systems by 
answering the second sub-question:  
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To what extent is the variation between new hospital payment systems of Germany, 
the Netherlands and the UK explained by state tradition and the institutional 
characteristics of the political and health care systems?  
 Subsequently, I outline in this chapter why focusing on the preferences and 
the strategic choices of actors in different institutional settings will provide insight 
into how NPM has emerged in health care reforms. Beside scholars that have 
focused on the large effects of a specific institutional setting, there are scholars that 
have considered actors, in particular political parties, more sufficient for explaining 
welfare state and NPM reforms (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2002b). This leads to the third 
sub-question of this dissertation is: To what extent and how are policy preferences 
of political parties about health care and NPM related to the variation in the new 
hospital payment systems of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? 
 The role of the medical profession is by many considered as so important, 
that the dynamics of health care reform are different in comparison to other welfare 
state areas. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze whether preferences and related 
behavior of the medical profession are useful in explaining reforms. The theoretical 
framework and research design to answer the fourth sub-question: To what extent 
are the negotiation strategies of the medical profession related to the variation 
between the new hospital payment systems of Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK? are outlined here. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the development of state regulation in 
health care is discussed to illustrate the variation in institutional settings between 
the countries and to conceptualize the preferences of actors. Second, the chapter 
explicates the distinction between health care and other welfare state sectors. Third, 
I conceptualize NPM. Fourth, consideration is given to why the preferences and 
related behavior of political parties and the medical profession are relevant for 
understanding how NPM has emerged in health care reforms. Lastly, I develop a 
research design to answer the research questions.  
2.2 Health care sector development and reform  
In this section, I first discuss how state involvement in health care regulation has 
developed. Second, I contend that although health care is part of the welfare state, it 
has its own dynamics and rationale. Finally, it is demonstrated that quality is a 
relevant aspect in comparison to other welfare state services and that health care is 
very important for the individual citizen. In other words, I show the distinctiveness 
between the health care sector and other welfare state sectors and argue that the 
way in which ‘politics matters’ in health care reforms, i.e. the extent to which 
actors can further their preferences, is likely to be different than in other welfare 
state reforms.  
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2.2.1 Health care and state intervention 
In 1980, almost all European states guaranteed access to health services for all their 
citizens, while in 1880 none of them did (Freeman, 2000: 14). Before the expansion 
of the welfare state and public health care in Western Europe, working class users 
of health services exercised strong bargaining power in contracting physicians into 
institutionalized third party payers (Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Teich Adams, 
1990).1 Market failures in health care provision were mainly caused by the 
dominance of these third party payers and by the fact that doctors made decisions 
about treatments. Due to governmental regulation, however, health care today tends 
to be organized more publicly than privately in many western countries.  
 A private health care system works inefficiently since market failures as 
adverse selection and moral hazard occur (cf. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; 
Thomson and Mossialos, 2006). Privately insured patients do not pay directly to 
health care providers, but are instead insured and do not make individual choices. 
Adverse selection is apparent in several instances. First, insurance companies 
obtain information about the risks of individuals and can refuse insurance or only 
offer coverage at high prices to persons with greater risks. Second, people might be 
able to conceal information about their health status. This will lead to the fact that 
healthy persons do not purchase full coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; 
Thomson and Mossialos, 2006). Finally, markets fail to provide health care that is 
accessible for all citizens, since bad risks are excluded from coverage. Particularly, 
citizens who need health care and have no income due to their illness cannot access 
private health care services.  
 Moral hazard appears when insurers lack information about the 
appropriateness of refunding treatment. In public and private health care delivery, 
an information asymmetry occurs since doctors or service providers usually decide 
what treatment a patient receives. The services are controlled less by the claims of 
the users than by the judgment of the providers. It is often difficult for insurance 
companies to estimate whether the costs are correctly measured. In addition, 
insured persons may use health services more extensively, since they do not pay 
them directly. Scholars argue that fully insured people spend 40-50% more on 
health care services than others, while their health status is not measurably 
improved (e.g. Newhouse, 1992). As the previous discussion has shown, both 
adverse selection and moral hazard are likely to lead to malfunction of the market 
provision of health care.  
 Historically, two routes have been taken to solve the aforementioned market 
failures. First, in some countries piecemeal expansion of social insurances took 
place, i.e. more and more citizens could make use of a (public) scheme. The health 
care systems in these countries have grown, but their organizational frameworks 
have remained static and ill-defined. They are characterized by complexity and 
                                                        
1
 The so-called sickness funds and sickness fund physicians in Germany (Kassenärzte) are the most 
well-known example.  
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relatively low involvement of the state. Strong interests – for instance the medical 
profession - in these systems were able to resist universalistic reform (Freeman, 
2000: 24). This route characterizes the Dutch and German systems. In the 
Netherlands, private ‘sickness funds’ were formed as far back as the 1820s, but it 
was only in 1941 that these funds became subject to strict governmental regulation 
(Companje, 1997: C). In Germany, private ‘sickness funds’ were formed during the 
mid-19th century and the first legal act was provided in 1883 (Freeman, 2000).  
 In the second route, radical universal access was instituted in a single stroke 
by creating national health services. This happened under particular circumstances, 
i.e. where a failure of existing arrangements occurred, where pro-reform (often 
social-democratic) parties were governing and where there was a strong executive 
and a divided medical profession (Freeman, 2000: 24). This route characterizes the 
UK. The NHS was set up in 1948, though there were some public insurance 
schemes before. In sum, the cases figuring into this study reflect two general 
organizational structures. Although both are mainly public, one has more complex 
relationships between the state and other organizations, while the other is 
dominated by the state.  
 Until the 1970s, the welfare state - including health care policies - expanded. 
The literature points to both political and economic reasons to explain the reforms 
that started in the 1970s. First, the era was marked by decline in rates of economic 
growth and by anti-welfare state sentiments (Hacker, 2004). Additionally, cost 
containment grew in importance. These developments occurred not only in health 
care, but also in other welfare state sectors. However, another important 
development in health care policy has been the change in the relationship between 
the government and the medical profession. According to Hacker (2004), this 
relationship has shifted from an uneasy cooperation between ‘states and interests’ 
towards ‘states versus interests’. Governments have often identified the medical 
profession as a cause of cost containment problems (cf. Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, and 
Walker, 2007; Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008). As further explicated below, this 
development is one of the aspects that distinguish health care reforms from other 
welfare state reforms. 
2.2.2 Is health care different from other welfare state sectors? 
As noted by Pierson (1994), reforming health care has been difficult. Health care is 
part of the welfare state, but there are three reasons why contemporary reforms in 
health care cannot likely be explained by the same set of factors that account for 
other welfare state reforms. First, quality is a separate policy goal. Second, 
governments have difficulties controlling health care provision,2 because 
physicians decide when and what kind of treatment patients receive. Third, health 
                                                        
2
 Health care in this dissertation is discussed with regard to solving health problems in curative 
medicine. The way primary care and chronic care are governed may be significantly different (see also 
Chapter 1).  
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is a matter of life and death for individual citizens making changes that lead to 
retrenchment more unpopular compared to other welfare services.  
 Although quality has become more relevant in contemporary welfare state 
services, e.g. in active labor market policies, the quality aspects of health care and 
education have remained more important than those of, for instance, sickness 
benefits. According to Harteloh (2003: 266), the concept of quality is used, on the 
one hand, to describe the relationship between possibilities realized and a 
normative frame of reference and, on the other hand, to prescribe or recommend a 
certain form of this relationship. While this definition is too vague to judge whether 
health care has a certain measurable quality, it introduces the concept of quality 
standards. There are, for instance, clinical standards to which the medical 
profession should comply, e.g. standards about client-centeredness and hygiene. In 
the cases under study, state intervention and organizations aimed, aside from 
solving market failures, at defining standards and monitoring quality standards set 
by the medical profession. The importance of quality in health care policy thus 
affects the dynamics of reform distinguishing it from other welfare state sectors.  
 In addition, the importance of quality complicates health care policy. For the 
purchasing organizations (i.e. insurance companies or other agencies that distribute 
money among providers), quality represents a way of evaluating how well money is 
spent. Patients, in comparison, evaluate care in terms of responsiveness to their 
individual needs (McGlynn, 1997: 9-10). For them, the quality of health care is a 
matter of life and death. Finally, physicians are caught between efforts to control 
costs, their own judgments and the demands of patients. According to physicians, 
quality erodes if they are less involved in choosing a treatment, since decisions are 
then made on the basis of costs (McGlynn, 1997: 10).  
 The second reason why health care is different from other welfare state 
sectors is that physicians are key decision makers in health care and work in single 
purpose organizations with strong informal networks (cf. Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, 
and Walker, 2007). We can assume, that when making decisions doctors prioritize 
treating patients within the available budget and that politicians do not seek to 
influence these decisions (Ham and Alberti, 2002: 839; see also Olson, 1982: 28). 
Heclo et al. (1990: 58-60) show that the directness of state control has varied more 
in health care than in education. Physicians’ organizations were able to affect the 
set up of the public health care sector in different ways. Moreover, these 
organizations have often been involved in governmental policy processes. Indeed, 
it is the influence of physicians that distinguishes health care from other welfare 
state services.  
 Finally, public health care has traditionally garnered large support 
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003: ; Houtepen and Ter Meulen, 2000a). Blekesaune 
and Quandagno (2003) argue that there is overwhelming support for welfare state 
policies for the sick and the elderly and generally positive attitudes toward welfare 
policies for the unemployed. Green-Pedersen (2002a) shows, however, that voters 
are often critical of the economic viability of extensive welfare states. Like in other 
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welfare state services, there is a tension between the public costs of health care and 
solidarity with the people who need services. Houtepen and Ter Meulen (2000b) 
argue that in areas such as unemployment, broad and fundamental consensus on the 
value of solidarity gave way to doubts concerning the attainability and desirability 
of big welfare schemes during the fiscal crisis of the welfare state beginning in the 
1970s. Solidarity in health care has remained mainly unquestioned. The 
distinctiveness of health care implies that the role of ‘politics’ is probably different 
in this area compared to other welfare state sectors. Health care reforms 
consequently affect interests and preferences of political actors in specific ways.  
2.2.3 Balancing health care goals 
Despite different dynamics, health care reforms cannot be completely isolated from 
other welfare state reforms. The new pressures on the welfare state have led to the 
common idea that current levels of social provision are unsustainable (Giaimo and 
Manow, 1999). Reducing the costs of health care has also become an important 
policy issue since health care costs grow faster than GDP (OECD, 2006). 
Furthermore, costs are constantly rising since new medical technologies are usually 
more expensive than the old. The government can only partly affect this, because 
doctors are important decision makers concerning the treatments patients receive. 
Finally, while governments have tried to reduce expenditures by introducing 
shorter periods for sickness and employment benefits, it is difficult to cut down 
costs in health care without compromising on quality and/or universal accessibility. 
 Cost containment, quality and accessibility are seen as competing goals in 
this study (see figure 2.1, Blank and Burau, 2004: 88). A comprehensive, universal 
health care system with high standards of quality is very costly. For this reason, 
conflicts among political actors are likely to arise regarding how the different 
health care goals should be (re-)prioritized and realized. In other words, it is 
impossible to improve the three elements simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Blank and Burau, 2004) 
Figure 2.1 Competing health care goals 
accessibility/
equity 
affordability/
cost 
containment
quality 
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 Another way of approaching health care goals is to define them as 
‘individual’ preferences and interests3 (cf. Czada, 1998; Keman, 1999b). Actors, 
for instance various political parties, as well as the individual citizen, might 
consider each of the health care goals important, but they are likely to rank these 
goals in a different order. Hence, leftwing parties may view universal accessibility 
and quality as more important than cost containment, while rightwing parties are 
more likely to prioritize cost containment over quality and universal accessibility.  
 Different actors in health care have specific preference orderings. Green-
Pedersen and Wilkerson (2006: 1041) argue that politicians seek the proper balance 
between responding to insatiable public demand for expanding services and 
controlling costs. In comparison, citizens care about their own health, which is not 
only seen as the absence of decease or injury but also as a state of complete 
physical and social well-being (Evans and Stoddart, 1990: 1347). Although people 
take risks, for instance by smoking, eating unhealthy food or skiing, they want to be 
healthy (Laver, 1986). Patients can estimate that they need health care, but the 
medical profession creates the demand by choosing the treatment. Fully insured 
individuals in Western Europe prefer a high quality and accessible health care 
service.  
 Figure 2.2 shows the preferences of government, society, the individual and 
the medical profession. The government seeks for a balance between health care 
goals, while in society there is a tension between the interest of solidarity with the 
sick and cost containment for all. The individual desires individual happiness. 
Finally, as outlined below the medical profession seeks self-regulation.   
 
Government  Society  Individual  Medical 
profession 
Balance (equal) 
accessibility, 
quality and cost 
containment  
 Solidarity 
versus cost 
containment 
 Individual 
happiness 
 Self-regulation 
Figure 2.2 Preferences and interests in health care 
 In sum, state involvement in health care emerged to solve market failures, 
but as this section has demonstrated, its development was not uniform across 
countries. Rather, specific political and institutional circumstances mattered in the 
way health care became publicly organized. The previous paragraphs have also 
shown that different sets of preferences can be distinguished in relationships 
between actors. Welfare state reforms occurred, according to several authors, due to 
a combination of reasons, e.g. political ideology, perceptions of the welfare state 
                                                        
3
 Other terms that can be used in this respect are needs (Keman, 1999b), desires (Laver, 1997) and 
wants. In this dissertation, I use preference to refer to the liking or ranking of one thing before or 
above another (McLean, 1996), and interest to refer to the ‘instrumental relation between such policies 
and the individual’s preferences attainment’ (McLean, 1996). If I cite authors, I use their terms.  
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and fiscal or economic reasons (cf. Freeman, 1998; Pierson, 1994; Pierson, 2006; 
Vis and Van Kersbergen, 2007). As will be outlined in the following pages, the 
introduction of NPM in health care reforms will lead to changes in the relationships 
between actors and, therefore, the preferences of actors.  
2.3 NPM as public-private shift 
In the former sections, I discussed how state involvement in health care developed, 
how the health care sector differs from other areas of the welfare state and how 
preferences and interests are shaped in the system. In this section, I argue that 
implementing NPM changes both the type of state involvement in health care and 
the ‘balance’ between the different preferences and interests. In addition, this 
section shows that new hospital payment systems can be characterized as welfare 
state restructuring, but that the emergence of NPM in these systems might lead to 
welfare state retrenchment.  
 NPM appears mainly in two ‘political science’ literatures: the governance 
literature (cf. Rhodes, 1996; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004) and the 
Principal-Agency (further PA) literature (cf. Lane, 2005). ‘Governance’ scholars 
conceptualize NPM as a model of governing situated between the public and 
private ideal types. Lane (1993: 1) argues that in liberal democracies there is a 
divide between the public and private sectors of the economy (or society): i.e. 
different institutions, interests and individual preferences exist. For instance, the 
way PA-relationships are organized differs between the public and private sector 
(Lane, 2005: 38-40).I use the theories about PA-relationships to illustrate that 
implementing NPM alters the relationships between actors in terms of how things 
are done, but not the roles of the actors.  
 The governance literature particularly shows that governing is not necessary 
done by the government (Rhodes, 1996). Many policy sectors have not a clear 
distinction between the public and private sector. I suggest that, in liberal 
democracies, policy sectors have a specific governance mix, which is affect by 
NPM. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004) list several contemporary shifts in 
governance: in forms and mechanisms of governance, in how institutional and 
organizational societal sectors and spheres are governed, and in the location of 
governance. They also distinguish vertical and horizontal governance shifts. 
Examples of the former consist of upward shifts from nation-states to international 
public institutions (i.e. the NATO, EU) as well as downward shift to regional 
levels. Horizontal shifts of governance include: shifts from statutory contracts to 
instruments under private law (contracting), shifts from ‘command to control’ to 
information management and shifts from public to private organizations (Van 
Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004: 153-155). As it embraces contracting, 
outsourcing and privatization, NPM can be characterized as a horizontal shift of 
governance.  
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 Literature about PA-relationships is useful for further conceptualizing the 
movement from public to private governance in NPM. Lane (2005) argues that PA-
models are particularly helpful for understanding the logic of organization of the 
public sector. Complex PA-relationships among the government, health care 
providers and other actors (e.g. insurance companies) occur in health care systems. 
According to the PA-model, providing public services is basically contracting, first, 
between the leaders of government (principal) and an organization responsible for 
service delivery (agents), and, second, between the leaders of government (agent) 
and individuals (principals) (Lane, 2005: 31). As elaborated below, relationships 
between principals and agents are organized differently in a bureaucracy than in 
NPM and private sectors. Hence, NPM is characterized by different relationships 
between actors as the traditional public administration.  
 In the PA-model, the basic governance problem of public sectors is 
conceptualized as contractual incompleteness: i.e. it is impossible to fully measure 
the effort of the agent in terms of money. Consequently, the principal attempts to 
spend too little and the agent shows little effort (Lane, 2005: 57). However, NPM 
remains different from private management, because the government is still the 
main principal (Lane, 2005: 27). This is important to note. NPM changes in health 
care do not aim at privatizing the whole sector, but at shifting the model of 
governance and at changing the PA-framework. In other words, the way 
relationships between actors and principals are organized changes.   
 In the countries included in this study, the public-private mix in the health 
care sector is particularly important in determining the structure of a health care 
system, i.e. whether a system is insurance-based or has a national health service. 
Several important sets of PA-relationships are distinguishable: government 
(principal) and health care provider (agent); individual patient (principal) and 
health care provider (agent); health purchasers (principals) - e.g. insurance 
companies or fund-raising general practitioners  - and health care providers 
(agents).  
 Hence, governments deal with a complex network of public and private 
organizations in health care. The insurance-based health care systems are more 
complex than national health services, because health insurance developed along 
the lines of work-based social insurance and, consequently, self-regulation and 
private organizations are found in the health care sector. In contrast, national health 
services are state-led and, to some extent, organized as a bureaucracy (see Table 
2.1). Despite such differences, PA-frictions will occur in both systems, since 
governments lack information about whether the effort of health care providers 
actually contributes to the health care goals (i.e. accessibility, quality and cost 
containment).  
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Table 2.1 Differences between national health services and insurance-based 
 systems 
National health services Insurance-based systems 
Large (overall) state 
involvement 
State as regulator  
 
Large distinction between 
public and private system 
Public and private 
organizsations provide care 
for public insured people 
 
A purchaser-provider split is 
created within the public 
system  
 
Insurance companies have a 
role as purchasing 
organizations 
 
 As argued in Chapter 1, DRG payment systems facilitate specific policy 
goals, which are not necessarily NPM. This implies that the roles of actors remain 
similar, e.g. the state remains an important principal for health care providers, but 
that how such relationships are constituted changes. Hence, if NPM goals emerge 
in payment systems, it will lead to a public-private shift, since the PA-relationships 
shift from ‘command and control’ to relationships between principals and agents 
that are more characteristic of private sectors, e.g. contracting. These changes in the 
relationships likely affect preferences and interests of actors in this system and 
might lead to conflict between actors during the policy process.  
2.4 NPM as ideational stream   
The term NPM is appropriate in labeling the majority of public management 
reforms that emerged since the 1980s (Lane, 2000). The idea of NPM as a body of 
managerial thought originates from the observation that management techniques 
are to a large extent imported into the public sector. NPM is sometimes seen either: 
as a major breakpoint in public sector management, as the most recent paradigm 
change on how the public sector is governed (Lane, 2000), or as a new international 
administrative orthodoxy (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001: ix). Aucoin (1995) 
states that in the late 1980s policies of bureaucracy-bashing and restraining 
government were widespread. Bureaucracy was identified as the source of every 
problem. According to Trubek et al. (2008: 2), governments nowadays struggle to 
regulate and govern in the face of loss of confidence in the ability of state 
regulation to produce satisfactory outcomes.     
 However, one must ask whether a global convergence towards a particular, 
new style of public management is inevitable (Pollitt, 2001). I argue that the 
emergence of NPM cannot be considered the solution to the bureaucracy problems, 
such as those identified by Lane (2005). It is striking that countries have introduced 
relatively similar hospital payment systems in which NPM can emerge. However, it 
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might also be that countries just copy what is in fashion, particularly under 
conditions of uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pollitt, 2001).  
 In this section, I define NPM in health care and explain why NPM should not 
be seen as a blueprint for reforming the health care sector. It is best viewed as an 
ideational stream that is given shape in policy by actors and through specific 
institutional settings. According to Pollitt (2001: 946), agents of reform are not 
concerned merely with maximizing efficiency but are also interested in keeping up 
appearances, i.e. convincing stakeholders and appearing to do the right thing. It is 
selective copying, in which the perceptions and purposes of the reformer reassume 
a distinctive significance (Pollitt, 2001: 946).  
2.4.1 Defining New Public Management in health care 
In this study, NPM is defined as lessening or removing differences between the 
public and private sector and shifting the emphasis from process accountability 
towards a greater element of accountability in terms of results to improve the 
performance of the public sector (Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 8). This 
definition shows that there are two different sides of NPM: 1) removing differences 
in governance between the public and private sector and 2) shifting to performance 
accountability. As stated above, it conveys both a horizontal shift of governance 
and changes in the PA-relationships. Since NPM is complex, it can emerge in 
various ways: i.e. different extents and different emphases. This is studied in 
Chapter 3.  
 Accountability is an aspect in the definition of NPM that needs more 
conceptualization. The essence of accountability in NPM is answerability 
(Brinkerhoff 2004: 372). Mulgan (2000) list a number of features of this 
“answerability”. First, it is external, so the account is given to someone outside the 
body that is being held accountable. Second, it involves social interaction and 
exchange, since one side seeks answers and rectification, while the other side 
responds and accepts sanctions and it involves rights of authority, the right to 
demand answers and impose sanctions (Mulgan, 2000: 555). In NPM social 
interaction and exchange is molded in contracts that may include sanctions, for 
instance selective contracting by insurers or patient choice. The latter, for instance, 
implies that patients can ‘sanction’ a hospital that does not deliver certain quality 
standards by choosing a different hospital for the next treatment.   
 Two types of accountability, managerial and political accountability, are 
distinguished (cf. Christensen and Laegreid, 2002; Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald et 
al., 1996). Managerial accountability in NPM means that service providers are held 
accountable for their performance (cost containment and quality) within a(n) 
(internal) market. Political accountability deals with ensuring that the government 
delivers on electoral promises, and responds to ongoing and emerging societal 
needs and concerns by guarding the accessibility of health care under changing 
conditions (Brinkerhoff 2004: 374). For the latter type of accountability, it is 
necessary that governments have insight in how hospital budgets are spent and how 
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accessibility is safeguarded. I argue that more managerial accountability is 
introduced with NPM, which focuses on performance instead of the process; i.e. 
performance accountability.  
 Hood (1991; 1995) distinguishes seven components related to the two sides 
of NPM: public-private: unbundling of the public sector into corporative units 
organized by product, more contract-based competitive provisions, stress on private 
sector styles of management practice; performance accountability: more disciplined 
and frugal use of resource, more emphasis on visible hands-on top management, 
explicit and measurable standards of performance and greater emphasis on output 
controls (Hood, 1995: table 1). Although these distinctions are useful, Hood’s 
components do not completely cover the way NPM emerges in the health care 
sector. For this reason, I use a different set of NPM elements that more accurately 
shows the variation in the emergence of NPM in health care policy (see Table 2.2). 
 The elements of table 2.2 are gleaned from the literature. Unlike Hood 
(1995), I  differentiate between aims and measures and do not put all elements in a 
specific category. This distinction between aims and measures allows one to study 
variation across countries in a comparative perspective. It may be the case that 
similar aims are found in policy documents but that the ways to achieve these aims 
vary (e.g. Pollitt, 2001). Moreover, for some elements that scholars have typified as 
NPM, it is difficult to assess whether they resemble “shifts in governance” or a 
change in a PA-relationship. The empowerment of services users, for instance, can 
be seen as a public-private shift in governance, i.e. a shift in the PA-relationship 
between the individual patient and the health care provider, as well as a shift from 
process to performance accountability. Competition is another example. It is clearly 
a market mechanism introduced in PA-relationships, but it also puts a focus on 
performance accountability. In Chapter 3, these different elements are further 
discussed and operationalized to show how the new hospital payment systems 
facilitate them.  
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Table 2.2 NPM elements 
 Accountability of results Public-private shift 
Aims Accountable for performance 
 
Transparency 
 
Efficiency 
 
Privatization 
 Empowerment of service users 
Competition 
Measures Standards and measures of 
performance 
 
Benchmarking 
 
The degree to which markets are 
actually established 
 
Deregulation 
 
Patient Choice 
Contracting in 
Notes: Elements based on Flynn (2002), Hood (1991) and Lane (2000).  
2.4.2 NPM: a blueprint for health care sector problems? 
I argue that NPM should be considered an ideational stream and not as a panacea 
for problems in the health care sector for two reasons. First, health care policy 
problems are more complex than bureaucracy problems. Second, though the sector 
might benefit from NPM under certain specific circumstances, ‘making the 
government work better’ depends on whose values and perspectives are taken into 
account (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 14). The variation in the payment systems 
likely depends on particular institutional and political circumstances. This also 
implies that NPM in health care policy probably changes more than would be 
expected from welfare state reforms that aim on restructuring.  
 NPM is often seen as a way to tackle the problems of the old public sector in 
a changing environment. One of the main issues has been the capacity of the state 
to govern society in an era when the state is cutting back and the global 
environment is becoming more complex (cf. Aucoin, 1990; Pierre and Peters, 
2005). In addition, the attention several international organizations have placed on 
it makes NPM look like a blueprint. The OECD, for instance, has set up a specific 
public management committee which states that ‘governments must find effective 
ways to make responsive policy decisions and to identify the right mix of 
incentives to implement them’ (OECD, 1995: 9). Some argue that it is possible to 
develop a framework that is able to determine when and how a specific task should 
be governed (cf. Cohen, 2001). Indeed, several NPM advocates, notably Osborne 
and Gaebler (1993), have provided rules and instructions for changing the public 
sector which and suggested that they are according to them, applicable in every 
public sector with bureaucracy problems.  
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 I argue that it is impossible to determine which tasks should be undertaken 
by the government versus the market or which should be subject to public 
management. It depends on whose preferences and values are taken into account 
(Pollitt, 2001). Furthermore, Resen (1998: 153) argues that implementing NPM 
may magnify potential disagreements and stir up dormant issues. Finally, though 
the welfare state might save the market from its own dysfunctional tendencies, it 
carries within itself the potential to undermine the market (Cerny, 1997: 261). In 
other words, a bureaucratic (state-led) health care system has specific PA-problems, 
as has health care organized by the market. In the former, bureaucracy problems 
occur, while in the latter information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse 
selection are present. This means that by implementing NPM in health care 
systems, governments are probably exchanging one set of problems for another.  
 Another important reason why NPM is not a universal blueprint is that old 
patterns of welfare provision are unlikely to be sustained by the implementation of 
NPM. Savoie (2006) argues that NPM is better at describing the solutions than at 
diagnosing the problems of the public sector. Resen (1998) states that many 
societal problems are of a nested nature and cannot be solved by focusing on 
limited aspects. In addition, NPM changes the distribution and content of social 
welfare policy substantively (Brodkin, 2006: 4). Resen (1998) contends that NPM 
not only changes the governance of social welfare policy, but also substantively 
changes its distribution and content. Moreover, opportunism, perverse effects and 
fraud are likely to appear more frequently. Goals are more focused on the 
performance with concrete (narrow) indicators, for instance admission days.  
 These arguments suggest that, PA-frictions will inevitably accompany the 
implementation of NPM. More importantly, it might be that exposing a public 
sector to ideas of competition, leading to wide spread individualism fosters certain 
elements at the expense of others (Resen, 1998: 155). Thus, NPM cannot be 
considered a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution for public sectors problems, since it may 
lead to welfare state retrenchment and triggers political questions about the role of 
the state. 
 One reason why NPM is sometimes seen as a blueprint stems from its 
widespread application by different types of governments in various public sectors. 
Indeed, NPM has been embraced by market liberal parties and (third-way) social 
democrats alike (cf. Cutler and Waine, 2000; Leys, 2001). However, it is important 
to note that this finding is somewhat biased towards Anglo-Saxon and 
Scandinavian contexts (cf. Cohn, 1997; Green-Pedersen, 2002b). It is unclear 
whether social-democratic parties in continental Europe have supported NPM to a 
similar extent as their Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian counterparts or whether they 
support it only under specific circumstances. It triggers the question whether and 
under which conditions actors can actively further NPM in health care policy.  
 Moreover, the preferences of Christian-democratic parties regarding NPM 
are under researched, making it difficult to discern the extent of their support. 
Similar to social-democratic parties, they have been big welfare state spenders, 
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particularly in times of economic prosperity. However, they support a different 
form of social capitalism, which is less based on universalism (Van Kersbergen, 
1994: 42). In this dissertation, the role of Christian-democratic parties is not 
specifically addressed, but I compare political competition in Germany and the 
Netherlands, which have important Christian-democratic parties, with the UK.  
 In sum, NPM is defined as lessening or removing differences between the 
public and private sector and shifting the emphasis from process accountability 
towards a greater element of accountability in terms of results. However, this shift 
is politically vulnerable, since it touches upon questions about the role of the state. 
In addition, health care policy problems are of a nested nature and therefore cannot 
be solved by focusing on ‘governance’ or changing PA relationships. I argued that 
the emergence of NPM in a health care system leads to political conflict, which 
makes studying actor preferences in different institutional contexts relevant to 
understand variation in reforms.  
2.5 Politics matters: political parties and NPM in health care 
Explanations for reform are often sought in the adaptability and structure of the 
system and not in the choices of political actors in these systems (Hacker, 2004; 
Harrison, 2004). This way of explaining reforms has been very common in the 
welfare state and health care reform literatures (cf. Kumpers, van Raak, Hardy, and 
Mur, 2002; Pierson, 1994; Starke, 2006). For this reason, this argument is taken 
seriously in this dissertation. However, several scholars have identified the role 
political actors play in these processes. Vis, Van Kersbergen and Becker (2008) 
have shown that coalition governments have political motives to pursue reforms. 
Béland and Shinkawa (2007) argue that institutions explain major differences in 
policy patterns but that politics of ideas, among other factors, also play a role. 
Pierson (1994) argues that health care is characterized by heated controversy and a 
staggering array of powerful interests that compete over policy reform. These 
studies suggest that studying the choices of actors in the interaction with their 
specific institutional settings (rather than studying institutional contexts alone) is 
relevant for understanding reforms.  
 The notion that actors and institutions should be studied in tandem is no 
longer novel. New institutionalism (cf. Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; 
Pierson and Skocpol, 2002) seeks to elucidate the role that institutions play in the 
determination of social and political outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936) and 
attempts to explain how institutions affect the behavior of actors. Thus far, new 
institutionalism has not provided a conclusive answer to how actors and institutions 
interact in welfare state reforms. The different forms of institutionalism – e.g. 
rational, historical and sociological institutionalism – respond to this question in 
specific ways (e.g. Czada, Héritier, and Keman, 1998; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Weingast, 2002). As will be outlined below, new 
institutionalist frameworks are used to interpret the interaction between actors and 
institutions.  
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 In the preceding sections, I have argued that implementing NPM influences 
the interests and preferences of actors in the health care system and is therefore 
likely to lead to conflicts between different political actors. Analyzing preferences 
of political parties will provide insight into how governments seek a new balance in 
health care goals. Several scholars mention social-democratic parties as particularly 
important for NPM reforms (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2002b; Leys, 2001). Many of 
these parties in Western Europe have adopted a pragmatic ‘third-way’ policy 
involving both a positive view of the ability of the market to provide certain 
outcomes and a strong emphasis on the active ‘social investment’ of the state 
(Green-Pedersen, Van Kersbergen, and Hemerijck, 2001). Cutler and Waine (2000: 
318), for instance, argue that Labour has embraced the changes of the Conservative 
party while at the same time setting out its ‘own’ managerialist approach.  
 However, Merkel and Petring (2007) argue that not all social-democratic 
parties have shifted towards a third-way approach. Besides, they argue that factors 
such as potential coalition partnerships and specific party competition explain 
policy patterns to a greater extent than institutional settings do. Hence, it is unlikely 
that social-democratic parties support implementing NPM in health care under all 
circumstances across countries. I argue that specific party configurations may 
accelerate or moderate the extent to which social-democratic parties will take up 
NPM (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2002b; Kitschelt, 2001; Merkel and Petring, 2007).  
 In addition, as will be further outlined in Chapter 4, national health services 
provide better possibilities for controlling costs, but individuals have fewer 
possibilities to affect the quality of the care they obtain. In contrast, insurance 
systems offer more choice to patients, but states are less able to offer equitable 
accessibility and to control costs. Since the preferences of political parties are not 
exogenous but determined by the specific health care system, actor preferences 
about NPM may vary across countries  
 I argue that specific institutional settings do not determine the outcomes of 
reform but that they are nevertheless relevant for understanding the choices of 
governments (cf. Hall and Taylor, 1996; Merkel and Petring, 2007). Political 
competition and political decision-making about NPM might be affected by the 
specific party configuration in which parties are embedded and by the specific 
health care system. In other words, the extent to which parties are able to further 
their preferences in health care policy depends on the relationships between parties 
and how the different goals are already embedded in the health care systems. 
However, health care policy is developed in a complex institutional context in 
which the medical profession is identified as an important actor in the policy 
process. To gain a better understanding of how actors and institutions interact in 
health care reforms, it is necessary to take also the role of the medical profession 
into account.  
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2.6 Balancing interests: the medical profession and the government 
An important characteristic of health care is the dominance of physicians in its 
provision. Physicians work in single purpose organizations with strong informal 
networks (Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, and Walker, 2007). They are organized by 
medical organizations that have access to policymaking, albeit in different ways. 
According to Olson (1982: 28), similar to other small well-organized organizations, 
these bodies are able to affect the small choices needed to implement policies.  
 A central argument of this dissertation is that action in health care policy is 
not determined by institutions alone but that it is also influenced by the preferences 
of the actors involved (Keman, 1999b: 250/251). While politicians are prone to 
strive for the proper balance between quality, cost containment and accessibility, 
patients seek the best obtainable care. The medical profession, in comparison, seeks 
self-regulation, autonomy and care for patients (e.g. Salter, 2002).  
 As will be outlined in Chapter 5, actors have a specific preference ordering 
with regard to NPM (see also Keman, 1999b; Scharpf, 1997). Whether these 
interests are parallel, conflicting or complementary likely varies across institutional 
settings (cf. Czada, 1998). I argue that the self-regulation of the medical profession 
is the most likely source of conflict between actor preferences. Governments have 
introduced means that reduced self-regulation in the last two decades (cf. Giaimo, 
2002; Horner, 2000; Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008; Lieverdink, 2001), but as Salter 
(2002) suggests, self-regulation is one of the key interests of the medical 
profession. The new payment systems, however, do not particularly aim on 
reducing self-regulation. It may have the result, but not necessarily. As I will show, 
this depends on the specific governmental preferences and the institutional position 
of the medical profession.  
 According to Keman (1999b), there are two possibilities for agreement when 
two parties compete in the same realm of ‘needs’. If parties have complementary 
interests or preferences (i.e. separate organizations demand identical measures that 
meets their respective preferences or interests), they can form strategic coalitions. 
Otherwise, if parties have parallel interests (i.e. separate organizations have similar 
preferences or interests) but with a different ordering, they can undertake 
cooperative strategies (Keman, 1999b: 260).  
 I argue that the strategies available to medical organizations in decision-
making depend on their preferences and interests, on the way they are embedded in 
the health care and political systems and on the assumptions about the strategies of 
other actors. Several authors have distinguished different strategies that are used in 
negotiations between governments and interest organizations: problem-solving, 
bargaining and confrontation (cf. Scharpf, 1997, 1998; Woldendorp, 2005). In 
addition, Hood (1995) has theorized which outcomes of NPM reforms are likely 
under different strategies. In Chapter 5, I outline more precisely the circumstances 
under which various outcomes can be expected.  
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2.7 Research design: a comparative approach 
This dissertation provides comparative studies of new hospital payment systems. 
The variation of interest is primarily synchronic, meaning that I focus on variation 
between cases and not on variation over time (Gerring, 2007). According to 
Colomer (2002), comparing in political science entails “gathering knowledge about 
similarities and differences among political structures and at the same time testing 
theoretical propositions about the real working of political institutions. The 
research question examined in this study is: To what extent is the variation between 
new hospital payment systems in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK a result of 
preferences about NPM, related behavior of political parties and medical bodies, 
and institutional characteristics of the political and health care systems? The 
question reveals several specific choices regarding the research design. First, it 
shows that only one phenomenon is studied, i.e. variation between new hospital 
payment systems. Second, it explicates which factors are relevant for understanding 
the phenomenon, i.e. which actors and institutions. Finally, it shows which cases 
are taken into account.  
 One of the most prominent questions in social science research is how many 
cases are needed to gather sufficient knowledge. In King, Keohane and Verba’s 
(1994: 4) influential book about social research, they distinguish between 
qualitative and quantitative research but argue that this is primarily a stylistic and 
methodological differentiation. All social research should derive from the same 
logic of inference. Hence, a central message of their book is that qualitative 
researchers can improve their work by adhering to the standards of quantitative 
research designs (cf. Laitin, 1995). Several authors have opposed this idea (cf. 
Brady and Collier, 2004; Gerring, 2007). According to Gerring (2007) despite the 
number of cases, the purpose of a  study should be – at least in part – to shed light 
on a larger class (i.e. a population). In this dissertation, the population constitutes 
Western European countries with a public health care service that implemented a 
new hospital payment based on DRG: i.e. systems that remunerate hospitals on the 
basis of case fees. Hence, I aim on finding conclusions that are not only relevant for 
the cases of this research.  
 The number of cases mainly affects whether a study will have more external 
or more internal validity. Studies with many cases often analyze one observation in 
each case, e.g. the relationship between economic growth and social expenditures, 
and are usually a good representation of the whole population. In comparison, 
studies with one or very few cases analyze several observations at different levels 
of observation4. They are typically able to gather better information about how 
causal relationships work, but they run the risk of overestimating the causal effect. 
                                                        
4
 There is some confusion about this term. What Landman (2000) defines as ‘unit of observation’ is 
probably similar to what Keman (1999a) defines as ‘unit of measurement’. In this dissertation, unit of 
observation is defined as the unit of data observations within the object of study (in this research the 
object of study is a country, but in studies where large numbers of countries are observed, object of 
study is the population these countries represent) 
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The advantages of case studies are found in their exploratory and (dis)confirmatory 
nature (Gerring, 2007: 40; see also Lijphart, 1975).  
 This dissertation aims on giving more insight in how the interaction of actors 
and institutions is related to the way NPM has emerged in new hospital payment 
systems and on arriving at plausible explanations as far as feasible given the data 
and the cases involved. There are two reasons why a comparative case studies 
design is the most relevant choice. First, it is difficult to obtain a larger sample of 
cases given the complexity of measuring the ‘dependent variable’. As will be 
shown in Chapter 3, the way and extent NPM has emerged cannot be measured in a 
way that is useful and meaningful in a large-N, quantitative design. Second, I 
explore the interaction between actors and institutions on different levels of 
observation to enhance understanding of the relationship between the different 
variables.  
2.8 Research design: new institutionalism as framework of interpretation 
New institutionalism provides useful frameworks to interpret the interaction 
between actors and institutions, but it does not offer a conclusive answer to how 
institutions affect actor preferences. I do not claim to test institutionalist theory, but 
use insights from its specific approaches to understand how and to what extent 
actors and institutions are related to the specific emergence of NPM in the hospital 
payment systems. Both rational institutionalism and historical institutionalism are 
relevant as interpreting frameworks. A rational institutionalist approach is useful 
for interpreting actor preferences and related behavior in specific institutional 
contexts. It is main argument is that actors act as rational as possible given their 
specific ‘room to maneuver’ (cf. Keman 1998). Rational institutionalism has 
however problems with ‘non-rational’ changes (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Hence, it 
has difficulties in explaining how new payment systems ‘abruptly’ have emerged in 
relatively rigid policy domains.  
 A historical institutionalist approach is particularly useful for interpreting 
punctuations in rigid policy domains. The main shortcoming of historical 
institutionalism is its unclear assumptions about the interaction between institutions 
and actor behavior. Some combine the ‘calculus approach’ from the rational 
institutionalists with a ‘cultural approach’: i.e. actors are bounded in their specific 
worldview (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939). The historical institutionalist approach has 
been particularly used in case studies that employ thick, historical analysis. 
However, it has been shown to be a useful framework for comparative studies too 
(Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 694).  
 Border crossing between institutional approaches is not new (Thelen, 1999). 
As noted above, it is argued that historical institutionalists borrow assumptions 
from both sociological institutionalism and rational institutionalism to interpret 
actor behavior. In addition, Peters et al (2005) argue that historical institutionalism 
would gain from some form of agency. Hence, he asks for a stricter way of 
interpreting actor behavior in their specific settings. He argues that the emergence 
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of NPM cannot be understand without some form of agency for the neo-liberal 
ideas (Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005: 1293). Scharpf (2000: 770-771) argues that 
using a specific institutionalist framework leads too deterministic results. He states 
that actor preferences should be treated as a theoretically distinct category: i.e. 
preferences are influenced, but not determined by the institutional setting in which 
interactions occur.  
 Instead of taking one particular type, I consider the institutionalist 
frameworks complementarily and assess particularly how far the new 
institutionalist explanations travel by analyzing to what extent and how actors and 
institutions account for variation in reforms. As outlined above, I explore the 
preferences and related behavior of political parties and medical profession and 
compare the emerging patterned variation between the countries. I do not treat 
preferences as exogenous and given, but relate them to their specific context. 
Hence, it is analyzed to what extent NPM can be seen as an ideational feature that 
together with economic problems creates a critical juncture in health care policy 
and to what extent actors have the capacity to forward their preferences under these 
circumstances.  
2.9 Research design: case selection 
Well-founded case selection is crucial in a comparative case studies design. Indeed, 
some of the often-mentioned problems of small-N studies relate to the methods by 
which cases are selected (cf. King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). Although small-N 
studies cannot cope with the requirements of statistical models, they nevertheless 
provide specific opportunities for research. In small-N studies, cases are seen as 
complex, yet meaningful, configurations of events and structures (Ragin, 2004: 
125). In this section, I provide the motivation behind my  selection of cases for 
which I try to trace the processes that have occurred (cf. Rothstein, 2007; Seawright 
and Gerring, 2008).  
 Case selection is a much debated topic in the methodology literature. 
Lijphart (1971) distinguishes six types of case selection and Gerring (2007) an 
astonishing nine. Lijphart (1971: 687) demonstrates several ways to solve the 
‘small-N many variables’ problem. One option is to focus on ‘comparable cases’, 
i.e. cases that are similar in a large number of important characteristics but 
dissimilar regarding the key variables that one wants to relate to each other.  
 My case selection is based on this idea and follows what Gerring (2007) calls 
a diverse cases design. The cases, which are expected to be representative in the 
minimal sense, are chosen to capture the full variation in the population on the 
variables that I want to relate to the variation in new hospital payment systems. 
This type of case study is particularly relevant for generating and testing 
hypotheses (Gerring, 2007: 89). As noted, both exploration and hypothesis testing 
are applied in this study: a direct, simple causal relationship is (dis)confirmed, and 
subsequently other aspects, i.e. the interaction between actor preferences,related 
NPM as public-private shift in health care 
31 
 
behavior and institutions, of the cases are studied to gain a better understanding 
better of the variation in the new hospital payment systems.  
 The cases Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, represent the population of 
Western European countries with a public health service in which new hospital 
payment systems based on DRG are introduced.  In these systems, every inpatient 
care is classified by diagnosis, procedure, age of patient and condition in which the 
patient left the hospital (Fetter and Freeman, 1986; Lungen and Lauterbach, 2000). 
Hospitals are rewarded for productivity, as an increase in activity will increase 
payments. The prices for each case are usually determined irrespective of the real 
costs (cf. Jegers, Kesteloot, De Graeve, and Gilles, 2002; Schreyögg, Stargardt, 
Tiemann, and Busse, 2006). DRG systems facilitate NPM in several ways, e.g. by 
focusing on efficiency, by shifting accountability to the health care providers and 
by enhancing the possibilities for competitive contracting (see Chapter 3). Table 
2.3 shows how the policy processes developed through time in the three cases. 
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Table 2.3 The implementation of new hospital payment systems 
Country  Year and decision 
The Netherlands  2000: Request research Diagnose Behandel 
Combinaties (DBC)  
2001: Project DBC 
2005: official start DBC-system 
2008-9: Budget component (fixed DBC 
prices) decreased to 60% , competition for 
40% of DBCs  
Germany  2001: First design “fallpauschalengesetz’1  
2002: Decision on legislation (start 
convergence phase) 
2003: Adjustment law (prolongation 
convergence phase and new rules special 
hospitals) 
2004: Second adjustment law  
2009: End of convergence phase 
UK  2000: NHS plan 
2002: Reforming the NHS financial flows 
2003: Payment by Results (PbR) 
consultation preparing for 2005  
2004: Start PbR foundation trusts  
2005: Start PbR (limited amount of 
services) 
20??: Most services under PbR 
1Fallpauschalen are difficult to translate into English. Common translations are ‘case-based lump-sum’ 
(http://www.aok-bv.de/lexicon)’, and ‘case fee’ (Busse and Riesberg, 2004: glossary). I would 
translate it as ‘case-based, all-inclusive fee’. Hospitals get remunerated a total sum of money based on 
cases with a fixed price. 
(source: Ettelt, Thomson, Nolte, and Mays, 2006) 
 
Though NPM elements can emerge in these payment systems, this is no certain 
conclusion. The assumption allows me to analyze variation in the way NPM 
emerges in these similar types of hospital payment systems. Furthermore, hospital 
payment systems incorporate all important institutional settings and actor 
constellations in a health care system, including health care providers, third actor 
payments, patients and the state (Busse, Schreyögg, and Smith, 2006). Germany, 
the UK and the Netherlands introduced new hospital payment systems in the same 
period (2002-2007) and are therefore likely to be similarly affected by external 
factors, such as economic conditions and the influence of international 
organizations (e.g. the OECD, the WHO and the EU), but they have different 
political and health care institutional settings. My cases illuminate the full range of 
synchronic variation on ‘the independent variable’. 
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 Figures 2.3-2.6 demonstrate that the countries have had comparable 
economic positions and the main differences exist in the degree of public health 
care spending. Germany has spent a large proportion of its GDP on health care in 
comparison to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The large financial 
constrain of the unification is probably the most likely explanation (cf. Altenstetter, 
2003), i.e. it might be an indication that cost containment is a more important 
health care policy goal in Germany compared to the other cases. However, despite 
this, Germany’s political and health care institutional setting makes it a relevant 
case. 
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Figure 2.3 Age dependency index in OECD countries (OECD, 2007) 
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Figure 2.4 Public spending on health among OECD countries (OECD, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
8,0
9,0
K
o
r
e
a
M
e
x
i
c
o
P
o
l
a
n
d
S
l
o
v
a
k
 
R
e
p
.
G
r
e
e
c
e
T
u
r
k
e
y
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
S
p
a
i
n
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
I
t
a
l
y
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
.
J
a
p
a
n
N
.
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
C
a
n
a
d
a
U
S
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
U
K
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
S
w
e
d
e
n
N
o
r
w
a
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
Public spending on health, in percentage of GDP 
(2003/2004)
mean oecd
plus one standard deviation 
minus one standard deviation
Seeking a balance?! 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Total spending on health care among OECD countries (OECD, 2007) 
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Figure 2.6 National income per capita (OECD, 2007) 
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As argued, the cases represent three specific institutional contexts in Western 
Europe, i.e. a state-led health care system in a centralized political system, an 
insurance-based system in a centralized political system and an insurance-based 
system in a federal political system. The cases differ with respect to several 
political and health care institutional settings (see Table 2.4), which determine the 
extent to which the government has to share powers with other actors (cf. Jordan, 
forthcoming; Lijphart, 1999). The only other useful case would be a state-led health 
care system in a federal political system. Unfortunately, such a case does not exist.  
 According to the specific problems in health care policy, one would probably 
expect that NPM is particularly popular in Germany. However, I assume that if the 
emergence of NPM is related to the specific institutional setting, it will emerge to 
the largest extent in the UK, to a moderate extent in the Netherlands and to the 
smallest extent in Germany. As will be shown in Chapter 3, NPM has emerged 
differently than assumed by the ‘power-sharing hypothesis’, particularly in the 
Netherlands. In other words, a direct causal relationship between institutions and 
the variation in health care reforms cannot be drawn.  
 
Table 2.4 Polity and health care characteristics 
Polity 
characteristics 
UK   Netherlands Germany  
State structure Unitary state1 Unitary state2  Federal state 
Parliament 
structure  
Asymmetrical 
bicameralism 
Asymmetrical 
bicameralism 
Symmetrical 
bicameralism 
Majoritary- 
consensus system 
Majority system  Consensus 
system  
Consensus 
system  
Party government 
structure  
Single party 
government 
Coalition 
government  
Coalition 
government3  
Health care 
system 
National health  Insurance based 
system,  
Insurance based 
system,  
State tradition  Anglo-Saxon French-
Napoleonic 
Germanic 
Notes: Characteristics shared between cases are underlined.  
1Although devolution matters for this specific reform and the new hospital payment system has only 
emerged in England, the decision-making is played out in a unitary context (Budge, 2002: 18).   
2Keman (2002: 232)  states that the Netherlands is unitary and decentralized at the same time, but that 
the ultimate regulating powers rest with central authorities. The latter is particularly the case in health 
care. For this reason, the Netherlands can safely be characterized here as unitary state.  
3The German chancellor has – legally – a more powerful position than the Dutch and British prime 
ministers. I assume that the role of the Chancellor has no specific role in this policy process. 
(sources: Colomer, 2002; Lijphart, 1999) 
` 
 As discussed in the theoretical sections of this chapter, scholars of NPM and 
welfare state reforms have identified (social-democratic) parties as important actors 
in reforms (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2002b). In all three countries included in the study, 
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the social-democratic party has been in the coalition either for the whole policy 
process (Germany and the United Kingdom) or for a considerable time period (the 
Netherlands from 1998-2002). For this reason, I argue that the responses of the 
social-democratic parties affect the outcomes of reform. In addition, I assume that 
the institutional characteristics are relevant in relating the party preferences to the 
way NPM has emerged. They determine political parties’ room to maneuver (cf. 
Colomer, 2002; Keman, 1997). This means that similar party families in different 
countries might not react in the same manner, since they are embedded in different 
structures (see Table 2.4)8.  
 Table 2.5 shows that the cases depict two specific public health care systems 
and three specific party system configurations. They do not represent the ‘perfect’ 
diverse cases design, because other combinations are possible, e.g. a national health 
service with a ‘Dutch’ party system configuration1. Although this makes the results 
less valid for the whole population of countries, there is sufficient variation among 
the cases to obtain meaningful results. Based on the variation in the new payment 
systems, one can expect that at least in the Netherlands and probably in the UK, 
social-democratic parties have been willing to introduce NPM in health care 
reforms.  
 
Table 2.5 Case characteristics: Health care and political system 
 UK Netherlands2  Germany 
Health care 
system: 
purchasers/funding 
National health 
service: large tax 
based financing 
Insurance system: 
public (70%) and 
(obligatory) 
private (30%)  
Insurance system: 
public (88%), 
(voluntary) private 
(12%) 
Political system: 
Party 
configuration 
United market-
liberals versus 
united social-
democrats 
Three-way divide 
between liberals, 
centre and social-
democrats 
Relatively weak 
liberals, strong 
centre and strong 
social-democrats 
(sources: Kitschelt, 2001).  
Note: Shared characteristics are bold.  
 
Additionally, the cases differ in specific institutional settings that are relevant for 
understanding the interaction between the government and the medical profession. I 
contend that negotiation strategies of the medical bodies depend partly on the 
preferences of the medical profession and partly on the institutional setting, i.e. the 
rules of the game. The specific institutional settings that are considered important 
for understanding the negotiation strategies of the medical profession are: first, 
clinical discretion - the extent to which the medical profession can set its own 
                                                        
1
 See for further details Chapter 4  
2
 This describes the situation until 2006 (which was the situation when the new hospital payment 
system was implemented).  
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standards; second, economic autonomy - the extent to which physicians can affect 
their ‘salary’; and third, joint decision-making - the extent to which the medical 
bodies are involved in decision-making (see Table 2.6).  
 Germany and the Netherlands have relatively similar institutional settings in 
comparison to the UK. Gerring (2007: 89) argues that cases can also be as diverse 
as possible on the combination X/Y. The cases represent: a case where the medical 
profession has an important (formal) position in the decision-making process and 
where NPM has emerged to a large extent (The Netherlands), a case where the 
medical profession has a formal position and where NPM has emerged to a small 
extent and in a specific way (Germany), and a case where the medical profession 
has no formal role and NPM has emerged to a large extent (the UK). 
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Table 2.6 Case characteristics: The institutional settings of the relationship 
between the medical profession and the state 
Institutional 
settings 
Netherlands Germany UK 
Economic 
autonomy 
70% of physicians 
are independent 
entrepreneurs 
(mainly in 
hospitals); the rest 
are employed by 
hospitals 
Approx. 50% of 
physicians work in  
hospitals, mainly 
salaried employees, 
with some mixed 
forms; the remaining 
50% works in 
ambulatory care, 
mainly office-based 
physicians  
NHS physicians are 
salaried 
Medical 
bodies 
 
Corporate body 
negotiates the 
(hourly) tariff, but 
this is determined 
by the Dutch health 
authority; hospitals 
negotiate with 
insurance 
companies about 
DBC’s 
Statutory Health 
Insurance (SHI) bodies 
negotiate tariffs; unions 
are also relevant in the 
hospital sector 
British Medical 
Association (BMA) 
negotiates about 
contracts with the 
Department of Health 
and NHS, consultant’s 
contract. 
 
Decision-
making 
Joint decision-
making: medical 
profession 
developed DBC 
system; involved in 
the maintenance 
Joint decision-making, 
SHI bodies (including 
medical profession, 
sickness funds and 
Hospital Society) were 
obliged to choose a 
new payment system; 
involved in the 
maintenance 
No (official) joint 
decision-making 
State-
profession 
relationship 
Government 
depends to a large 
extent on the 
corporate bodies 
Government depends 
to a large extent on the 
corporate bodies 
Government only partly 
depends on the medical 
profession, e.g. clinical 
directors 
(sources: Giaimo, 2002: 86-106; Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008; Lombarts and Klazinga, 2001).  
Notes: Shared characteristics are bold. 
 
Chapter 5 explores whether the interactions between the medical bodies and the 
government in different institutional settings are related to the outcomes of the new 
hospital payment system reform. According to the way NPM has emerged in the 
payment systems, I assume that medical strategies in the Netherlands focus more 
on problem solving than in Germany, despite the comparable institutional contexts. 
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In the UK, medical strategies are less relevant for explaining the outcomes, due to 
the limited involvement of the medical bodies in the policy process.  
 In sum, the following empirical chapters explore to what extent and how 
institutions and actors affect health care policy with a new institutionalist 
framework. Together, they form a comparative case study to explain variation in 
the emergence of NPM in new hospital payment systems. As outlined in the next 
section, the empirical chapters analyze the specific factors at different levels of 
observation and with different research techniques.  
2.10  Research design: Data and methods 
There is a frequent confusion regarding types of evidence, data collection and 
research strategies (Gerring, 2007; Yin, 1981: 58). Although a comparative case 
study provides the opportunity to garner a complete picture of the cases, this does 
not imply that the types of evidence and data collection must be qualitative in 
nature. A case study can also be done with quantitative data (cf. Vietorisz and 
Harrison, 1970). In this study, both quantitative and qualitative research techniques 
are used to address the research questions. 
 A case study allows one to approach the research problem from different 
units of observation (Gerring, 2007; Mahoney, 2000). Depending on the research 
question and the number of meaningful observations that can be made within a 
case, the data collection and the subsequent research techniques are more 
qualitative or quantitative in nature. In contrast to some comparative case studies 
which present broad and case-by-case reports, the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation are devoted to specific sub-questions across all three cases. In this 
section, I provide a short overview of the data collection and methods; both are 
further discussed in the chapters that follow.  
 By means of systematic document analysis, Chapter 3 demonstrates the 
degree and manner in which NPM has emerged in the policy documents of the new 
payment systems. The results show that NPM does not emerge in accordance with 
the state tradition and the way powers are formally shared. The extent to which 
NPM elements have emerged in the Netherlands, for example, is particularly 
remarkable. In addition, the focus in the German plans on efficiency, cost 
containment and the absence of competition is a notable finding.  
 In Chapter 4, the observations follow from a textual analysis of party 
manifestos (1986-2006) and parliamentary debates (1998-2004). With Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression, the saliency to different elements of NPM and 
health care of parties are compared between and within cases. The limited number 
of countries allows for a more in-depth study of the role of the different social-
democratic parties in specific contexts. However, the limited number also restricts 
generalizations. The results show that governmental parties can further their 
preferences. The party configuration and health care system are important to 
understand how politics is shaped and therefore how NPM has emerged.  
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 Chapter 5 employs different types of sources to get insight how preferences 
and related behavior of the medical profession matters. By means of an expert 
questionnaire, document analysis, a close reading of the contributions to 
professional journals and studying a review of the secondary literature, the 
perceptions and strategies of the medical bodies are analyzed. The results show that 
medical strategies are related to the outcomes – politics matters - but depend 
heavily on the specific institutional position of the medical body. The strategy of 
the Dutch medical body has facilitated the way NPM has emerged. In Germany and 
the UK, the medical profession had more aggressive, uncooperative styles, but 
these strategies resulted in different outcomes. The specific institutional settings 
have affected whether the strategies have been effective; i.e. actors and institutions 
are both necessary to explain outcomes of health care reforms. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the research design of this dissertation. I 
argued how NPM would change the PA-relationships between health care actors 
and the type of governance. Implementing NPM leads to a public-private shift in 
the health care sector and is no ‘blueprint’ for enhancing the performance of the 
health care sector. A public-private shift affects the main preferences of the 
political and sectoral actors and will lead to political conflict. However, political 
conflict does not take place in a vacuum, but in a specific political institutional 
context.  
 The main argument of this dissertation is that the interaction between actor 
preferences, related behavior and institutions explain variation between the new 
hospital payment systems. New institutionalism has provided useful frameworks 
for interpreting the interaction between actors and institutions. I argued why 
combining assumptions from the historical institutionalist and rational 
institutionalist frameworks is meaningful to explain variation between different 
institutional contexts. Preferences of actors should be studied as a separate 
category, but not exogenous from their specific institutional context.  
 Political parties and the medical bodies are the actors that are taken into 
account in this dissertation. First, I argued that preferences of political parties affect 
the reforms and these preferences are affected by the specific party configuration 
and health care system. Second, medical organizations are mentioned as actors that 
affect health care reforms. I argued that their preferences and related behavior need 
to be studied in tandem with their specific institutional position in relation to the 
government to understand the way NPM has emerged.  
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 The comparative design that was presented in the second half of this chapter 
allows for analyzing the way NPM has emerged in new hospital payment systems 
in three different cases, i.e. diversity of actors, institutions and outcomes. In the 
next chapters, first, it is studied whether the variation the new hospital payment 
systems can be explained without taking actors into account. Second, I explore the 
preferences of political parties and relate them to the specific institutional settings. 
Third, the negotiation styles of the medical bodies are studied in tandem with the 
specific institutional settings.  
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3. THE EMERGENCE OF NPM IN HEALTH CARE 
3.1 Introduction 
How can the state preserve or even improve the quality of health care without a 
huge increase in cost? In the 1980s and 1990s, similar questions about the public 
sector and welfare state provoked debates about the size and role of the state in 
public sector provision. Inspired by a particular set of economic theories and values 
mainly focusing on enhancing efficiency (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001), NPM 
emerged as an ideational movement to address such questions.  
 In NPM, elements such as increased competition, devolution, managerialism 
and the use of contracts occur simultaneously (cf. Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; 
Hood, 1995; Lane, 2005). Contemporary studies have asked to what extent NPM 
can be considered a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution (cf. Hood and Peters, 2004), i.e. is it 
applicable in every public sector and in different countries? Proponents of NPM 
consider it the solution for more efficient service provision, offering the possibility 
for services of equivalent or even superior quality but at lower or equal costs. In 
short, restructuring health care services by means of NPM holds the potential to 
fight bureaucracy and to create greater choice. Yet others view NPM as a neo-
liberal attempt to dismantle the welfare state, e.g. by disguising cutbacks. 
According to these critics, NPM results in a decrease in the quality of public 
services (Green-Pedersen, 2002b). Moreover, Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 
(2004) argue that implementing NPM would lead to a horizontal shift in 
governance, creating a separation between the functions of policymaking, policy 
implementation, enforcement and control (i.e. a shift from a ‘command-and-
control’ state towards information management). This shift has the danger of 
generating new problems related to governability, accountability, responsiveness 
and legitimacy in the (welfare) state. 
 This chapter examines the variation in the new hospital payment systems in 
different political and health care contexts: the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. 
One avenue of research would be to compare why rather different countries have 
converged to a similar type of payment system. Harrison et al. (2002), for instance, 
question why different actors in different environments (the UK and United States) 
have converged towards ‘scientific-bureaucratic medicine’. According to these 
authors ideational convergence, i.e. similar ways of ‘framing the problem’ and 
similar intellectual underpinnings of the proposed solution, offers a possible 
explanation.  
 Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons why it is more interesting to 
study the variation in payment systems rather than their convergence. First, I argue 
NPM is not an ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution (cf. Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). 
This means that variation in the payment systems is more likely than similarity. 
Second, policy convergence may have quite distinctive explanations, making 
consensus about what exactly policy convergence entails, problematic, if not 
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impossible (cf. Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer, 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; 
Knill, 2005). Furthermore, public sector and welfare state studies have shown that 
reforms tend to vary enormously among countries rather than being similar.  
This chapter has two goals: establishing how NPM has emerged in the new 
payment systems and to ascertain that the different institutional settings alone 
cannot account for the variation. It addresses the following sub-questions:  
 
• To what extent and how has variation occurred in the emergence of 
NPM elements in the new  hospital payment systems of Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK?  
• To what extent is the variation between new hospital payment systems of 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK explained by state tradition and 
the institutional characteristics of the political and health care systems? 
 
The interactions between actors and institutions invoke differences between 
hospital payment systems although they originate from the same ‘ideational shift’, 
i.e. NPM (cf. Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005).  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss what factors 
might be decisive for reform. The third section outlines why NPM is a relevant 
concept for analyzing variation in health care reforms. Subsequently, I elaborate 
my choice for analyzing reforms in hospital payment systems and I outline the 
conceptual framework and operationalization for comparing the emergence of 
NPM further. To preview the results, the analysis of policy documents shows that 
variation is indeed found and it is somewhat different from what one would expect 
given the particular political systems and health care state organizations.  
3.2 Institutional settings and reform 
Comparative studies on welfare state and public sectors reforms offer several 
explanations for variance in policy outcomes, focusing on cross-national structural 
differences. The most important are: variation in political systems (cf. Bonoli, 
2001; Immergut, 1992a; Swank, 2001), state traditions, i.e. organizational features 
and the forms of procedures in state organizations (cf. Peters, 1997; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004; Resen, 1998) and welfare state structures (cf. Swank, 2001). 
Although the explanatory power of actor behavior is discussed by several scholars, 
many argue that despite political support, structural factors are to a large extent 
responsible for reforms (cf. Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Lieverdink, 2001). Hacker 
(2004), for instance, predicts that on the basis of their medical systems and the 
structure of their decision-making systems (i.e. polities), the UK should experience 
‘big legislative breakthroughs and reversals’, Germany more ‘incrementalistic 
policy making’ and the Netherlands an intermediate outcome.  
 Given their different state traditions, political systems and health care 
systems, the three countries provide excellent cases for my analysis. Additionally, 
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they introduced new hospital payment systems in the same period (2002-2007) and 
are likely similarly affected by external factors, such as economic conditions and 
the influence of international organizations (e.g. the OECD, the WHO and the EU). 
In other words, the countries are similarly exposed to NPM.   
 In sum, this chapter examines to which extents NPM elements have emerged 
in the three countries. We expect the emergence of NPM to the greatest extent in 
the UK and to the least extent in Germany, with the Netherlands experiencing an 
intermediate outcome. As elaborated above, the reasons for this stem from 
fundamental differences in these countries state traditions, political structures and 
health care systems. The UK has an Anglo-Saxon state tradition, which is more 
receptive for NPM elements, as well as a hierarchical, centralized health care 
organization and a majoritarian political system. In contrast, NPM elements would 
emerge to a lesser extent in Germany, which has a Germanic state tradition, a self-
regulated health care organization and a political system based on consensus and 
separation of powers. Finally, this chapter explores whether the Netherlands will 
have an intermediate outcome because this country has a unitary state structure and 
asymmetrical bicameralism (like the UK) and a coalition government and a self-
governed health care system (like Germany) (see also Table 2.4).  
3.3 NPM: The development of a ‘paradigm’ 
Though NPM continues to be relevant for contemporary research, the term ‘new’ is 
increasingly a misnomer, as the concept has changed over the years. NPM used to 
be a ‘new’ approach superseding traditional ‘old’ public administration. But it has 
shifted to a new logic with specific values and recently to a combination of market 
oriented philosophy combined with managerial thinking, in contrast to the 
professional bureaucracy (Hood and Peters, 2004). The emergence of NPM has 
been widely explored in public sector reforms, but little research has been done 
with regard to welfare state and health care reforms outside of the UK (cf. Ferlie, 
Ashburner, Fitzgerald et al., 1996; Green-Pedersen, 2002b).  
 Hood (1991) defines NPM as two different streams of ideas: new 
institutional economics and managerialism. Furthermore, Lane (2005) mentions 
two additional theories that are behind NPM: the Chicago School of Economics 
and PA-studies, both focusing on the relationship between the state and service 
delivery and the relationship between the state and its citizens (the customers of the 
services). Scholars of public choice and the Chicago School of Economics show 
that bureaucracy does not work and demonstrate why market-inspired mechanisms 
are needed to run the public sector efficiently (cf. Lane, 2005; Niskanen, 1971; 
Stigler, 1988).  
 The specific content of NPM has changed over the years. Ferlie et al. (1996), 
for instance, illustrate that the concept is comprehensive and unstable, and define 
four models of NPM in the 1990s. Nevertheless, several elements of NPM form its 
core and have remained recognizable during the evolution of the concept, namely 
contracting, decentralization or deregulation, emphasis on outputs and outcomes, 
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client-centeredness, efficiency, and contestability or marketization (cf. Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2001: ; Lane, 2005). The elements show a contradiction between the 
centralizing tendencies (for instance, explicit measures for performance) that are 
inherent in contractualism and the devolutionary tendencies of managerialism 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). 
 The main criticisms of NPM focus on two aspects. The first is that the 
underlying normative values, derived from the Chicago School of Economics and 
public choice, are not universal solutions for problems in the public sector, as 
outlined in Chapter 2. A more intense focus on the efficiency of health care, as 
implied by NPM, might make it more difficult to ensure universal access of citizens 
to high-quality health care services. For this reason, opponents often see the 
introduction of NPM as a neo-liberal attempt to hollow out the welfare state 
(Green-Pedersen, 2002b). In Chapter 2, I linked NPM to ‘shifts in governance’ and 
theories about PA-relationships, and argued that NPM is no blueprint to improve 
the performance of the health care sector, since it affects the balances between 
health care goals and leads to different PA-problems. Hence, introducing new 
hospital payment systems is politically vulnerable.  
 Second, the tensions that are caused by the dual character of NPM have led 
to questions about the universal applicability of NPM, since focusing on 
depoliticization might easily lead to the opposite effect. Since public managers are 
not totally autonomous from political direction, applying NPM may lead to 
differentiated roles and to the (contestation of) allocation of risks of blame between 
public servants and politicians (Hood, 2001; Hood and Peters, 2004). Additionally, 
although aimed at deregulation, NPM forces the introduction of control 
mechanisms since political executives fear losing control over the implementation 
process (Hood and Peters, 2004). Finally, administrative costs do not decrease but 
increase, as actors have to invest and comply with new rules. In other words, 
introducing NPM in the health care sector is likely to have unintended negative 
consequences rather than being the solution to problems such as rising costs and 
waiting lists. 
3.4 Conceptualizing NPM in hospital payment systems 
I outline in this section that NPM elements can be expected to emerge in DRG-
based hospital payment systems, but not necessarily in similar ways. I focus on the 
implementation of new hospital payment systems, since these are building blocks 
of any health care system, introducing powerful incentives for the behavior of 
actors in the system (Busse, Schreyögg, and Smith, 2006). Moreover, reforms 
usually involve changes in the relationships between all actors in the health care 
field, including providers, purchasers, patients and the state. The payment systems 
are either nation-specific Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) systems, as in 
Germany, or systems based on the likeminded ideas but which code hospital 
episodes in a different way, as the ‘payment by results’ system in the UK and the 
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so-called DBC system in the Netherlands. The latter, for instance, incorporates 
outpatient care in its coding scheme.  
 The use of DRG payment systems became more prevalent in the 1980s and 
1990s and has taken on a variety of forms (Fetter and Freeman, 1986; Leister and 
Stausberg, 2005; Lungen and Lauterbach, 2000). In some cases, the systems have 
been mainly symbolic, inducing little real change in the way the hospital sector is 
governed, while in other cases they have provided the basis for privatization of the 
hospital sector. The rationale behind all systems is that hospitals earn money if they 
treat patients for less than the DRG-tariff (cf. Fetter and Freeman, 1986). Though 
NPM elements can emerge in DRG-based payment systems, this is no forgone 
conclusion. This assumption allows me to analyze variation in the way NPM 
emerges in these similar types of hospital payment systems.  
 I argue that NPM can be adopted in DRG based payment systems in three 
ways. The first and most obvious is that NPM implies enhancing efficiency, 
particularly by increasing the emphasis on outputs and outcomes (Lane, 2005: 6). 
In health care policy, more emphasis on outputs and outcomes is usually sought by 
extending auditing systems, e.g. by introducing more transparent methods of 
performance review (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald et al., 1996: 11). DRG systems 
are specifically designed to obtain better information about the performance of 
hospitals. An increased focus on efficiency is likely to emerge if the policy plans 
contain specific ideas and measures about, for example, the extension of auditing 
and transparency.  
 The second way concerns the change in accountability, suggesting that 
shifting accountability towards service providers and purchasers is a major feature 
of NPM (cf. Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; Lane, 2005). The government no 
longer directly controls or governs public sector providers, but instead becomes a 
contractor (Lane, 2005). It remains the principal in the PA-relation with the health 
care providers, but its role has changed. DRG-based payment systems might 
facilitate contracting in several ways, e.g. by allowing hospitals to determine what 
they actually have to offer to contractors. The increased stress on provider 
responsiveness to customers is an example of a shift of accountability (Ferlie, 
Ashburner, Fitzgerald et al., 1996: 11). In addition, a DRG system supports 
customer orientation by allowing for benchmarking (hospitals can more easily be 
compared) and patient choice (money can follow the patient).  
 Finally, introducing NPM might lead to (more) marketization and 
competition in health care provision. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the 
introduction of a DRG system might allow hospitals to enter competitive contracts 
about price, volume and quality with purchasers and might allow competition 
among patients (money can follow the patient). Second, DRG systems might allow 
private (or for-profit) hospitals to be paid from public money, i.e. they can “sell” 
DRGs (a certain hospital episode, e.g. cataract surgery) to insurance companies or 
public purchasers. Exploration of the variation in the hospital payment systems 
may reveal that plans have a particular focus on efficiency, competition and/or a 
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shift in accountability towards service providers. Hence, payment systems may 
affect the accessibility or quality of health care and the way the state is involved in 
health care organization.  
Table 3.1 NPM elements as conceptual framework1 
 Performance accountability  Efficiency  
Aims Accountable for performance  
 
Empowerment of service users 
Efficiency  
 
Transparency 
 Competition 
Privatization 
Measurers Choice 
 
Bench-marking   
 
Deregulation 
Standards and measures of 
performance 
 
Contracting in 
The degree to which markets are actually established 
Notes: Elements based on Flynn (2002), Hood (1991) and Lane (2000), used as examples that possibly 
emerge in DRG based hospital payment systems. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the conceptual framework of this chapter. The ideas and 
measures are presented in the rows, while the columns differentiate NPM elements 
into those focusing on increasing efficiency and those focusing more on 
performance accountability. The NPM elements that focus on marketization and 
competition merge both columns, since by introducing competition elements, 
policy makers simultaneously aim at increasing performance accountability of 
health care providers for their performance and at enhancing efficiency. The 
elements mentioned in Table 3.1 are examples of the aims and measures of NPM 
that one expects to find in policy plans2 about DRG based hospital payment 
systems. Placing ideas and measures in the different boxes of the analytical scheme 
provides a clearer picture of how NPM has emerged. It highlights whether or not 
variation in aims and measures has developed with respect to new hospital 
payments systems.  
 Although in some cases the policy plans do not clearly separate between 
ideas and measures, I distinguish between them in the conceptual framework. It is 
possible that governments have had quite similar ideas about the aims of the new 
payment systems but have proposed quite different measures to reach these. Hence, 
                                            
1
 Note that Table 3.1 is somewhat different from Table 2.2. In this Chapter I analyze how NPM has 
emerged in new hospital payment systems, while in Chapter 2, I showed how the NPM elements are 
related to public-private shifts and shifts in accountability.  
2
 Please note that not the outcomes of the reforms are studied but the policy plans. Since, this 
dissertation has been written between 2004 and 2008, the outcomes of the systems were not yet 
known.  
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the variation between the ideas and the measures is studied to understand how 
NPM is given shape in the new hospital payment systems. The next sections shortly 
outline how the policy processes developed and compare the ideas in the policy 
plans and, the policy measures of the new payment systems. 
3.5 Policy processes compared 
The policy processes show variation between the countries, particularly with regard 
to the way actors have been involved in the processes. This variation mirrors how 
the political and health care systems constitute the power sharing between political 
and health care actors. Decision-making in Germany and the Netherlands takes 
place in close co-operation between the government and interest organizations, 
while in the UK decisions are taken more hierarchically. In Germany, the medical 
profession and sickness funds organizations constitute the self-regulated structures 
that operate the financing and delivering of benefits covered by statutory health 
insurance (Busse and Riesberg, 2004). These organizations were responsible for 
developing a new system for hospital remuneration compulsory for all hospitals 
and other health care providers. They chose to create a nation-specific DRG system 
which is partly based on the Australian DRG system (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2001b).  
 As in Germany, interest organizations have been involved in defining and 
implementing health care policy in the Netherlands (Harrison, 2004). Medical 
specialists started as early as 1994 with the development of the DBC system. This 
system turned out to be remarkably similar to DRG coding, but it incorporates 
outpatient care as well as fees for medical specialists. It was not until 2000, 
however, that the Dutch ministry decided to implement the DBC system 
(Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport, 2006). In contrast, the NHS has 
more hierarchical forms of decision-making and top-down implementation (Ham, 
2004), meaning that interest organizations are likely to be less directly involved in 
the policy process compared to similar groups in the other two countries. 
 The new payment systems are either embedded in a general reform plan or 
emerge simultaneously with other health care reforms. In Germany and the UK, the 
introduction of the new hospital systems has been clearly part of a larger general 
reform plan. The German health care reform bill (Gesundheitsreformgesetz), 
implemented in January 2000, provided the first legal basis for developing a new 
payment system (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999). And in 2001, the first draft of the 
new DRG-system was created (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a). The bill to install the 
new system was accepted in both chambers of parliament in April 2002. In the UK 
the white papers – The NHS plan: a plan for investment, a plan for reform 
(Department of Health, 2000) and Delivering the NHS plan: next steps on 
investment, next steps on reform (Department of Health, 2002b) – have provided 
the basis for the country’s new hospital payment system.  
 In the case of the Netherlands, the new payment system originated from a 
general reform plan that was already developed in 1994 but that was never fully 
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implemented (cf. Lieverdink, 2001). Simultaneously with the implementation of 
the DBC system, the insurance structure was reformed: the dual system of sickness 
fund and private insurance has been replaced by a compulsory basic insurance 
executed by voluntary organizations (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en 
Sport, 2005).  
 Finally, the extent to which the new systems differed from the old payment 
systems varies extensively. In the UK, the change in the payment system mainly 
involved a shift in the content of contracts between hospitals and purchasers. 
Hospitals are refunded for work actually done on the basis of a national tariff, with 
compensation for unavoidable high costs (Department of Health, 2003). In contrast, 
before the implementation of the new systems, hospitals in Germany and the 
Netherlands were refunded using a completely different mechanism. The Dutch 
health care system had a budgeting system in which hospitals received budgets 
based on specific calculations and fixed costs (Den Exter, Hermans, Dosjlak, and 
Busse, 2004). In Germany, the DRG system has replaced the mix of 
reimbursements per diem, per case and for expensive procedures (Busse and 
Riesberg, 2004). The DRG system is now the sole system for financing recurrent 
expenditures in German hospitals (Busse and Riesberg, 2004). Although the 
decisions were taken under different polity structures, the decision-making 
processes have taken place in a similar period (around 2002) in all three countries, 
however, the consultation period, as for instance in the Netherlands, could have 
been rather lengthy. 
 The implementation phases, i.e. the time it takes for the systems to come into 
effect, are fairly similar in the three countries. In the Netherlands, the new system 
quickly began to function as the sole budgeting system for acute hospital care, but a 
convergence phase has been introduced for price competition. In comparison, the 
German and British governments have introduced rather extensive convergence 
phases, i.e. hospitals are still receiving stable budgets and not all hospital episodes 
are incorporated into the system yet. The convergence phases are supposed to end 
in 2009 (see also Table 2.3).  
3.6 Comparing the aims of the new hospital systems 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the variation in NPM elements that 
have emerged in hospital payment systems and to examine whether variation can 
be explained from the health care and political contexts or whether other factors 
should also be considered. The characteristics of NPM make it possible to 
distinguish three types of elements that might emerge in DRG-based hospital 
payment systems: elements focusing on efficiency by means of governmental 
control over outputs and transparency, elements aimed at making health care 
providers and purchasers more accountable for their performance, and elements 
addressing marketization and competition. Tables 3.2-3.4 present how ideas and 
measures within the policy plans are divided among the categories. 
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Table 3.2 Aims and measures of the German DRG-system 
 Accountability of results  Public-Private shift  
Aims Shift to payment on the basis 
of achievement  
 
Efficient and effective 
resource use  
 
Cost-effectiveness  
 
Transparency to improve 
quality 
Shorten hospital stays  
 
Intensify the integration of care 
 
Specialization of hospitals  
 
 
 Focus on patient preferences 
Measures Public publications on 
transparency, which are 
accessible for patients   
 
Benchmarking  
 
If hospitals do not have a 
minimal number of treatments 
of certain specialty, they are 
not remunerated for that 
specialty next year  
 
Hospitals are financed per case-
mix, in which the price per case 
is fixed 
 
Quality management developed 
by hospitals  
 
Teamwork and optimalization 
of the workforce 
(Bundesministerium für 
Gesundheit, 2007)   
 
 
 
(Sources: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2007; Deutscher Bundestag, 1999; Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001b, 2001a; Schimmelpfeng-Schütte, 2006) 
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Table 3.3 Aims and measures of the 'Payment by Result' system 
 Accountability of results  Public-private shift  
Aims Strengthen accountability to the 
public  
 
Increase  
transparency  
 
Efficient delivery 
 
Improve efficiency and value for 
money  
 
Reduction in waiting times  
 
Rewards efficiency and quality  
 
Sharper budget discipline  
 
Fair pay for health care providers  
 
Underpin the devolution of resources and 
responsibility to frontline organizations  
 
 Reward providers whose services is able to attract patients 
 
Support patient choice and encourage hospitals to respond to patient preferences 
Facilitate plurality and contestability 
Measures Providers should provide appropriate 
and transparent information to 
patients, so they can make 
appropriate health care choices   
 
Risk management arrangements in 
contracts  
 
Contract monitoring arrangements  
 
Negotiations between PCT’s and 
providers on quality and innovation  
 
More freedom for hospitals and 
PCT’s for delivering to focus on local 
needs, and by underpinning this, there 
will be a national framework of 
standards and accountability  
Setting a national price for units of 
activities based on the average NHS costs  
 
Encourage commissioners to focus on 
costs and volume  
 
Pay a price that reflects real costs  
 
Hospitals have the freedom to use the 
surpluses they generate for the benefit of 
the patients  
Reward providers for the work done   
 
Commission service from private and 
voluntary providers  
 
 
  
Encourage commissioners to provide effective care in the most appropriate setting 
Money flowing to providers in support of patient choices 
 
(Sources: Audit commission, 2004; Department of Health, 2002b, 2002a, 2003, 2004, 2005b, 2005a) 
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Table 3.4  Aims and measures of the Dutch DBC system 
 Accountability Efficiency  
Aims Integration of medical 
profession in hospital 
administration  
 
Incentives for insurer and 
health care providers to work in 
line with the preferences of the 
patients  
 
More management information  
 
Decentralised steering of health 
care  
 
More responsibility for 
sickness funds regarding the 
costs of health care  
 
 
Direct relation between costs and 
benefits  
 
Efficacy  
 
Shorten waiting times (Ministerie 
van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en 
Sport, 2003a)  
 
Decrease of administrative costs  
 
Awareness of costs for health care 
providers  
 
Transparency as the key word of 
the DBC’s (Ministerie van 
Volksgezondheid Welzijn en 
Sport, 2000, 2003a)  
 Competition 
Demand-led system 
 
Measurers More steering for insurers  
 
Introduction of risks  
 
Comparison between hospitals  
 
Negotiation on the basis of 
volume, price and quality  
 
Introduction of health authority  
Fixed tariffs for 90%, which are 
based on mean costs per patient  
 
Contracting of insurers with health care providers 
(Regulated) competition 
No fixed tariffs for 10% of the DBC’s (part of the negotiation 
process) 
Government creates a transparent market and encourages 
competition 
 
 
(Sources: DBC Onderhoud, 2007; De Geus, 2003; Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport, 
2000, 2002, 2003b, 2003a, 2003c; Project DBC, 2003) 
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 One of the main purposes of enhancing efficiency in Germany has been to 
shorten the hospital stays of patients. The government argues that there is a direct 
relationship between the length of stay and the way hospitals are remunerated (see 
Table 3.2). The English hospital plans show a clear focus on increasing efficiency 
by mentioning sharper budget discipline, reduction of waiting times and incentives 
to increase efficiency (see Table 3.3). The Dutch plans also centre on efficiency, 
e.g. by means of shortening waiting times, decreasing administrative costs and 
focusing on efficacy (see Table 3.4).   
 The three countries demonstrate variation with regard to shifts in 
accountability. The German policy plans place relatively little weight on this NPM 
element. Although the plans mention that hospitals and insurance companies are to 
be held more accountable for their performance by being rewarded on output 
instead of costs, no explicit ideas are presented in which hospitals or insurance 
companies are granted more leeway, i.e. the extent to which they are able to make 
decisions about their budget.  
 In comparison to Germany, aims focusing on shifts in accountability are 
more recognizable in the English policy plans, which explicitly focus on improving 
patient choice and shifting control over resources from the central level to Primary 
Care Trusts (further PCTs). Hospitals that are able to attract patients and perform 
better are rewarded (see Table 3.3). In the new Dutch system, shifts in 
accountability can be seen in goals concerning making insurance companies more 
accountable for the costs of health care, incentives for insurers to respond more 
effectively to patient preferences and the installation of a demand-led system (see 
Table 3.4).  
 The third way in which NPM can emerge in DRG hospital payment systems, 
concerns the elements competition and marketisation. The introduction of NPM 
may have involved an increased market-orientation or more competition in DRG 
systems, particularly, by means of competitive contracting about price, quality and 
volume or by means of privatization. The results show that marketization and 
competition are visible in the UK and particularly in the Netherlands, but they are 
absent in the German policy plans.  
 The emergence of NPM elements marketisation and competition highlights 
the most important difference among the countries. In the UK, goals are set to 
intensify competition among hospitals for patients. The rationale is that if hospitals 
are paid per case instead of on the basis of national contracts, they will work more 
efficiently. In the Netherlands, competition is mentioned as an explicate aim of the 
implementation of the DRG system. Hospitals are forced to negotiate contracts 
with insurance companies about quality, volume and increasingly about the specific 
price of treatments (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid Welzijn en Sport, 2003a).  
 In conclusion, elements of NPM are prominent in the English and Dutch 
policy plans and less prominent in the German plans. The latter has a strong focus 
on increasing efficiency by means other than shifting accountability. However, 
NPM is recognizable, for example in the argument that transparency in hospital 
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remuneration will lead to better quality of hospital care (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2001b). In addition, despite the variation in each country, the two sides of NPM are 
visible in the DRG based hospital payment systems and the ideas in the policy 
plans resemble to a certain extent the problems of the old payment systems.  
 The results confirm to some extent the main hypothesis that institutions and 
actors matter for reforms, since institutional settings do only partly shape the 
outcomes. First, NPM has emerged in the Dutch policy ideas to a larger extent than 
expected. Second, the ideas in the countries seem to focus on specific NPM 
elements that can be partly explained from the specific context. The strong focus on 
efficiency in the German case can be explained from the fact that this country had 
the most expensive health care sector (see Figures 2.5-2.6). But the relatively 
strong focus on marketization in the Dutch case and the absence of these elements 
in Germany cannot be explained. The next section explores the policy measures of 
the new hospital payment systems to see whether the same variation can be 
observed.  
3.7 Comparing policy measures 
The extent to which health care providers and purchasers are held accountable for 
their performance and have the freedom to control budgets also varies considerably 
in the three cases. Measures directly aimed at efficiency are clearly visible in 
Germany. The prices of DRGs, for example, are fixed and adjusted to regional 
differences. This means that regardless of the effort needed to treat a patient, a 
certain price is paid to health care providers. The new system enables the 
government to better control the costs of hospital care than was the case during 
under the old system with budgets and fixed prices per hospital day. The German 
plans also reveal measures encouraging hospitals to specialize, i.e. hospitals have to 
offer a certain amount of specific treatment to stay eligible for funding.  
 Interestingly, although the Dutch system presented clear goals concerning 
efficiency and accountability, it is difficult to find actual measures that are directly 
aimed at improving efficiency, although the majority of the tariffs are still fixed 
(90% by the introduction of the new system). Similarly, efficiency measures are 
less common in the English than in the German plans. Nevertheless, the English 
policy plans do mention some direct procedures to improve efficiency, e.g. stricter 
budget discipline is mentioned (see Table 3.3).  
 Although making hospitals and insurance companies more accountable for 
their performance was a less visible aim in the German plans, the specified 
measures show that benchmarking, i.e. publishing the performance of hospitals 
publicly, is an important instrument in making health care providers more 
accountable for their performance (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999). In addition, 
German hospitals have obtained some leeway to develop quality management 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a). In contrast, Dutch hospitals and insurance 
companies are clearly made more accountable for their performance. However, 
direct governmental steering in health care is not completely abolished, as 
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evidenced by the installation of a health authority and the involvement of the 
government in the health care market (see Table 3.3). The English plans show 
shifts in accountability that are more comparable to the Dutch plans. This is visible 
in the change of money flows, the way the new payment system provides more 
transparent information for patients, and the introduction of more freedom for 
providers to deliver health care addressing the needs and risks of their patients (see 
Table 3.3).  
 The visibility of competitive contracts and marketization in the measures of 
the new hospital payment systems provides the most noticeable differences among 
the countries. As mentioned above, the German policy plans did not include any 
ideas about increased competition or marketization. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that these kinds of measures are also absent. The Dutch policy plans included the 
most explicit ideas about competition and marketization, and the measures 
undertaken are to a large extent based on these ideas (see Table 3.4). In the UK, the 
possibility for PCTs to purchase hospital treatment from voluntary and private 
health care providers was introduced to encourage marketization and competition 
among hospitals. Simultaneously with the introduction of the payment by results 
system, NHS hospitals received incentives to become more independent from the 
NHS by becoming foundation trusts and by entering legally binding private 
contracts with PCTs (Ham, 2004).  
 It is worth noting that certain measures in the English plans deviate 
somewhat from the traditional view on NPM. First, contracts between PCTs and 
hospitals have, according to the plans, a primary focus on quality and volume 
instead of price (Department of Health, 2005b). Second, in several documents the 
government has emphasized that collaboration among actors in the health care 
system is more important than competition (see Table 3.3). Hence, while NPM is 
clearly visible in the aims of the English payment system, this is less so in the 
actual policy measures mentioned in the documents. The measures focus on 
increasing performance accountability and ‘empowering service users’. This focus 
fits to some extent in the ‘public service management model’ of NPM (Ferlie, 
Ashburner, Fitzgerald et al., 1996: 15).  
 In sum, the policy measures resemble the policy ideas. This means that the 
variation observed in the ideas, remain if the policy measures are taken into 
account. However, the NPM elements marketisation and competition are absent in 
the English policy measures. This might be explained from the evaluation of NPM 
in the ‘public service management’ model, but the explanation is unlikely since 
marketisation and competition are clearly visible in the Dutch system. The results 
support the idea that institutional settings are not decisive for the way NPM has 
emerged in the new hospital payment systems. As will be further outlined in the 
next chapters, specific preferences of policy-makers and their ‘room to maneuver’ 
need to be taken into account to explain the way NPM is given shape in the new 
hospital payment systems.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has had two goals: showing how NPM elements are embedded in the 
DRG based hospital payment systems and testing whether formal institutional 
settings are sufficient for explaining the variation. Three expectations were 
formulated. First, one could expect that NPM elements would emerge in the 
English hospital system most clearly, since this country has an Anglo-Saxon state 
tradition, a majoritarian political system and a ‘statist’ organized health care 
system. Second, NPM elements might emerge to a considerable lesser extent in 
Germany where large policy shifts are less common and the state tradition provides 
a less receptive environment for NPM. Finally, reforms in the Netherlands were 
expected to have an intermediate outcome in comparison to the other two cases.  
 The results have shown that NPM elements are visible in the three payment 
systems. In Germany, there is a clear focus on efficiency, while the Dutch system 
focuses on competition and marketisation and the English system focuses on 
patient choice. Hence, three clear patterns could be distinguished in three different 
contexts. The way NPM has emerged in the German and British case suggests that 
path-dependency and ‘power-sharing’ matter, since NPM elements have emerged 
to a large extent according to the expectations. In addition, the reason that 
efficiency has been highlighted in the German plans and patient choice in England 
can be understood from the specific characteristics of the health care systems. 
However, the focus on specific NPM elements in the ideas and measures of the 
hospital payment systems, in particular the emphasis on marketisation and 
competition in the Dutch payment system, can neither be explained from the 
specific problems in the health care sector nor from the institutional setting. The 
outcomes reinforce the argument that for explaining reforms not only institutional 
settings, but also the specific context and actors need to be taken into account 
(Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005). 
 The main conclusion of this chapter is that NPM needs to be seen as an 
ideational feature given shape by actors in a specific institutional setting. A formal 
institutionalist explanation does not travel far if the variation in the new payment 
systems is concerned. NPM matters and the results suggest that actors are able to 
further their preferences. The next chapters explore the specific interactions 
between actors, i.e. political parties and the medical profession, and institutions to 
see whether the variation in the new payment systems indeed can be explained by 
the interaction of actor preferences, related behavior and institutional settings.  
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4. COMPARING PARTY COMPETITION ON HEALTH 
CARE REFORMS1 
4.1 Introduction 
Specific political institutional settings constrain the reform capacities of 
governments, particularly those of the Netherlands and Germany (cf. Pierson, 
1994). However, despite different political and health care contexts, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK2 have implemented comparable hospital payment systems. 
The systems classify specific hospital episodes in terms of costs, facilitating the 
emergence of NPM. As shown in Chapter 3, the extent of power sharing between 
political and health care actors and other structural factors, e.g. state tradition, 
cannot satisfactorily explain the variation in the new hospital payment systems. It is 
necessary to introduce some form of agency (Peters, Pierre, and King, 2005).  
 A number of scholars have observed that political parties are relevant for 
welfare state reforms (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2002a; Ross, 2000; Starke, 2006). 
Green-Pedersen (2002b), for example, argues that the different responses of social-
democratic parties explain variation in the emergence of NPM in Denmark and 
Norway. Hence, the literature to date suggests that party preferences are relevant 
for welfare state reforms based on NPM. I argue that the interactions between actor 
preferences and institutional settings do a better job in explaining variation in 
reforms (cf. Scharpf, 2000). This leads to the following sub-question: To what 
extent and how are policy preferences about health care and NPM related to the 
variation between the new hospital payment systems of Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK?  
 Despite their possible relevance for outcomes of reform, party preferences 
about health care are seldom studied. In addition, although studies about party 
positions have based their theory and evidence on a wide range of issues, health 
care issues have typically not been included (e.g. Blendon, Altman, Benson, and 
Brodie, 2004; Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum, 2001; Laver 
and Benoit, 2006). This makes it unclear what role health care issues play in 
political competition and decision-making. For instance, do parties have different 
preferences about health care goals, i.e. universal accessibility, quality and cost 
containment? And are political parties able to further preferences in policy 
decisions? The chapter studies policy preferences in interaction with the 
                                            
1
 This chapter is based on the article Van Essen, A.M. and P. Pennings (2009) “Balancing Competing 
Goals: Exploring the political controversy on new hospital payment systems in Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK”, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, vol. 3(1), p.59-80. 
2
 Due to devolution in the United Kingdom, reforms in the NHS do not necessarily emerge 
simultaneously in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England. The new payment system is not 
implemented in the Scottish and Welsh NHS. Since this study deals with the extent to which NPM has 
emerged in new hospital payment systems, only the reforms of the English NHS are taken into 
account. 
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institutional settings, i.e. the specific health care system and the party 
configuration, to get insight in cross-national differences.  
 In the sections that follow, I discuss health care issues in relation to the 
characteristics of NPM and formulate assumptions about the role of party 
competition. It is useful to explore party preferences within and across countries in 
two stages of the political process, since differences are probably more prominent 
during the election phase than during the political process. To preview the results, 
governmental attention to specific NPM elements is related to the variation of the 
new hospital payment systems and specific party configurations do not determine 
whether governmental parties are able to further their preferences. In addition, 
political competition in both political phases has varied considerably between the 
three cases  
4.2 Theories about party preferences 
As noted previously, it is unclear how policy preferences on health care vary 
among political parties. I contend that preferences on NPM are related to the left-
right positions of parties (see Chapter 2). For this reason, it is argued that market-
liberal parties and to some extent social-democratic parties are the main supporters 
of the implementation of NPM. An alternative to this line of argument, however, is 
that NPM is a universal solution for contemporary health care problems. It is 
possible that all parties to a large extent support NPM in their manifestos and in 
parliamentary debates, viewing it as a means to increase the performance of the 
health care sector. Although, this is unlikely considering the way NPM emerged in 
the three countries under investigation, it may nevertheless be that no political 
differences between parties are observable, indicating that other factors have led to 
variance in the new hospital payment systems.  
 Though this chapter is not about voting behavior, theories and debates from 
this literature are useful for exploring party competition. Important insights into 
party competition can be obtained by questioning whether voters choose a party 
that is close to them on a specific dimension (cf. Downs, 1957; Lewis and King, 
1999; Stokes, 1963), by testing whether parties ‘own’ particular issues in health 
care and by exploring whether parties  distinguish themselves from one another by 
emphasizing different goals and means (cf. Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge, 
Klingemann, Volkens et al., 2001). These ideas originate from theories on 
proximity and directional voting (cf. Downs, 1957; Lewis and King, 1999), valence 
(cf. Stokes, 1992; Stokes, 1963), and issue saliency (cf. Budge, Klingemann, 
Volkens et al., 2001).  
 This chapter explores whether political competition has ‘path-dependent’ 
characteristics; whether policy preferences can be related to specific circumstances 
and/or institutional settings. It is studied whether parties favor solutions in one 
particular direction and whether this should be related to their specific institutional 
setting or to their party affiliation. Two types of interactions between actor 
preferences and institutional settings are studied in this chapter. First, political 
Comparing party competition on health care reforms 
63 
 
competition and decision-making about NPM in health care is affected by the 
position of parties in a party system, i.e. by the specific party configuration, which 
determines the ‘room of maneuver’ of parties. Governmental parties, for instance, 
have to compromise between blame for economic mismanagement (e.g. rising costs 
or extensive waiting lists) and blame for cutbacks that undermine the accessibility 
or quality of the system. In addition, parties in the Netherlands and Germany must 
seek consensus with coalition partners. Second, the specific problems and the 
health care system might affect the attention parties put on health care goals and on 
the balance between state-market regulation.  
4.3 Health care: a valence or positional issue? 
To explore political competition regarding NPM elements in health care, I rely on 
two ideas originating from the literature on voting behavior. Specifically, I examine 
what role health care plays in political competition by discussing it with regard to 
positional and valence issues. The former refers to a situation in which parties offer 
alternatives to voters, and voters have different preferences. Here, parties might 
offer these alternatives by placing themselves on a certain point on a scale, e.g. 
more or less universal accessibility in health care. Valence issues, by contrast, are 
those issues for which parties do not offer alternatives, and for which voters 
evaluate parties based on their performance.  
 Downs (1957) argues that parties choose (simultaneously) positions in a one-
dimensional space and that voters, who also have a specific position on this 
dimension, choose a party located close to them in this space. Aspects of this theory 
have been criticized and extended. For instance, the notion put forward by Downs 
(1957) that all party competition takes place on one policy dimension, usually the 
left-right, has been critiqued. Researchers have shown that political competition is 
located on at least two dimensions, e.g. left-right and conservative-liberal (e.g. 
Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2004).  
 Stokes (1963) argues that Downs’ model does not work if voters are simply 
reacting to parties’ associations with some goal, state or symbol that is positively or 
negatively evaluated (p. 373). According to him, voters choose a party based both 
on issues with alternative ends (positional issues) and on issues which relate parties 
to some condition that is positively or negatively evaluated (valence issues) 
(Stokes, 1963). Issues in health care may be valence issues if voters are not 
scattered on the scale but are clustered close together at one point. Voters are aware 
of how close parties are to that point, but parties cannot rationally change their 
position as they can on positional issues (MacDonald and Rabinowitz, 1998). In 
other words, voters evaluate parties on their performance and trust in eliminating, 
for instance, unemployment and take this into consideration when choosing a party.  
 There are several reasons to view health care as a valence issue. First, voters 
cannot predict when they need health care and an individual voter cannot be ‘too 
healthy’. Health should not been seen as the absence of decease or injury, but as a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being (Evans and Stoddart, 1990: 
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1347). In addition, voters generally have solidarity with sick people (cf. Blekesaune 
and Quadagno, 2003). This makes health care, to date, somewhat distinct from 
other welfare state services. During the fiscal crisis of the welfare state, broad and 
fundamental consensus on the value of solidarity gave way to doubts concerning 
the attainability and desirability of the big welfare schemes, such as unemployment, 
but solidarity in health care has remained largely unquestioned. According to 
Houtepen en Ter Meulen (2000a):  
 
 “Apparently the care of the sick is a strong paradigm for the sort of moral 
and  social responsibility that is commonly acknowledged by members of 
contemporary western society” (p. 330)  
  
 Political parties are thus dealing with voters who cannot be ‘too healthy’, a 
general support for a society that has a social and moral responsibility for those 
who are sick and limited financial resources constraining the achievement of these 
needs. They have to balance three goals: quality, equitable accessibility and cost 
containment. These health care issues are probably valence, if voters all prefer the 
same balance between these goals (see also Figure 2.1). 
 Valence issues are particularly challenging for parties in office. These parties 
are more vulnerable since their achievements with regard to valence issues are 
evaluated by voters (MacDonald and Rabinowitz, 1998). If parties perform well 
they might attract voters (voters consider the party more close to them than before), 
but if they perform not so well they are likely to lose voters. This demonstrates the 
difficulties parties face in office, if health care is a valence issue. They are forced to 
compromise between blame for economic mismanagement, e.g. rising costs or 
extensive waiting lists, and blame for cutbacks that undermine the accessibility or 
quality of the system.  
 Whether an issue is a positional issue or a valence issue varies among 
countries (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). I study whether the different health care 
goals or health care regulation (state-market) are positional or valence issues; in 
other words, whether parties offer alternatives to voters or not. Again, we assume 
that voters have different preferences about what goals should be emphasized in 
health care policy and reforms and that they will support the party that is closest in 
line with those goals.  
 An important question is what different forms of party competition might 
mean for the variation in health care systems. As argued previously, NPM likely 
favors cost containment to a large extent, since its elements focus on efficiency 
(Lane, 2000: 6). Furthermore, universal accessibility may be in danger, since it is 
difficult to work as a business and still offer equitable and accessible health care 
service. Hence, parties that emphasize cost containment3 will support NPM, while 
                                            
3
 Note that cost containment, i.e. reducing (public) costs, is not the same as efficiency, i.e. doing more 
with less money.  
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parties that emphasize accessibility will not. If health care is a valence issue, NPM 
will be supported to the extent that it improves the performance of health care 
without compromising any of the health care goals.  
4.4 NPM as shift from state to market? 
Parties can distinguish themselves from one another on health care goals, but also 
on how to achieve these goals. Implementing NPM is likely to be politically 
contested among parties, since it implies a potential shift from public service to 
market regulation of welfare services. As outlined in Chapter 2, NPM can be 
considered a public-private shift, although it does not aim on complete 
privatization.  
 Although heavily criticized, the economic left-right dimension has remained 
important in understanding political competition. Political contestation regarding 
lesser versus more governmental regulation tends to be the chief determinant of 
left-right differences between parties (e.g. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2004; 
Huber and Inglehart, 1995). Hence, voters may not differ on the health care goals, 
but they might differ on how to achieve the goals. While leftist parties emphasize 
state regulation, rightist parties stress market regulation. If political contestation 
about NPM mainly reflects the issue of state-market regulation, market-liberal 
parties are particularly likely to support NPM.  
 However, recently, social-democratic parties have become more fervent 
supporters of market regulation. As several studies suggest, social democratic 
parties in Western Europe have adopted a ‘third-way’ policy pragmatism involving 
both a positive view of the ability of the market to provide certain outcomes and a 
strong emphasis on active ‘social investment’ of the state (Green-Pedersen, Van 
Kersbergen, and Hemerijck, 2001). Cutler and Waine (2000: 318), for instance, 
argue that British Labour has embraced the changes of the Conservative party, but 
has also found its own ‘managerialist approach’. Hence, social democratic parties – 
particularly in the countries under study here – have changed, making them more 
supportive of greater market regulation in welfare and likely supporters of NPM.  
 In sum, by exploring whether health care is a valence issue or a positional 
issue, it is possible to understand how political competition is shaped in a specific 
institutional context. To understand the relationship between policy preferences and 
the way and extent NPM has emerged in the hospital payment systems, it is 
important to study whether political parties attempt to distinguish themselves on the 
health care goals and on how health care should be regulated (state-market).  
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4.5 Different party systems and health care organizations 
Political competition about introducing NPM elements in health care departs from 
different starting points, e.g. the current prioritization of the health care goals and 
the extent to which NPM elements already emerged in the health care sector before 
the implementation of the new payment systems. Green-Pedersen et al. (2001) 
argue, for instance, that despite similarities found between the Dutch and Danish 
labor parties, different starting points have led to important disparities in the 
outcomes of the reforms. As noted previously, the responses of social-democratic 
parties towards health care and NPM may be important in explaining the variation 
in new hospital payment systems. However, different starting points are likely to 
affect how political competition takes place in the election and decision-making 
phases. Parties, not operating in a vacuum, have different strategic positions 
(Green-Pedersen, 2002a) 
4.5.1 Party configurations: Policy preferences of social-democratic parties 
One reason for selecting Germany, the UK and the Netherlands is their different 
party configurations, i.e. “weak liberals, strong centre and strong social-democrats” 
(Germany), “three-way divide between liberals, centre and social-democrats” 
(Netherlands), and “united market-liberals versus united social-democrats” (UK) 
(Kitschelt, 2001). As several authors have argued, each party configuration has it 
own possibilities for reform (Green-Pedersen, 2002a; Kitschelt, 2001). In Britain, 
the Labour party, when in government, can reform more easily than the 
Conservative party. In the Netherlands and Germany, the combination of the 
Christian-democratic party and the social-democratic party have the best 
possibilities for pursuing welfare state reforms, although more difficult than in the 
UK (Green-Pedersen 2002a; Kitschelt, 2001). In addition, it can be assumed that 
coalition governments in general have fewer possibilities to reform, but as shown 
above some coalitions have better possibilities than others. 
 The specific party configurations during the decision-making processes of 
the new hospital payment systems have seldom conformed to the ‘ideal reform’ 
configurations as outlined above. Aside from in the UK, where Labour was in 
government during 1997-2006, the governments in the other countries did not 
reflect the ‘ideal’. During 1998-2002, the Netherlands had a ‘purple cabinet’, 
formed by the market-liberal party (VVD), the liberal party (D66) and the social-
democratic party (PvdA), followed in 2002 by centre-right cabinets: i.e. List Pim 
Fortuyn (LPF) (replaced by D66 in 2003), Christian Democrats (CDA) and VVD. 
Germany had a left-wing cabinet with the social-democratic party (SDP) and the 
Green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) from 1998-2005.  
 As noted before, if NPM is primarily related to the left-right differences of 
parties, its supporters should be market liberal parties and third way social 
democratic parties. However, this does not necessarily mean that social democratic 
parties can no longer be distinguished from more rightist parties. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that social-democratic parties would move considerably to the right, as 
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such a move would be irrational. According to theories of proximity voting, voters 
would go to other parties, i.e. switch their votes from social democratic parties to 
Christian-democratic parties for instance.   
 Merkel and Petring (2007) combine the changed role of social democratic 
parties with the specific party configurations of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
According to these scholars, Labour and the PvdA have been forced more towards 
the liberal approach than the SPD. In the UK, party competition gave great leeway 
to the right, while in the Netherlands coalitions partners, ‘demanded’ a movement 
to the right from the PvdA. In contrast, the German party system – namely the 
Green-Left coalition and a second big welfare party, the CDU(/CSU) – the limited 
new programmatic approaches (Merkel and Petring, 2007).  
 In sum, differences in party preferences and political competition may help 
to explain the variation in the new hospital payment systems and should show how 
actors and institutions interact. Moreover, the specific party configuration in a 
given country is likely to moderate or strengthen the supportive role of social-
democratic parties toward NPM.  
4.5.2 The role of different health care systems in political competition 
A second reason for cross-national differences in political competition is the 
different health care systems found in the three countries. The Netherlands and 
Germany have social insurance systems in which payment is shared among the 
government, employers and citizens. This system has relatively large out of pocket 
payments and a distinction between a group that relies on obligatory insurance (e.g. 
a basic insurance or a ‘sickness’ fund) and a group that is able to insure itself 
(additionally) with private insurance (Busse and Riesberg, 2004; Den Exter, 
Hermans, Dosjlak et al., 2004). This type of insurance system is only partly 
redistributive. The total share of payments comprises an income related payment, 
an employer contribution, and an individual flat rate contribution to an insurance 
company or association. Such a system creates difficulties for offering universal, 
equitable access to health services (Hussey and Anderson, 2003). If you earn more, 
you are able to obtain better health care services by taking better insurance 
schemes.  
 In contrast, the British system is mainly redistributive, since it is paid from 
general tax revenues, meaning that citizens who earn more pay more for the 
National Health Service (NHS). It is possible to take private insurance, but not 
instead paying for the services provided by the state, as was to some extent the case 
in Germany and in the Netherlands until 2006 (cf. Ham, 2004; Robinson and 
Dixon, 1999). The single-payer structure of the NHS also allows for strict cost 
containment. The government can control health expenditures more easily than in 
multi-payer systems. Some argue that this is the reason for the under-investment in 
the NHS. Indeed, the UK has spent the least on health care per capita in western 
Europe (Hussey and Anderson, 2003; OECD, 2006).  
Seeking a balance?! 
68 
 
 The differences between the health care systems reflect how various health 
care goals are prioritized. This suggests that political competition concerning health 
care and NPM originates from different institutional settings and contexts; it has 
path-dependent characteristics. Health care in the UK is equitably distributed – 
citizens have, irrespective their incomes, access to the same package of services. 
However, the overall quality is questionable; for instance, more individual payment 
does not positively affect the quality of the service nor does it increase patient 
choice within the NHS. In the Netherlands and Germany, accessibility and choice 
depend to a certain extent on the type of insurance, while costs are more difficult to 
control by the state. Hence, the way health care goals are prioritized in a certain 
system is often disputed, and parties may offer alternatives to voters. In addition, 
whether and which goals of health care are valence or positional issues may vary 
between countries (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006).  
4.6 NPM: a coherent issue in party competition? 
Up until this point, NPM has been seen either as a blueprint or, more likely, as a 
ideational stream that together with specific problems brought about a critical 
juncture. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, however, NPM elements have not emerged 
in similar ways in the specific payment systems. In the UK and the Netherlands, the 
emphasis has been on (price) competition and shifting accountability to non-
governmental actors, while in Germany the emphasis was put on efficiency, 
transparency and quality measures (see Chapter 3).  
 It might be that party manifestos do not emphasize NPM, but its specific 
elements. Since NPM is often seen as a paradox between centralizing and 
decentralizing tendencies (cf. Hood, 1995), it is likely that parties only partially 
support NPM. For instance, parties emphasizing cost containment and quality as 
health care priorities will support efficiency and shifts of accountability to health 
care providers, while parties that consider accessibility and quality more important 
than cost containment will support centralizing tendencies, e.g. transparency and 
quality standards. This idea is supported by the results of Chapter 3; countries have 
implemented different forms of NPM in their hospital payment systems. 
Furthermore, cross-national differences may occur. In the UK, for instance, costs 
are relatively easy to control by the central government, which would be more 
difficult if accountability were to shift. Hence, patterned variation across parties, 
i.e. the extent to which NPM elements are stressed, is likely to occur.  
 To understand this variation clearly, it is necessary to explore whether 
political competition can be found with regard to the use of NPM in health care 
policy. By disaggregating NPM, I examine the relationship between party 
preferences and the emergence of NPM in three ways. First, I explore whether 
different elements of NPM are relevant in political competition. Second, I study 
whether variation is observable between party families. Third, I consider whether 
political competition in the separate countries focuses on different elements of 
NPM, i.e. whether cross-national differences can be found. It is expected that the 
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attention of social-democratic parties towards NPM, which is given shape by the 
specific party configuration and health care system, is particularly relevant to 
understand the variation in the way NPM has emerged in the new hospital payment 
systems.  
4.7 Method and data 
In recent years, lengthy discussion has taken place about which resources are most 
valid and reliable in obtaining policy preferences. The main resources are party 
manifestos and expert surveys (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens et al., 2001; Laver 
and Benoit, 2006). The latter are less relevant for this study since the existing 
surveys do not include (specific) questions about health care. With the manifesto 
database, however, the original texts and party preferences can, if necessary, be 
retrieved back to the 1950s.  
 An advantage of expert surveys is that experts can base their opinion on a 
wide range of party behavior and not solely on written (and strategic) party 
manifestos and interventions in debates. However, it is unclear on what bases 
experts judge parties (cf. Budge, 2000). Moreover, Marks et al. (2007) show that 
different sources for obtaining party preferences on the left-right scale correlate 
highly.  
 The manifestos of the main parties in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK 
(1986-2006) have been recoded with a predefined coding scheme in Atlas.ti (Muhr, 
2004). This was necessary, since the original coding scheme (Budge, Klingemann, 
Volkens et al., 2001) did not include health care. I decided to only analyze (quasi) 
sentences that are coded with at least one of the forty-two codes (usually the health 
care parts of the manifestos dealing with hospital care). These codes include NPM 
elements, the goals of health care policy, the actors in the health care field, 
prevention and home care (see appendix A).  
 The party manifestos that are included in the analysis have a time span of 
twenty years. I chose 1986 as a starting point since there is a consensus in the 
literature that NPM became relevant beginning in the 1980s. As noted, this study 
particularly focuses on synchronic variation between cases, it does not take time 
into account, which does not affect the results since parties hardly change their 
party preferences over the years (see also Van Essen and Pennings, 2009).  
 The parliamentary debates about the new hospital payment systems are 
recoded with the same scheme. The total time span is six years (1998-2004). In 
each country, the debates are coded from the first policy proposal until the start of 
the implementation of the system. To overcome the problem that one intervention 
of a party in a debate may overestimate its focus on a specific code, I only include 
party interventions in a specific debate in the analysis if at least five sentences were 
coded. This allows enough space for parties to emphasize several elements and 
provides a relatively fair representation of the different parties in the debates.  
 In total, 14 parties are included from which 80 manifestos were coded, 
resulting in 2748 quotations (coded sentences): 1524 for the Netherlands (36 
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manifestos), 594 for Germany (29 manifestos) and 630 for the UK (15 manifestos). 
From 60 debates, 2124 quotations (coded sentences) are included in the analysis: 
694 for the Netherlands (50 interventions), 900 for Germany (35 interventions), 
530 for the UK (34 interventions).  
 My rationale for employing two types of resources is to explore whether 
differences in party preferences are more visible in the manifestos than in the 
debates. It may be the case that parties offer alternatives in the their manifestos but 
that these differences are not found in the debates (cf. Keman, 1997). This would 
suggest that health care is a positional issue during the election phase but that these 
differences do not play a role during parliamentary debates. Analyzing two sources 
provides another way of studying policy preferences to establish whether specific 
interactions between actors and institutions take place.  
4.8 Political competition about health care 
In this section, I compare the attention that parties and countries pay to specific 
elements of health care. I assume that the proportion of attention to a specific code 
determines the importance of that issue for a party.4 Using OLS regression, I am 
able to show to what extent a specific party or country can explain attention to a 
particular issue (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). The regression analysis shows in a 
relatively simple way how parties differ from each other. It is used to describe 
variation between parties, countries and issues. The regression equation is as 
follows:5 
 
Y = Si = Ci + P1Ki1 + P2Ki2 + P3Ki3 + . . . + PnKin + εi 
 
where Si is the saliency score of a category (for instance, the health care goal of 
accessibility), Pn is the dummy-coded variable for the party analyzed, C is the value 
of the constant in category i (always the mean attention of the reference party to 
category i), Ki is the difference in attention of party n to category 1 compared with 
the reference party (e.g. Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006).  
 The reference party in the analyses is (usually) the social democratic party, 
i.e. Labour, PvdA and SPD. These are chosen to examine whether their salience on 
issues differs from rightwing parties and/or other leftist parties. Where countries are 
compared, the Netherlands is the reference country, since NPM has emerged to a 
larger extent in its new payment system than in German one and, as shown in 
Chapter 3, comparable to the English payment system.  
  
                                            
4 See appendix B for more detailed figures.  
5All models deal with some multicollinearity. For this reason the R- squares are published but not 
discussed. I present here a regression analysis, since it gives very readable output. 
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4.8.1 Health care as positional or valence issue? 
I begin by exploring whether health care is a positional or valence issue, i.e. 
whether parties offer alternatives to voters during the election phase. Health care is 
a valence issue, if political parties do not devote significantly different degrees of 
attention to the goals (equitable accessibility, quality, cost containment). However, 
there is good reason to believe that specific goals are emphasized due to the 
specific ‘starting position’ of a country; equitable accessibility might be a 
positional issue in the Netherlands and Germany and that quality might be a 
positional issue in the UK. To examine this, I use regression analysis in order to 
compare the degree of attention to the various policy issues between the parties and 
countries.   
 The results show that parties allocate different proportions of attention to 
accessibility (see Table 4.1). In the Netherlands it is particularly an issue for party 
far to the left, i.e. a left-positional issue (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). The SP 
devotes almost twice the attention to accessibility in its manifesto compared to the 
PvdA. The results also show that the PvdA does not distinguish itself from other 
parties. In Germany, accessibility is a positional issue, i.e. multiple differences 
between parties. The SPD distinguishes itself both from the FDP, by devoting more 
attention to accessibility, as well as from PDS. The latter devotes on average 16% 
more attention to accessibility than the SPD (see Table 4.1).  
 In the UK, parties dedicate significantly different proportions of attention to 
accessibility. Here, the Liberal Democratic Party devotes on average 8% of the 
sentences to accessibility, in contrast with the Conservative party which devotes on 
average 3% to the issue. Despite such significant discrepancies, however, the 
relatively low percentages show that accessibility is not really an important issue in 
the UK; parties devote relatively little attention to it. This calls into question 
whether varying degrees of attention to accessibility is really relevant in this case. 
On the two other health care goals no party differences can be observed within 
countries (see also Appendix B). These goals also receive – in general - less 
attention in the party manifestos.  
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Table 4.1 OLS regression of attention to accessibility in health care paragraphs in 
party manifestos (1998-2006) 
Netherlands 
 (n = 36)  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
Reference party: 
PvdA 
B Std. Error t 
(Constant) 7.840 2.417  3.244** 
dummy SP 14.553 3.418  4.258** 
dummy Green Left 5.934 3.585 1.655 
dummy CDA -0.323 3.418 -0.095 
dummy D66 -3.090 3.418 -0.904 
dummy VVD -3.898 3.418 -1.140 
R2 = 0.59 
 
Germany   
(n = 29) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t 
 Reference party: 
SPD 
B Std. Error   
(Constant) 22.544 5.041 4.472** 
dummy Grünen -7.183 7.129 -1.007 
dummy PDS 16.131 7.477 2.157* 
dummy FDP -14.603 7.129 - 2.048* 
dummy CDU -9.587 7.129 -1.345 
R2 = 0.45 
 
 UK 
 (n = 15) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t 
Reference party: 
Liberal Democrats 
B Std. Error  
(Constant)    8.071 1.274 6.336** 
Labour -3.381 1.801 -1.877 
Conservatives -5.197 1.801 -2.885*  
R2 = 0.42 
(**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05) 
 
As expected, there are cross-national differences among the three countries. In the 
German manifestos, on average more attention is devoted to accessibility compared 
to what we find in the UK and the Netherlands. The Dutch parties dedicate little 
attention to quality compared to the UK, and parties in the UK devote less attention 
to cost containment than parties in the Netherlands and Germany.  
 Table 4.2 shows how political competition on health care goals is related to 
the specific context. First, the attention to cost containment and quality in the 
manifestos reflects the differences between the health care systems, but not 
between parties. Overall, the party manifestos reflect different starting points for 
political competition and decision-making about implementing NPM in health care 
across the countries (see Table 4.2). The finding that cost containment is no issue in 
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the British debates and quality is most stressed, has been expected since the UK is 
one of the lowest spenders on health care (8.3% of GDP in 2004) and at the same 
time one of the biggest growers in Real Health Care Spending per capita in the 
period 1994-2004 (being 4.2%) (Cylus and Anderson, 2007; Klein, 1998)  
 The patterned variation shows that trade-offs exist, since health care goals 
get varying degrees of attention in the countries. In addition, in Germany, 
accessibility reveals large party differences, while in the other countries these 
differences are smaller. According to voting theories, this means that voter 
positions vary in the countries. While in Germany voters are scattered about health 
care issues, they are less so in the UK and the Netherlands. It can be expected that 
actors attempt to use their ‘room to maneuver’ to affect political decisions. The fact 
that health care is a positional issue in Germany might affect the way political 
parties are able to further their preferences in the new hospital payment systems.  
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Table 4.2 OLS regression of attention to health care goals in party manifestos (1986-2006) 
 
(n = 79) Universal accessibility 
 
Cost containment  Quality 
Reference country: 
 The Netherlands 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
 B Std. 
Error 
t B Std. 
Error 
t B Std. Error t  
(Constant) 9.929 1.873  5.302** 5.687 0.971 5.858** 4.962 1.017 4.879** 
dummy Germany 8.906 2.782  3.201** 0.182 1.442 0.126 2.702 1.511 1.788 
dummy UK -4.717 3.419 -1.380 -5.061 1.772 -2.855** 5.148 1.857 2.772** 
 R2 = 
0.19 
  R2  = 0.11   R2 = 
0.09 
  
(** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05) 
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 As indicated, two resources – party manifestos and parliamentary debates – are 
used to explore party preferences about NPM in health care. Both sets of data are coded in 
a similar way, but OLS regression makes less sense in the latter. Party manifestos 
throughout the years have a similar structure. In contrast, party interventions in debates 
are more difficult to compare, because not all debates deal with every aspect of the new 
payment system. In other words, while most codes are mentioned in a single manifesto, 
only a subset is used in an intervention in a debate. Though they are less useful for 
regression analysis, the debates nevertheless provide a good overview of party 
preferences. I therefore explore to what extent these preferences are reflected in the 
debates. For example, the manifestos show that parties far to the left put more emphasis 
on the accessibility of health care, making it a left-positional issue. Are these parties 
distinguishing themselves from other parties in the debates as well?  
 In addition, I compare the saliency of various health care goals in party manifestos 
versus parliamentary debates. The results show that attention to health care goals in 
manifestos and debates differ. In the UK, attention to cost containment is more prominent 
in the debates, while accessibility also remains relatively important (see appendix B). This 
is in contrast to the Netherlands where accessibility – being very important in the election 
phase - almost disappears in the debates. Hence, though debating a similar type of reform, 
the degree of attention each of the goals receives, varies.  
 While accessibility does not seem to be an issue in the Dutch debates, all British 
parties dedicate considerable attention to it. In Germany, parties that devote a relatively 
large degree of attention to it in the manifestos also do so in debates. Thus, leftist parties 
devote more attention to accessibility than rightist parties, both in their manifestos and in 
parliamentary debates.  
 This attention is, however, moderated by the specific health care system (Hussey 
and Anderson, 2003). In the NHS universal accessibility is a key feature of the system and 
hardly questioned among political parties, while in Germany accessibility is a positional 
issue and not completely guaranteed by the insurance-based system. Remarkably, 
although the Dutch health care system is comparable to the German system, accessibility 
is not as political sensitive neither in the manifestos nor in the debates.    
 The results show that the saliency of issues in parliamentary debates is not 
necessarily related to the saliency in the party manifestos. One possible explanation for 
this discrepancy is that parties compromise about issues during the decision-making 
process (Keman, 1997). The results also show that there is variation between countries in 
the attention to health care goals which can be partly explained from the type of health 
care system. This shows that preferences are related to a specific institutional setting, but 
not determined by it, since other contextual factors seem to play a role.  
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4.8.2 NPM in health care as shift from state to market? 
In this section, I show to what extent party preferences on NPM are related to their 
positions on state and market regulation in health care. NPM entails the shift from a public 
service organization towards market regulation of welfare services. According to several 
scholars, it is only supported by neo-liberal parties and possibly by third way social 
democrats. If NPM is a blueprint, it is unlikely to be related to party preferences about 
state and market regulation. As in the previous section, here I examine to what extent 
saliency regarding state and market regulation in health care can be explained by the 
‘variables’ party or the country.  
 In each of the three countries, parties differ significantly in their attention to state 
and market regulation of health care in the election phase. In Germany and the UK, state 
regulation is a left party issue, and market regulation is a positional issue (i.e. parties 
farther to the left differ significantly form social-democratic parties, and rightist parties 
differ from social-democratic parties) (see Table 4.3, Franzmann and Kaiser 2006). In the 
Netherlands, these differences are less prominent. The PvdA differs from the VVD, but 
not from other parties.  
 In sum, social-democratic parties are more supportive of market regulation than 
parties more to the left, though not as supportive as rightist parties. Moreover, parties 
more to the left than social-democratic parties are more supportive of state regulation than 
all other parties, meaning that social-democratic parties do not distinguish themselves 
from rightist parties on this issue, except in the UK. This is in line with the results that 
Harrison and Calltorp (2000) find in the Swedish case. Social-democratic parties support 
marketisation; however, according to the findings presented here, the extent of this 
support appears to vary across cases. 
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Table 4.3 OLS regression of attention to state and market regulation in the party 
manifestos (1986-2006) 
 
 State regulation Market regulation 
Netherlands  
(N = 36)  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 Unstandardized Coefficients  
 Reference party: 
PvdA 
B Std. Error T B Std. Error  t 
(Constant) 13.320 3.210 4.150** 6.411 2.721 2.357* 
dummy SP 7.160 4.539 1.577 -5.696 3.848 -1.480 
dummy Green 
Left 
-4.010 4.761 -0.842 -0.465 4.035 -0.115 
dummy CDA -4.163 4.539 -0.917 6.347 3.848 1.650 
dummy D66 1.236 4.539 0.272 1.183 3.848 0.307 
dummy VVD -9.726 4.539 -2.143*  9.903 3.848 2.574* 
R2 = 0.36    R2  = 0.41   
(**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05) 
 
 State regulation Market regulation 
Germany  
(N = 29)  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
Reference party: 
SPD 
B Std. Error T B Std. Error  t 
(Constant) 3.931 1.475 2.665* 9.294 2.107 4.411**  
dummy PDS 5.643 2.187 2.580* -8.385 3.125 -2.683* 
dummy Grünen 0.357 2.085 0.171 -6.717 2.980 -2.254* 
dummy FDP -3.216 2.085 -1.542 21.477 2.980 7.207** 
dummy CDU -2.866 2.085 -1.374 -0.582 2.980 -0.195 
R2 = 0.46    R2 = 0.84   
(**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05) 
 
 State regulation Market regulation 
UK 
(N = 15)  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 Unstandardized Coefficients  
Reference party: 
 Labour 
B Std. Error t B Std. Error  t 
(Constant) 9.613 2.047 4.696** 6.819 2.023 3.372** 
dummy Liberal 
Democrats 
-7.576 2.895 -2.617* 1.636 2.860 0.572 
dummy 
Conservatives 
-9.148 2.895 -3.160** 8.637 2.860 3.019* 
R2 = 0.49    R2 = 0.46   
(**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05) 
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 Dutch parties, by comparison, devote considerable attention to state 
regulation in health care (see Table 4.3). This might be explained by the limited 
role the central government plays in controlling health care. While the NHS 
consists of state agencies, the Dutch health care system is characterized by private 
organizations, on which the government imposes rules (Saltman, 2002: 1678). This 
might also explain why no significant differences are found between social-
democratic and other leftist parties concerning state regulation. Furthermore, it 
sheds light on why the Christian-democratic party devotes extensive attention to 
state regulation, particularly compared to its German counterpart (see appendix B). 
In contrast to state regulation, no cross-national differences are found with regard 
to attention to market regulation. In this respect, party affiliation is more important 
than the specific context.  
 Compared to the manifestos, differences between parties are less visible in 
the parliamentary debates. In Germany and the UK, parties generally refer more 
often to state regulation in debates than in their manifestos. The extensive attention 
the Conservative party and the VVD devote to it is particularly remarkable. 
Turning to the content of the debates, the VVD and the Conservative party focus on 
how the minister can regulate the health care market and whether the government is 
able to implement the new regulation. In contrast, Labour and the Dutch Green 
party had a more traditional view on the role of the government. They related it to 
creating patient choice and support to patients (cf. Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, 2003; Tweede Kamer, 2004). Hence, a qualitative approach is 
sometimes necessary to unravel unexpected results (cf. Van Essen and Pennings, 
2009).  
 A key question is whether parties that devote a relatively large degree of 
attention to market regulation (or relatively little attention to state regulation) also 
focus more on NPM elements.6 The results show that NPM in the Netherlands 
seems a positional issue, even more so than market regulation, since the attention of 
the PvdA differs significantly from the attention of VVD and the SP. VVD puts 
significantly more attention to NPM elements than the PvdA, while the SP puts 
significant less attention to it than the PvdA. In Germany, NPM is mainly a right 
positional issue, since the FDP distinguishes itself from all other parties by putting 
more attention to NPM elements. In the UK, no significant differences are found, 
meaning that in contrast to market regulation, NPM is not a positional issue in the 
election phase (see Table 4.4). This means that countries depart from different 
starting points with regard to political competition about NPM. However, no cross-
                                            
6
 In exploring this pattern, we should be aware that market regulation is coded as part of NPM, making 
it probable that political differences follow the same patterns (see Appendix A). Including 
marketisation in NPM may bias the results, but excluding it would not provide a fair representation of 
NPM. The results show that marketisation matters for attention to NPM, but it does not necessarily 
determine it. For instance, the PvdA pays twice as much attention to NPM than it does to 
marketisation. Hence, parties can give attention to NPM without putting much emphasis on 
marketisation (see also Appendix B).  
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national differences are observed in the saliency of the issue, suggesting that the 
importance of NPM in the election phase is similar in the three countries.  
 
Table 4.4 OLS regression of NPM in party manifestos (1986-2006) 
 Netherlands  
(N = 36) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
T 
Reference party: 
PvdA 
B Std. 
Error 
  
(Constant) 12.826 2.761  4.646** 
dummy D66 3.557 3.904 0.911 
dummy VVD 9.746 3.904 2.496* 
dummy CDA 6.005 3.904 1.538 
dummy Green Left -0.268 4.095 -0.065 
dummy SP -10.472 3.904 -2.682* 
R2 = 0.52 
 
 Germany  
(n = 29)  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t 
Reference party: 
SPD 
B Std. 
Error 
 
(Constant) 13.448 3.443 3.905** 
dummy Grünen -4.204 4.870 -0.863 
dummy PDS -5.308 5.107 -1.039 
dummy FDP 23.337 4.870 4.792** 
dummy CDU -1.212 4.870 -0.249 
R2 = 0.65 
 
UK 
(n = 15) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t 
Reference party: 
Labour 
B Std. 
Error 
  
(Constant) 12.041 3.030 3.973 
dummy Liberal 
democrats 
0.367 4.286 0.086 
dummy 
Conservatives 
7.907 4.286 1.845 
R2 = (F- test is not significant)  
(** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05) 
Note: The regression of the standardized residuals is not completely normally distributed in the 
German model 
 
 Unlike in the manifestos, cross-national differences are discernable in the 
debates. NPM receives less attention in Germany than in the other countries (see 
Table 4.5). It has to be stressed that the variable country does not explain attention 
to NPM very adequately according to the low R2. In addition, we must take into 
account that in these analyses it has been assumed that the specific NPM elements 
are of equal importance to parties.  
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 However, it can be stated that the following pattern occurs: while in the UK, 
NPM elements obtain more attention in the debates than in the manifestos, the 
opposite is true in Germany where parties devote greater attention to it in the 
manifestos than in the debates and the attention to NPM elements particularly 
comes from the FDP and the SPD. Parties in the Netherlands exhibit more 
consistency, devoting considerable attention to NPM in both the manifestos and the 
debates (see also appendix B; Table 4.10). This shows that NPM elements are 
relevant in political processes, but that they are not similarly relevant for the 
election and decision-making phases, since parties further NPM in the political 
process in different ways.  
 
Table 4.5 OLS regression: NPM in parliamentary debates 
 (N =119) Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t 
Reference country: 
Netherlands 
B Std. Error   
(Constant) 22.144 2.503 8.848** 
dummy Germany -7.942 3.846 -2.065* 
dummy UK 6.226 3.910 1.592 
R2 = 0.09 
(* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01) 
 
4.8.3 Party competition about NPM and the party configuration 
The results provided above support the hypothesis that NPM matters in the political 
process. At least in Germany and the Netherlands political competition concerning 
NPM largely follows left-right differences. However, remarkable cross-national 
differences do exist in attention to health care goals and the table shows between 
which political parties differences are observed. While attention to NPM elements 
in health care distinguishes parties in the Netherlands and Germany, it does not in 
the UK. Indeed, in the UK, party competition appears to be different since NPM is 
not (a rightist) positional issue in this country, but a valence issue.  
The possibilities for reform may depend on party configurations. Social-democratic 
parties in government, particularly those in block party systems (like the UK) or 
governing with a Christian-democratic party in pivotal systems, have the best 
possibilities for reform (Kitschelt, 2001). In this portion of the study, I compare the 
attention social-democratic ministers allot to NPM elements in parliamentary 
debates verses the attention paid by ‘back benchers’ from the same party. Since 
several characteristics may affect the behavior of backbenchers, the results are 
mainly used to explore how political competition takes place. For instance, British 
MPs represent a certain constituency and have to be re-elected by that constituency. 
However, if NPM is a general solution supported by third way social democrats, it 
would be particularly remarkable if significant differences were to be found 
between the MPs and the minister. 
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 The results show that in the UK significant differences are visible between 
the minister and backbenchers (F = 13.14; p < 0.01). In Germany, the differences 
are not significant, but the ministers devote on average more attention to NPM (see 
Table 4.6). However, the two social-democratic ministers do not devote a 
significantly different proportion of their debate time to NPM elements than the 
Dutch social-democratic party. 
 Overall, the findings indicate that political competition regarding NPM 
elements differs among the countries and that these elements also seem to matter in 
the decision-making phase. Table 4.6 shows that particularly social-democratic 
ministers put much attention to NPM elements. However, the variation between the 
payment systems cannot be explained from these results, it is necessary to explore 
which NPM elements get attention from the different parties.  
 
Table 4.6 Attention to NPM in parliamentary debates of the minister (only 
Germany and the UK) and social-democratic backbenchers 
  N Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Germany SPD 9 16.28 20.19 0.00 66.67 
 Minister 4 35.17 24.62 15.38 66.67 
UK Labour 6 23.15* 7.26 12.05 33.33 
 Minister 7 45.37^ 13.36 30.00 60.00 
Netherlands PvdA 6 26.07 20.38 7.14 57.14 
Party* differs significantly (p<0.05) from party^ 
 
4.9 Party preferences on NPM elements 
Thus far, I have shown that parties offer alternatives to voters with regard to the 
health care goal “accessibility” and that the saliency of NPM elements in 
manifestos is related to the left-right positions of parties in the Netherlands and 
Germany. Additionally, the type of health care system seems to influence the 
attention particular issues receive in the debates. Lastly, I have shown that political 
competition differs among the countries and that NPM has mattered in both 
political phases.  
 Although NPM can be recognized in all three countries, the new hospital 
payment systems have emphasized different elements. Hence, it can be questioned 
whether certain parties emphasize only specific elements of NPM. In addition, I 
study whether differences in the attention dedicated to specific elements of NPM 
between countries are caused by the health care system and/or party configuration. 
 I employ factor analysis to test whether NPM consists of one dimension or 
several.7 The factor analysis (including both the manifestos and the debates in all 
countries) indicates that there are 5 dimensions, which together explain more than 
60% of the variance (see Table 4.7). This is sufficient to conclude that the different 
                                            
7
 A Likert analysis shows (including both the manifestos and debates in all countries) that the different 
elements are no comprehensive scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.147). 
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dimensions form one concept, but also shows that the specific dimensions are 
important. Depending on the country and/or the party, each of these dimensions 
may have received more or less attention. This provides a clearer picture of how 
political controversy concerning NPM varies between the countries.  
 
Table 4.7 Dimensions of NPM in health care debates and manifestos 
   Eigenvalues  
Dimension Description Atlas.ti codes Total  Cumulative % 
1 ‘Individual responsibility’ Patient choice,  
privatization_p  
1.494 14.94 
2 ‘Competitive contracting’ Contracting  
Managerial 
accountability_p 
Marketisation_p 
1.330 28.24 
3 ‘Sector accountability’ Political accountability_n 
Benchmarking 
1.263 40.87 
4 ‘Transparent quality’  Transparency 
Quality 
1.150 52.38 
5 ‘Efficiency’ Efficiency 1.022 62.60 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis  
 
 Dimensions 1 and 2 are positional issues in the election phase in the 
Netherlands and Germany (see Table 4.8). In the Netherlands, the leftist parties 
devote less attention to these categories. In Germany, the FDP distinguishes itself 
from the other parties by emphasizing these elements to a larger extent. The 
dimension sector accountability is not relevant in the countries, and transparent 
quality shows no differences among parties. In other words, political controversy 
surrounding NPM focuses on the dimensions pertaining to the shift from public 
service to market regulation of health care.  
 In contrast to MPs in other leftist parties, those in the German PDS place 
considerable weight on efficiency in the debates. The attention of the German PDS 
is most likely a result of Germany’s transition from an Eastern to a Western 
orientation (cf. Marks, Hooghe, Edwards, and Nelson, 2007). Another interesting 
finding is that in the UK, parties do not position themselves on either of the 
dimensions, since no significant differences can be observed. 
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Tables 4.8 OLS regression: individual responsibility and competitive contracting in Dutch and German party manifestos (1986-
2006) 
 
Individual responsibility Competitive contracting 
Netherlands 
 (N = 35) 
Unstandardized Coefficients  Unstandardized Coefficients  
Reference party: 
VVD 
B Std. Error t B Std. Error t 
(Constant)   8.202 1.681  4.879**  12.140 2.257  5.379** 
dummy SP -7.492 2.378 -3.151** -11.639 3.192 -3.647** 
dummy Green Left -4.206 2.494 -1.687 -5.731 3.347 -1.712 
dummy PvdA -5.419 2.378 -2.279* -5.116 3.192 -1.603 
dummy CDA -2.718 2.378 -1.143 -0.016 3.192 -0.005 
dummy D66  0.407 2.378  0.171 -6.763 3.192 -2.119* 
R2 = 0.37    R2 = 0.40   
 
Individual responsibility Competitive contracting 
 Germany (N = 29) Unstandardized Coefficients  Unstandardized Coefficients  
Reference 
party: FDP 
B Std. Error t B Std. Error t 
(Constant)  15.411 2.664  5.784**   22.012 2.388  9.220** 
dummy PDS -14.697 3.952 -3.719** -21.103 3.541 -5.959** 
dummy Grünen -11.191 3.768 -2.970** -19.435 3.376 -5.756** 
dummy SPD -9.938 3.768 -2.637* -13.690 3.376 -4.055** 
dummy CDU -11.525 3.768 -3.059** -17.595 3.376 -5.211** 
R2 = 0.41    R2 = 0.67   
(* p < 0.05 and ** p < 0.01) 
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 The positions of parties in their manifestos are only partly reflected in the 
debates. As was the case with the general concept of NPM, significant party 
differences within countries can only be observed in the manifestos and not in the 
debates, since political parties seek to compromise in the decision-making phase. 
Dimension 1, individual responsibility, appears to be somewhat important during 
the election phase. However, it is remarkable how much attention Labour pays to 
this dimension in the debates compared to the other British parties. Since it is a 
valence issue, introducing patient choice in the British health care system would be 
highly appreciated by voters and does not directly affect health care goals.  
 Competitive contracting - the second dimension that shows positional 
differences among parties – gets much attention in the manifestos and remains 
important in the debates. Social-democratic parties in the Netherlands and Germany 
give relatively more weight to this category. With regard to the Dutch case, it 
seems that the policy preferences of the government explain why competitive 
contracting emerged in the Netherlands. One could argue that this issue is a 
(negative) left positional issue, meaning that the SP can be distinguished from other 
parties. However, the PvdA cannot be distinguished from the VVD by its amount 
of attention to the issue. Transparent quality is a relevant valence issue in all three 
countries. Only in the UK, the relevance drops significantly in the parliamentary 
debates. The dimension efficiency is more important in the British debates than in 
the manifestos, which can probably be explained by the potential effect the new 
payment system could have on cost control.  
 Next, I test whether there are differences between and within social-
democratic parties. As shown in section 4.8.3, social-democratic ministers devote 
significantly more attention to NPM than their backbenchers. The results from the 
analysis show that in Germany significant differences between the minister and the 
‘backbenchers’ are found on the dimension of transparent quality (F = 8.49; 
p<0.05, see Table 4.9). The minister devotes more attention to this dimension than 
the backbenchers. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, this type of NPM elements is 
heavily stressed in the policy plans. Hence, the degree of attention to certain issues 
by the coalition in the debates is reflected in the reform plans. In contrast to 
Germany, significant differences are found on the dimension of competitive 
contracting in the UK, where the minister devotes far more attention to this 
dimension than the backbenchers (F = 9.20; p < 0.05). In comparison, the German 
and British social-democratic ministers do not place more weight on these 
categories than the Dutch social-democratic party (see Table 4.9).  
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Table 4.9. NPM dimensions 'transparent quality' and 'competitive contracting' and 
social-democratic actors in the parliamentary debates (comparing means with one-
way ANOVA) 
   N Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Competitive 
contracting Germany SPD 9 10.31 15.54 0.00 50.00 
  Minister 4 17.45 16.04 0.00 33.33 
 UK Labour 6 5.70* 5.74 0.00 14.85 
  Minister 7 23.89^ 13.62 0.00 45.45 
 Netherlands PvdA 4 12.67 12.73 0.00 30.77 
Transparent 
quality  Germany  SPD 9 6.76* 8.62 0.00 25.86 
  Minister 4 22.80^ 10.48 15.38 38.10 
 UK Labour 6 6.19 4.21 0.00 11.90 
  Minister 7 7.87 10.39 0.00 30.00 
 Netherlands PvdA 4 5.71 9.04 0.00 20.00 
Party* differs significantly from party^ (p < 0.05) 
 
 In sum, parties in Germany and the Netherlands, emphasize specific 
elements of NPM, while in the UK these elements are valence issues. Competitive 
contracting, the dimension with the most important cross-national differences (see 
Chapter 3), shows the greatest political controversy. It also reveals clear differences 
between the Netherlands and Germany. In the latter, it principally remains a right 
positional issue, i.e. the FDP parties devote significantly more attention to these 
dimensions than other parties. However, in the Netherlands, only the SP is not a 
supporter. In the case of the UK, the minister devotes significantly more attention 
to it than the backbenchers.  
 The specific governmental preferences are visible in the new hospital 
payment systems. These preferences have interacted with the institutional setting in 
specific ways. In the Netherlands, the government focused on traditional rightist 
NPM issues, i.e. marketization and competition. However, it has been expected that 
the specific Dutch coalition has not the best possibilities to further its preferences. 
The fact that its preferences are reflected in the payment systems shows that a 
multiparty system has not hampered the reforms. 
 The way NPM has emerged in the English payment system shows a different 
interaction between preferences and institutions. Here, NPM has been seen as a 
way to solve waiting lists, i.e. increase spending without compromising on 
efficiency. Voters evaluate the British government on its performance on health 
care policy, since means and goals do not differ across political parties. The Labour 
party has the best possibilities for reform and could further its specific preferences. 
In Germany, leftist parties emphasize transparency and quality instead of individual 
responsibility and competitive contracting. This is likely related to the fact that 
accessibility and state regulation are left positional issues. The social-democratic 
party and green party are unlikely to distinguish themselves too far from the PDS. 
Particularly, since health care and NPM are positional issues.  
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4.10 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to relate policy preferences to the variation in the 
DRG-based hospital payment systems. I argued that in the interaction between 
actor preferences, related behavior and the institutional setting is necessary to 
explain variation. The main conclusion of the chapter is that governmental 
preferences have strongly affected the variation in the new payment systems. 
Governments seem to be able to further their preferences irrespective of the party 
system.  
 Table 4.10 summarizes the results. It illustrates that attention to health care 
goals is distributed quite differently among the countries in the two phases of the 
political process. As noted, accessibility to health care is a positional issue in party 
competition in the Netherlands and, particularly, in Germany. State regulation is a 
left positional issue in the Netherlands and not relevant in the two other countries. 
Political competition about NPM in the election phase is comparable between the 
Netherlands and Germany, but the British parties do not distinguish themselves on 
the NPM dimensions which are positional in Germany and the Netherlands.  
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Table 4.10 Summary of political competition in two stages, i.e. election and debates 
 Netherlands Germany United Kingdom 
 Political 
competition in 
election phase 
Change in 
saliency in 
debates 
Political 
competition in 
election phase 
Change in 
saliency in 
debates 
Political 
competition in 
election phase 
Change in 
saliency in 
debates 
Accessibility  Left  Positional  Lib dem - 
Quality Valence - Valence - Valence  
Cost containment Valence - Valence  Valence  
State – market    
State regulation Left - Left  Left  
Market regulation Right - Positional - Right - 
NPM    
Individual 
responsibility Right - Right  Valence - 
Competitive 
contracting Left (negative) - Right - Valence - 
Sector 
accountability Valence - Valence - Valence - 
Transparent 
quality Valence - Valence - Valence  
Efficiency  Valence - Valence - Valence  
Bold : issue gets more than 5% attention in the health care parts of the manifestos  
: attention in the debates is at least 5% more than in the manifestos  
:  attention in the debates is at least 5% less than in the manifestos  
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 The findings show that governmental attention in the decision-making phase 
to the specific NPM health care goals is related to the variation in the new hospital 
payment systems. In the Netherlands, individual responsibility, competitive 
contracting and transparent quality are supported by parties in coalition. In 
Germany, in comparison, individual responsibility and competitive contracting – 
which are missing in the DRG payment system - get much attention from a party 
that is in opposition. The results also reveal large support for NPM from social-
democratic ministers in contrast to relatively low support from the British and 
German social-democratic backbenchers, indicating that the position of political 
actors matters.  
 Though the strength of the market-liberal parties – the key proponents of 
NPM – is relevant to understanding variation in the hospital payment systems, the 
party system affects the extent to which social-democratic parties will prefer NPM 
in health care reforms. Social democratic parties seem to support NPM in 
accordance with their coalition parties. In the Netherlands, PvdA probably gives 
more attention to NPM since it formed a coalition with the VVD, while in 
Germany, the SPD did not want to distinct itself too much from its coalition 
partner.  
 Preferences about NPM are not completely related to left-right party 
differences and need to be understood in their specific context. In the UK, NPM in 
health care is a valence issue that is particularly supported by the government. The 
extent to which the centre-right cabinets in the Netherlands were able to implement 
NPM elements shows that governmental parties are able to further their preferences 
even if they do not form the ‘ideal reform coalition’ (Kitschelt, 2001). This might 
be explained from the fact that health care policy goals and NPM are hardly 
positional and therefore political consensus for the rightwing view on NPM could 
be easily found. 
 In sum, the specific political and health care system might not have a direct 
effect on hospital payment system, but affect the preferences and the distinctions 
between parties with regard to health care. These institutional settings are important 
to understand the different preferences of political parties about the new payment 
systems. It can be expected, for instance, that in the German decision-making phase 
parties cannot find consensus easily, since the health care goals and the means to 
achieve them are more positional. 
 As argued, the federal and corporatist institutional settings limit the ‘room to 
maneuver’ of the German government to a large extent. However, despite the 
political sensitiveness and power-sharing between actors, the preferences of the 
German governmental parties are recognizable in the new hospital payment 
systems. It is therefore interesting to consider the role of the medical bodies, since 
they are regarded as important actors in the process of reform.  
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5. COMPARING STRATEGIES OF GOVERNMENTS AND 
MEDICAL BODIES1 
5.1 Introduction 
A central argument of this dissertation is that action in health care policy is not 
determined by institutions alone but is also influenced by the preferences of the 
actors involved (Keman, 1999b: 250/251). Politicians will strive for the proper 
balance between responding to public demand for expanding services and 
controlling costs (Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson, 2006: 1041). The medical 
profession, in comparison, seeks self-regulation, autonomy and care for patients 
(cf. Salter, 2002). To understand strategies and outcomes, one must ascertain 
whether the interests of the government and medical profession are parallel, 
conflicting or complementary in different institutional contexts (cf. Czada, 1998).  
 As noted in Chapter 2, decision-making in health care is often complex, 
since it involves many political and sectoral actors and since the medical 
professionals dominate provision. This distinguishes health care from other welfare 
state services in which the state, often in collaboration with social partners, controls 
both provision and distribution. For this reason, variation in the payment systems is 
better understood by taking into account the interaction between actors and the 
specific institutional setting (cf. Ross, 2007). In addition, agency is mentioned as 
important for understanding specific reforms. Klein (1990: 700) argues that it is 
possible to understand what is happening in the NHS today and over the last forty 
years by viewing it as a stage on which tensions are acted out. He points 
particularly to the conflict between the medical profession and the state. Other 
countries have also encountered conflicts, especially concerning the economic 
position of the medical profession (e.g. Lieverdink and Maarse, 1995). 
 Chapter 3 underlined that actor preferences and related behavior are 
necessary to understand the variation in the new payment system. Despite 
comparable institutional settings, NPM has emerged to a large extent in the new 
Dutch payment system and to a smaller extent in the German one. Furthermore, the 
payment systems of the UK and the Netherlands are more similar than expected 
given the institutional settings. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the variation in the new 
hospital payment systems cannot be understood without taking party politics into 
account; the preferences of the governmental parties are recognizable in the policy 
output. To improve our understanding of how actor preferences have affected the 
variation in new hospital payment systems, the preferences of the medical bodies 
and their related behavior is studied.  
                                            
1
 Another version of this chapter is published as: Van Essen, A.M (2009). ‘New hospital payment 
systems: comparing medical strategies in the Netherlands, Germany and The UK’ Journal of Health 
care Organisation and Management. vol. 23(3), 304-318 
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The sub-question posed in this chapter is: To what extent are the negotiation 
strategies of the medical bodies related to the variation in the new hospital 
payment systems of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? 
 The next sections conceptualize how the medical profession and the 
government might interact in different institutional contexts, i.e. in contexts with 
different rules of social practice. The formal political system and the health care 
institutions produce different ‘rooms to maneuver’ for the medical profession and 
the government. I conceptualize the interaction between governments and medical 
bodies from a game theoretical perspective. Subsequently, this chapter explores the 
preferences and related behavior of the medical profession by using different data 
sources: official documents, professional publications, secondary studies and an 
expert questionnaire. Subsequently, the game-theoretical conceptualizations are 
compared with preferences and related behavior of medical bodies and 
governments. Finally, the strategies are related to the variation between the 
payment systems.  
 To preview the results, the strategy of the Dutch medical body in interaction 
with the government facilitated the emergence of NPM in an institutional setting 
with comparatively little room to maneuver for the government. The German and 
British medical bodies used more offensive negotiation styles. In the German case, 
this made a smooth-running new hospital payment system more difficult. In the 
UK, the government could further its preferences in the payment system despite the 
offensive strategy of the medical body. In all cases, the interaction between the 
preferences, related behavior and the specific institutional settings do a better job in 
explaining variation than the institutional settings or preferences alone.  
5.2 Centralizing and decentralizing tendencies in payment systems 
Payment systems are the building blocks of any health care system, as they 
introduce powerful incentives for the behavior of actors in the system (Busse, 
Schreyögg, and Smith, 2006). Furthermore, NPM elements are likely to emerge in 
new hospital payment systems, but will do so differently, in particular the extent to 
which hospitals have to compete for funding, the extent to which process 
accountability shifts to performance accountability, and the extent to which 
efficiency is considered an important policy goal.  
 As noted in Chapter 2, The new hospital payment systems are either nation-
specific forms of DRG, as in Germany, or systems based on likeminded ideas, such 
as the ‘payment by result’ system in the UK and the Dutch DBC 
(Diagnosebehandelcombinaties) system. Differences in the way health care 
products are categorized are apparent, but the three systems all reward providers for 
productivity, as an increase in activity will subsequently increase payment (Jegers 
et al, 2002). In other words, the reform initiatives are similar across the countries, 
while the policy ideas and measures vary (see also Chapter 3).  
 The main similarity in how NPM has emerged in the payment systems 
concerns the notion of transparency. Particularly in the Netherlands and Germany, 
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transparency is frequently mentioned as one of the key ideas of the system. 
Differences are found in two areas. First, how accountability has shifted from 
process to performance, i.e. the extent to which non-governmental actors have been 
made accountable for the performance of the system instead of governmental actors 
alone, varies. Second, differences are observed in how and to what extent the 
system facilitates marketization and competition. In Germany, contracting out and 
competition are seldom emphasized or mentioned in the policy plans and 
legislation, while competitive contracting is a key method in the British and Dutch 
plans (see Chapter 3). This indicates that NPM can emerge in various ways in the 
new hospital payment systems.  
 
Table 5.1 Divergence of NPM elements in hospital payment systems 
Netherlands Germany UK 
NPM to a large extent 
recognizable; 
focus on competition and 
marketization 
NPM to some extent 
recognizable; 
focus on transparency, 
efficiency and performance 
NPM to a large extent     
recognizable; 
focus on patient choice and 
contracting 
(source: Chapter 3)  
 
 The contradiction between the centralizing tendencies, e.g. explicit 
performance standards and measures, and the devolutionary tendencies (i.e. 
managerialism) in NPM is relevant (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001). Table 5.1 
shows that in the Netherlands and the UK both centralizing and decentralizing 
elements are present, while in Germany the system prioritizes centralizing 
elements, such as monitoring and transparency. Other studies have confirmed the 
latter finding (cf. Dent, Howorth, Mueller et al., 2004). This shows that preferences 
are probably complex and relevant in understanding the specific policy processes in 
the countries.   
 As argued previously, the variation in hospital payment systems needs 
further empirical investigation, as institutional and state traditions do not provide 
sufficient explanations. These structural factors have been, for instance, unable to 
explain the remarkable ease with which NPM emerged in the Netherlands. Hence, 
it is interesting to study the impact of strategic behavior on similar types of 
reforms, e.g. the implementation of new hospital payment systems, in different 
institutional contexts.  
5.3 Medical bodies and interest representation 
Medical bodies are interest organizations. Similar to other political actors, they 
represent an aggregate of individual preferences and a collectively shared and rank-
ordered set of urgent needs (Keman, 1999b). Their key interests are self-regulation, 
autonomy and care for patients (e.g. Salter, 2002). The selective principle of most 
medical bodies is coercion, i.e. doctors are obliged to become members. Medical 
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bodies act in many cases according to the closed shop principle (Olson, 1982: 21). 
German doctors, for instance, must be members of the Statutory Health Insurance 
(further SHI) doctor association to be allowed to treat SHI patients, who constitute 
a majority.  
  all are interest organizations, medical bodies are organized in different 
ways. In the UK and Germany, the bodies that represent doctors in policy processes 
and those who organize self-regulation are separate: the British Medical 
Association (further BMA) and the General Medical Council (further GMC) are 
separate entities; the German SHI doctors’ associations and are distinct from the 
German doctors’ chambers. Moreover, in Germany voluntary unions represent the 
interests of certain types of doctors (e.g. Hartmann and Marburg union). In the 
Netherlands, by contrast, the body that represents the physicians (Orde van medisch 
specialisten) is part of the organization of self-regulation (further KNMG). All 
recognized medical specialist organizations are members of the representing body. 
Dutch doctors who are employed by the hospital have a specific interest 
organization for collective working agreements (Landelijke vereniging artsen in 
dienstverband, LAD).  
 It is important to understand the role of the medical bodies as interest 
organizations and their role in health care policy. Olson (1982: 28) argues that 
medical bodies, similar to other small well-organized organizations, are able to 
affect the small choices needed to implement policies. As an example, he points to 
the US, where physicians were able to increase their income by the setting up 
Medicare and Medicaid. Moreover, Klein (1990) argues that there is mutual 
dependency between the state and medical bodies. In the UK, for instance, the state 
has become a monopoly employer but is dependent on the medical profession for 
running hospitals. Although this mutual dependency differs in Germany and the 
Netherlands, which do not have national health services, some form of dependency 
is nevertheless present, since most patients are part of public schemes. The 
government is thus the main sponsor and/or regulator, while physicians provide 
health care (in private organizations).    
 Many scholars contend that health care is different from other welfare state 
sectors since a professional group, rather than the state, dominates provision (cf. 
Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Teich Adams, 1990). According to Ham and Alberti 
(2002), in the past, physicians had a large degree of autonomy and control over 
their work. In return, doctors accepted the governmental right to determine the 
budgets and the broad national political framework. Typically when making 
decisions, doctors prioritize treating patients within the available budgetary 
constraints, and politicians do not seek to influence these decisions. However, 
individual professional discretion has eroded over time. On the one hand, it is 
constrained by external pressures, namely the organizations within which 
professionals work and governmental regulation. On the other hand, clinical 
autonomy rests more and more in elite-set rules (Armstrong, 2002; Freidson, 1984).  
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 As noted in Chapter 2, three main health care priorities – quality, cost 
containment and universal accessibility – compete with each other (see also Figure 
2.1). Either a particular treatment for an individual patient is done at the expense of 
other patients who may require equally urgent treatment, or public expenses must 
rise. Doctors are not able to solve this dilemma, yet they are expected to resolve 
conflicts between their interests and the patient’s interest in favor of those of the 
patient (Blumenthal, 1996). For this reason, health care reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s aimed at reducing the decision-making power of medical bodies and 
individual physicians (Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, and Walker, 2007; Giaimo, 2002; 
Horner, 2000; Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008; Lieverdink, 2001).  
 Klein (1990) sees the mutual dependency between the medical profession 
and the government as the politics of a double bed.2 When determined to weaken 
the medical profession, the state has the power to breach the accommodation 
(Klein, 1990). The power of the state in this regard is particularly relevant in 
studying NPM reforms. NPM does not always reduce medical self-regulation, but it 
certainly has the possibility to do so. A central question to understand the 
preferences is therefore whether individual physicians gain from the shifts in 
accountability (i.e. its devolutionary tendencies of NPM) or lose from the enhanced 
scrutiny of the government into their performance and the expenditures of health 
care resources (i.e. its centralizing tendencies).  
 The preceding discussion underlines the complexity of the interaction 
between the medical profession and government. They are in a mutual relationship 
with each other. The medical bodies are able to affect minor choices in policy, but 
the government has the ability to breach the accommodation with the medical 
profession by implementing a specific form of NPM, i.e. by focusing on the 
centralizing tendencies. As will be outlined in the next section, the strategies of the 
medical bodies depend on whether they expect the government to influence their 
position in the health care organization and on how the new payment system may 
affect the care for patients.  
5.4 Conceptualizing ‘politics’ in the interaction between the government and 
medical bodies 
In this section, I apply a game theoretic approach to illustrate the relationship 
between the strategies of the government and those of the medical corporate bodies 
in the policy process under study. The aim is to discern whether strategies tell us 
something about the outcomes of reform. In other words, how does politics matter 
in different institutional settings?  
 I compare the hypothetical game situation with the actual policy processes to 
gain insight into how institutions and actors interact. Woldendorp (2005: 278) 
distinguishes three types of interaction that may occur between different actors: 
                                            
2 As will be outlined below, this is a different interplay than what Scharpf (1998) and Woldendorp (2005) refer to 
as ‘the battle of the sexes’. In the battle of the sexes, the preference to preserve the relationship is more important 
than fulfilling  self-interest. 
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confrontation, bargaining and cooperation. These forms of interaction are useful for 
conceptualizing the strategic choices actors can make under specific circumstances 
in various institutional settings. To understand the strategies of actors as they 
interact with one another, it is important to understand the overall environment: 
what are the preferences of an actor regarding a specific decision; what is the status 
quo, and what are the behavioral assumptions about the strategies of other agents 
(Dion, 1992)?  
5.4.1 Conceptualizing preferences and interests 
Conflicts over competing interests often occur as a ‘zero-sum game’ to actors, i.e. 
political actors may either win or lose at costs of the interests of others (Keman, 
1999b: 251). In health care, conflicts between the government and medical 
profession are explained by the tension between health care as a political decision 
and as a technical medical decision (Starr and Immergut, 1987). As already noted 
in Chapter 2, private interests in health (of patients, for instance) are different from 
the public intersts regarding health care (which is a compromise between quality, 
equitable accessibility and costs). However, it is unclear whether these varying 
interests and preferences are always conflicting or whether they might also be 
parallel or complementary (Czada, 1998; Keman, 1999b).  
 I assume that neither the government nor the medical bodies have an interest 
in keeping the status quo in the three cases. Under the old payment systems, either 
a particular treatment for an individual patient was done at the expense of others 
who may have required equally urgent treatment (fixed budgets), or public 
expenses were pushed up (fee-for-service or payment per hospital day). The result 
was either long waiting lists (as in Netherlands and the UK) or high public costs (as 
in Germany). The old payment systems thus directly limited the care patients 
received, particularly in the Netherlands and UK. Moreover, a new payment system 
might be attractive to both parties. The medical profession is likely to gain from the 
decentralizing tendencies, since these expand their autonomy. In addition, 
governments generally favor more effective and transparent spending of resources.  
 Three aspects are important in conceptualizing the interests or preferences of 
physicians and the government: self-regulation and autonomy of the medical 
profession, an efficient health care system and care for patients. Whereas self-
regulation is likely the most important (self-)interest for physicians, contemporary 
reforms introducing measures to reduce self-regulation of physicians and medical 
bodies suggest that governments prefer the opposite (cf. Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, and 
Walker, 2007; Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008). Implementing NPM, however, does 
not particularly aim on reducing self-regulation. It may have this result, but it is not 
a certain outcome. For this reason, (reducing) self-regulation of the medical 
profession is not considered a very important preference the government.  
 As shown in Chapter 4, parties place varying degrees of attention on the 
different health care goals. Since cost containment has consistently been a salient 
issue in political debates, a more efficient health care system (i.e. more value for 
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money) is more important for the government than either the self-regulation of the 
medical profession and care for patients (i.e. quality and accessibility) in this 
reform (see also Table 4.10). Table 5.2 shows the hypothetical ranking of actor 
preferences. 
Table 5.2 Hypothetical ranking of preferences and interests 
 Medical body Government  
Self-regulation medical profession 1 or 2 [+] 3 or 2 [-]  
Efficient health care system 3 1 
Care for patients  2 or 1  2 or 3 
(1 = very important, 2 = important, 3 = indifferent) 
 
 The strategies actors adopt are not only determined by their own interests 
and preferences, but also the strategic choices of other actors and the specific 
institutional context. According to Keman (1999b: 249), there are two possibilities 
to come to an agreement when two parties compete in the same realm of ‘needs’. If 
parties have complementary preferences, i.e. separate organizations demand 
identical measures that meet their respective interests, they can form strategic 
coalitions. Otherwise, if parties have parallel interests, i.e. separate organizations 
have similar interests but with a different ordering of these interests, they are likely 
to employ cooperative strategies (Keman, 1999b: 260).  
5.4.2 Conceptualizing governmental and medical strategies 
The implementation of new payment systems is here considered as a micro-macro 
paradox (Keman, 1999b: 251). Strategies can be defined as pursuing self-interest 
by means of social interaction whilst being dependent on others. Actors must act 
strategically within the rules of the game to achieve their individual preferences and 
interests, e.g. self-regulation and an efficient health care system. Woldendorp 
(2005) distinguishes three strategies.  
 The first strategy is confrontation. Actors consider their conflicting interests 
more important than the common interest and are therefore unwilling to cooperate. 
With regard to the hypothetical preference ordering, the medical profession and/or 
the government hold opposite views on the importance of self-regulation of the 
medical profession (see Table 5.2). Otherwise, parties might agree on the fact that a 
new payment system is important for the efficiency of health care, but they are 
aware of potentially different self-interests, such as self-regulation. This second 
strategy is bargaining: actors will support a common solution, but only if their 
other interests are safe-guarded. As noted by Keman (1999b), actors might come to 
a solution in instances when the interests and preferences that compete are not very 
important. Finally, a strategy can be described as problem solving when actors deal 
with the same concerns and present comparable solutions. The necessity of a new 
payment system is so important for medical bodies that they are willing to give up 
their other interests to solve the conflict (Keman, 1999b; Scharpf, 1998; 
Woldendorp, 2005). 
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 Game theory is a useful method for relating preferences to strategies and 
outcomes. Building on Scharpf’s framework (1987) - describing the interaction 
between governments, unions and central banks - Hood (1995) has constructed a 
game for public sector workers and politicians (see Figure 5.1). The outcomes and 
possible strategies that he describes provide insight into the way NPM might 
emerge in new hospital payment systems. Figure 5.1 shows that outcome 1 needs 
the cooperation of both political actors. Outcome 2, 3 and 4 are so-called Structure-
Induced Equilibriums (further SIE), meaning that actors cannot change their 
strategy without making the outcome worse (in terms of individual utility) (Hood, 
1995; Keman, 1999b; Shepsle, 1995).  
Table 5.3 Hypothetical outcomes of in the interaction between politicians and 
profession 
 
Pr
o
fe
ss
io
n
 
 Politicians 
 Cooperative Non-cooperative  
Cooperative Outcome 1: smooth 
running medium 
cost NPM/payment 
system  
Outcome 2: 
politicians exploit 
self-regulation 
ethos for cheap and 
effective NPM  
 
Non-cooperative  Outcome 3: 
medical profession 
can expand self-
regulation, 
probably leading to 
high costs public 
management  
Outcome 4: large 
transaction costs by 
the implementation 
of the new hospital 
payment systems 
(i.e. bureaucracy) 
 (sources: Hood, 1995: ; Scharpf, 1987) 
 
 Table 5.3 relates the strategies of actors to different outcomes, but it fails to 
provide insight when different strategies in interactions are expected; in other 
words, the strategies are described without taking the specific context into account. 
Depending on the different modes of interaction, three pay-off matrices can be 
distinguished in Table 5.3. The pay-off matrix chicken game will occur if at least 
one party opts for the confrontation strategy. The prisoner’s dilemma will be played 
if one or both parties opt for the bargaining strategy, while none of the parties opt 
for confrontation. Finally, the battle of the sexes will occur if both parties opt for 
problem solving (see table 5.4c Woldendorp, 2005: 278). The hypothesized 
relationships between interactions and outcomes described here apply to scenarios 
in which two equal, isolated actors play the game once.  
 To be useful for assessing outcomes between actors, the battle of the sexes 
pay-off matrix needs to be conceptualized in a somewhat different manner. In the 
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original game, the least preferred outcome is for the couple to go out separately.3 
With regard to the options specified under Hood’s (1995) scheme, outcome 4 
would be the least preferable option, since in this cell no agreement is reached. 
Outcomes 2 and 3 reveal that an agreement serving the interests of one actor is 
reached. Lastly, outcome 1 prevails if both actors strive for the best common 
solution (Woldendorp, 2005: 68).  
 Which cells can be SIEs according to Hood’s (1995) scheme depends on the 
interaction between the government and the medical bodies, i.e. a chicken game 
results in a different SIEs than a prisoner’s dilemma. SIEs are equilibriums in 
which actors are not likely to change their strategy since their individual utility will 
not increase. If one actor acts offensively in the chicken game, the other actor 
cannot act offensively, as this would lead to outcome 4. In a (one-shot) prisoner’s 
dilemma, both actors have the incentive to act uncooperatively, since if one actor 
does act cooperatively, it will lead to the best individual outcome for the non-
cooperative actor.  
 Note, however, that cooperation can also be a dominant strategy in a 
prisoner’s dilemma. First, an outside enforcement could punish players for 
breaking the deal, in which case free riding is less rational. Or second, an infinite or 
indeterminate number of repetitions of the game could occur, in which case actors 
tend to use the same strategy as in the last game (Axelrod, 1984; Laver, 1997). 
Since the game is repeated over the years, outcome 1 is possible. This is 
conditional cooperation: remaining the cooperation is more useful than free riding 
and breaching the contract (Laver, 1997: 47-48).  
  
                                            
3
 In the original game, a couple wants to go out. The woman prefers to go to the Opera, while the man 
wants to see a ball-game. Going out separately rather than together is the least preferred option 
regardless the venue (see for instance Scharpf 1998).  
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Table 5.4a-c Hypothetical pay-off matrices between government and medical 
bodies 
a. Chicken game  
 Government 
M
ed
ic
a
l 
bo
di
es
 
 Cooperative  Non-cooperative 
Cooperative 0,0  -1, 1 
Non-cooperative 1, -1 -2, -2 
 
b. Prisoner’s dilemma 
 Government 
M
ed
ic
a
l 
bo
di
es
 
 Cooperative  Non-cooperative 
Cooperative 0,0  -2,1 
Non-cooperative 1, -2 -1, -1 
 
 c. Battle of the sexes 
 Government 
M
ed
ic
a
l 
bo
di
es
 
 Cooperative  Non-cooperative 
Cooperative 2,2 0,1 
Non-cooperative 1,0 -2,-2 
Ordinal pay-offs are ranked from worst (-2) to best (2),  
SIEs are bold.  
: Conditional cooperation 
(source: Scharpf, 1998: figure 3.2) 
 
5.4.3 ‘Playing games’ in three different institutional settings 
The simple game theoretic scenarios presented in the last section do not take the 
specific institutional context into account.4 It compares the hypothetical setting 
with the empirical situation to get insight in the interaction of actors and 
institutions. I argue that it is unlikely that the ‘power relations’ of the medical 
bodies and the government are similar across cases, meaning that the specific 
institutional settings influence strategies and interactions.  
 The three cases are relevant. They are comparable with regard to context - 
international organizations and economic situation - but the medical bodies and the 
individual physicians are embedded differently in the political and health care 
systems. As noted in Chapter 2, the countries represent diverse cases (Gerring, 
2007). They signify variation on the independent and dependent variables. As 
outlined below, in the Netherlands and Germany the medical bodies can be 
considered veto players, while in the UK the medical body is not a veto player (cf. 
Immergut, 1992a; Tsebelis, 2000).  
                                            
4
 Several studies have taken institutional settings in games into account, e.g. Ostrom (1998), Norgaard 
(1996), Greif and Laitin (2004).  
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 The organization of the medical self-regulation is not completely similar 
across cases. As shown in Chapter 2, two general trajectories of health care system 
development can be distinguished. The first trajectory is characterized by the 
radical institutionalization of universal access, i.e. the UK (Freeman, 2000: 24). 
State control and power are accepted and embedded in this structure (cf. Kuhlmann 
and Allsop, 2008). The second trajectory is characterized by piecemeal expansion 
of the public insurance scheme (Freeman, 2000: 24). The relationships between 
health care providers and the state have remained more complex in the latter. In 
Germany, self-governing powers developed parallel with the setting up of the 
welfare state. Social health insurance was introduced much earlier alongside a 
corporatist and federal political system (Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008). The Dutch 
system shows a somewhat mixed form; self-regulation of the medical profession 
(1865) existed before the installation of the social health insurance system (1941), 
but in a centralized political system. However, in the Netherlands most 
organizations that operate on the health care market are private (not-for-profit).   
 As noted in Chapter 2, the dissertation does not follow a configurative 
approach, but it studies the interaction between actors and specified institutional 
settings. This chapter focuses on specific institutional settings that are considered 
theoretically important for understanding the interplay between the government and 
the medical profession: first, clinical discretion - the extent to which the medical 
profession can set its own standards; second, economic autonomy - the extent to 
which physicians can affect their income; and third, joint decision-making - the 
extent to which the corporate bodies are involved in decision-making (see Table 
5.5). Clinical discretion is organized most comparably across countries, since 
evidence-based medicine has become the rule. It remains, however, very difficult 
for third parties, e.g. the government, to break the clinical monopoly of medical 
bodies. Financial incentives, as the new payment systems, are usually not able to 
change this (Timmermans, 2005: 490). For this reason, governments recognize 
medical bodies in the three cases despite the specific ‘power balances’. 
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Table 5.5 Institutional context of the medical profession 
Institutional 
settings 
Netherlands Germany UK 
Economic 
autonomy 
70% of physicians are 
independent entrepreneurs 
(mainly in hospitals); the 
other 30% are employed by 
hospitals 
Approx. 50% of physicians work 
in hospitals, mainly salaried 
employees, with some mixed 
forms; the remaining 50% work 
in ambulatory care, mainly 
office-based physicians  
NHS physicians are salaried 
Corporate bodies 
 
Corporate body negotiates 
the (hourly) tariff, but this is 
determined by the Dutch 
health authority; hospitals 
negotiate with insurance 
companies about DBC’s 
Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) 
bodies negotiate tariffs; unions 
are also relevant in the hospital 
sector 
British Medical Association 
(BMA) negotiates about 
contracts with the 
Department of Health and 
NHS, consultant’s contract. 
Decision-making Joint decision-making: 
medical profession 
developed DBC system; 
involved in the maintenance 
Joint decision-making, SHI 
bodies (including medical 
profession, sickness funds and 
Hospital Society) were obliged to 
choose a new payment system; 
involved in the maintenance 
No (official) joint decision-
making 
State-profession 
relationship 
Government depends to a 
large extent on the corporate 
bodies 
Government depends to a large 
extent on the corporate bodies 
Government only partly  
depends on the medical 
profession, e.g. clinical 
directors 
(sources: Giaimo, 2002: 86-106; Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008; Lombarts and Klazinga, 2001)
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 In all three countries, medical bodies register doctors and carry out 
disciplinary punishment.5 These bodies also control the basic standards and 
outcomes for medical education. However, some legal acts, for instance the health 
professions act (BIG) in the Netherlands, make it impossible for the medical bodies 
to close the shop completely, i.e. they cannot act unilaterally. The government is 
able to affect the self-regulation of the medical profession by deciding who can 
work as a physician.  
 To understand the degree of economic autonomy, it is relevant to compare 
how physicians are employed. In the Netherlands and Germany, more than 50% of 
the physicians are individual entrepreneurs (Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008; Lombarts 
and Klazinga, 2001). This means that, in contrast to the British physicians, a large 
proportion of Dutch and German doctors have been able to affect their individual 
income, although medical bodies or interest organizations negotiate (hourly) tariffs 
for hospital doctors. Since 2000, however, Dutch hospitals rather than the medical 
bodies negotiate about the budget and tariffs with insurance companies (Integration 
Act, 2000). Hence, medical organizations are no longer necessary for the 
negotiations. National differences in salaries are also important. Dutch physicians 
(particularly independent entrepreneurs) have very high incomes, and British 
doctors are similarly amongst the peak earners. Salaries are on average much lower 
in Germany and this remains a source of conflict, as demonstrated by the recent 
hospital strikes (Janus, Amelung, Gaitanides, and Schwartz, 2007; Maynard and 
Street, 2006; OECD, 2006).  
 Finally, the medical bodies have been involved in the implementation of the 
new payment systems in different ways. Although the UK does not have a 
corporatist tradition, the health care sector is probably an exception (cf. Giaimo, 
2002). The medical profession is still involved in all layers of the Department of 
Health (Ham, 2004). However, the implementation of the new hospital payment 
system in the UK did not involve the medical bodies to the same extent as in the 
Netherlands and Germany, where medical bodies have contributed considerably to 
the content of the new payment system.  
 In the Netherlands, the physician organizations of the different specialties 
developed the health care products in collaboration with the hospital and insurer 
organizations (Borst, 2000). In Germany, key organizations of the medical 
profession, hospitals and insurers were legally obliged to develop the system 
(Lauterbach and Lungen, 2000). In both countries, institutions representing 
members of key health organizations continue to maintain the system (DBC 
Onderhoud, 2007; InEK, 2009). In the UK, the case mixes of the new payment 
system have been based on historical data. Hence, the degree of clinical and 
economic autonomy varies across cases, and the medical profession has been 
involved in the policy processes in several ways. In the Netherlands and Germany 
medical bodies have had significant leeway, while in the UK individual physicians 
                                            
5
 These are the General Medical Council (GMC) and the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG)  
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are more integrated in the hospital organization and the medical bodies have not 
been involved in joint decision-making with other political actors.  
 As argued, actors attempt to pursue their self-interests but remain dependent 
on others to achieve this. It is clear from the institutional context that the German 
and Dutch governments are unable to act unilaterally in their interactions with the 
medical profession. In contrast, the British government seems better able to pursue 
its individual utility unilaterally, irrespective of the medical strategy. This can be 
explained by the large state involvement in the NHS. Although (weak) corporatism 
can be observed (cf. Giaimo, 2002), the state has a stronger position than in the 
other two cases, since the medical profession is less involved in the policy process. 
The different new institutonalist approaches, i.e. historical institutionalism and 
rational institutionalism do not agree whether institutions are only affecting the 
formal ‘room to maneuver’ or are more decisive for actor preferences and related 
behavior. The next sections show how the preferences and strategies in the policy 
processes interact within institutional settings and whether these mirror the 
hypothetical game-theoretical situations.  
5.5 Method and data 
To analyze the specific interests underpinning the medical profession’s strategies, it 
is necessary to study the stances that the medical profession adopted in relation to 
the introduction of the new hospital payment systems. More specifically, I analyze 
the preferences of the medical profession regarding how the new system might 
affect care for patients and self-regulation. The analysis is based on a systematic 
review of articles, the positions of the medical bodies (retrieved from reports and 
statements published on medical bodies’ websites) and an expert questionnaire.  
 The systematic review of articles centers on three key resources – the ‘BMJ’ 
(edited by the British Medical Association, BMA), ‘Medisch Contact’ (edited by 
the Royal Dutch Medical Association, KNMG) and ‘Das Deutsche Ärzteblatt’ 
(edited by the German Medical Association, Bundesärztekammer, BÄK). It covers 
a time span of 1996-2007, with a focus on 2002-2006. The articles included in the 
review were selected from the digital archives in January 2008 using the following 
key words: 'DBC', 'Fallpauschalen/DRG' and 'payment by results'. All articles 
selected have the new payment system as their main topic or relate the payment 
system to the medical bodies and/or individual physicians. A total of 286 articles 
were reviewed: 138 for Germany, 59 for the Netherlands, and 99 articles for the 
UK.6 
 Note that the nature and scope of the resources differ in some respects. The 
Dutch and German publications are both non-refereed with opinion and policy 
articles, and generally written by physicians. The BMJ, by contrast, is a refereed 
                                            
6
 Note that the number of articles vary significantly among the journals: 962 articles that refer to the 
new payment system were found in the German journal, 347 in the Dutch journal, and 108 in the 
British journal. See for a complete overview of the articles taken into account in this research 
Appendix C (January 2008) 
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journal with a more international scope, and contributions include articles by 
policy-makers as well as scholars of health policy and management. Moreover, the 
total number of articles addressing the new payment systems in the BMJ is 
somewhat lower. All of the journals, however, provide a broad basis for analyzing 
the views of the medical profession.  
 In addition to the analysis of secondary sources described above, an expert 
survey was carried out in the three countries. The questionnaire was administered 
between January and March 2007 to experts selected on the basis of their function, 
e.g. academic, author of professional or scientific publication, or key lecturer at a 
professional conference. Twenty-six experts completed the survey – five from 
Germany, seven from the UK and fourteen from the Netherlands. The primary 
purpose of the survey has been to uncover selection bias and biased reporting of the 
journals. It is thus used in a qualitative manner, i.e. as a form of triangulation of 
data sources.  
 There are two potential risks of focusing mainly on the views of the medical 
bodies. First, the aggregated preferences and interests of individuals might not be 
similar to those of the medical bodies. Second, disagreement within the bodies 
might affect the ranking of their preferences. The present study, however, focuses 
primarily on the views of the medical bodies and the debates presented by the 
journals, since they are involved in the policy process and are assumed to act in the 
interests of their members (Scharpf, 1997).  
5.6 Results 
The purpose of this section is three-fold. First, I analyze the preferences and 
interests of medical bodies across cases. Second, I determine which strategies were 
likely used and which interactions between the government and medical bodies 
occurred. Finally, I consider how such strategies and interactions are related to the 
way NPM has emerged in the policy of new hospital payment systems. This section 
explicates that the tactics employed by a specific actor are not determined by the 
institutional settings alone; rather, an actor’s ‘room to maneuver’ is also affected by 
other political actors, preferences and the assumptions about the strategies of other 
actors (Dion, 1992).  
 It is important to note that this research does not present a thick analysis 
through time (cf. Woldendorp, 2005). As indicated in Chapter 2, I study synchronic 
variation among cases. The expert survey does not allow for comparison over time 
and the resources consulted in the systematic review of articles are also limited. 
The study is however, useful in determining whether politics matters, for instance, 
since preferences of medical bodies seldom change much over time. The German 
and British bodies, for example, did not modify their preferences during the 
reforms of the 1990s (cf. Giaimo, 2002: 56-60, 132-135). Of course, there are some 
instances in which strategies have changed (Giaimo, 2002; Woldendorp, 2005). 
Evidence of such changes in this study is indicated whenever possible.  
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5.6.1 Complementary and parallel interests 
Table 5.6 summarizes the preferences of the medical bodies as found in the three 
data sources. The first row shows the general (aggregated) opinions. The next rows 
indicate opinions regarding how the new payment system will affect care for 
patients, position in the health care system and bureaucratization. The last row 
presents the preferences of the governmental parties (as extensively discussed in 
Chapter 4). 
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Table 5.6 Overview of the views of the medical bodies about policy of the new hospital payment systems 
 Netherlands Germany UK 
General 
standpoints 
All resources show that the 
corporate body has supported the 
development of the system.  
 
Corporate bodies are in general 
negative about the system. 
 
Corporate body is negative about the 
system.  
Care for patients Fear that accessibility to hospital 
care might become more 
difficult1.  
 
 
Competitive elements will lead 
to fragmentation of care 
 
 
Cherry picking of private centers, 
which can be funded through Payment 
by Results (further PbR) 
 
Fear of fragmentation of care  
 
New clinical practices cannot be taken 
into account immediately in tariffs 
 
Self-regulation: 
clinical and 
economic 
autonomy 
An extended role for insurance 
companies   
 
More influential role of the state 
Physicians get more financial 
responsibility.  
 
Shift from clinical priorities to 
economic priorities. 
 
More influential role of the 
state 
Authors focus on other role of 
Primary Care Trusts. Own position 
not really discussed.  
 
Shifts in accountability are discussed 
with regard to hospitals instead of 
individual physicians  
 
Bureaucratization Administrative workload is the 
most negative aspect of the DRG 
system 
 
The way health care products are 
inadequately described 
The way health care products 
are described is unfair 
PbR does not taken into account 
differences 
 
Health care products inadequately 
described 
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(Table 5.6 continued) 
 Netherlands Germany UK 
Summarized 
standpoints of 
government and 
profession 
The governmental parties 
emphasize competition.  
 
 
 
 
Dutch profession more positive 
about competition than other 
countries, particularly at the start 
Governmental parties 
emphasize efficiency and 
transparency  
 
 
 
Profession points to more 
centralized role of government 
and the shift to economic 
priorities  
 
Governmental parties focus on all 
elements of NPM and all important 
parties support payment system 
 
Profession fears competitive elements, 
e.g. competition with private centers  
(For a complete list of sources see appendix C, details about the questionnaire can be obtained from the author)  
1
 This perception is only found in the questionnaire  
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The most remarkable finding is the relatively sizeable support of the Dutch medical 
body. One of its campaigns has been ‘The DBC system is a necessity, but needs to 
be done well’ (DBC moet, maar dan wel goed, http://orde.artsennet.nl). Several 
articles also point to the support of the system (cf. Bolhuis, 2005; Dofferhoff, 
2005). Finally, the evidence from the questionnaire shows that the Dutch medical 
body has been more positive than its German and British counterparts.7  
 It is striking that the preferences of the medical bodies are fairly similar to 
their general reactions to the reforms of the 1990s. Giaimo (2002) argues that both 
the German and British medical bodies were extremely negative about the market-
oriented governmental plans in the 1990s. Lieverdink (2001: 1191) shows that 
Dutch medical practitioners, in contrast, underlined the importance of demand-led 
organization of care in the 1990s. Such findings support the notion that preferences 
about governmental plans are relatively stable over time.  
 As noted in Chapter 2, quality and accessibility of health care are likely 
impacted when reforms focus on containing costs and/or introducing competition 
and marketization. Resen (1998: 155), for instance, argues that including 
competition in public sectors will lead to a focus on specific goals. However, the 
extent to which competition is implemented in the systems seems to have little 
influence on the preferences of the medical bodies concerning care for patients. In 
the Netherlands, for example, neither the journal discussion nor the official 
publications of the medical body highlight the probable effects on quality or 
accessibility of care.8  
 In contrast, the views reflected by the British and German medical bodies 
suggest that they consider the new payment system to be at odds with their ideas 
about care for patients. As illustrated in Table 5.6, their concerns about the 
consequences of the new payment systems on care for patients are comparable. The 
British medical profession points to the influence of the system on fragmentation of 
care (i.e. when money would move out of the NHS to private providers) (Black, 
2004; McGauran, 2004). Similarly, German physicians fear the fragmentation of 
care (Flintrop 2006) and are moreover concerned about the effects of NPM on the 
quality of care (Rieser, 2006; Scherlitz, 2002).  
 The evidence also suggests that self-regulation is important for all medical 
bodies. The Dutch and German bodies emphasize the centralizing tendencies of 
NPM. In the Netherlands, the extended influence of insurance companies is also a 
key issue (Crommentuyn, 2005, 2006). German articles, in comparison, focus 
heavily on the growing economic responsibility of health care providers (Flintrop, 
2006). Hensen et al. (2004), for example, stress the key role of physicians 
nowadays in the economic survival of hospitals.  
                                            
7
  Means on a five points scale (1 = very positive, 5 = very negative): NL 1.71 (N=14, std: 1.07), GER 
4.40 (N = 5, std 0.55), UK 3.86 (N = 7, std 1.07) 
8
 Not one article in Medisch Contact (search June 2008) contained both Dutch words for accessibility 
(toegang/ toegankelijkheid) and DBC. However, the results from the expert survey show that experts 
state that accessibility may decrease with the implementation of the new system.  
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According to these authors, the new payment system will especially deteriorate the 
clinical autonomy of the physicians. In the UK, the expanded roles of PCTs and 
hospitals are important points of discussion. In the British case, the economic 
autonomy of physicians has been so severely eroded in earlier reforms that 
preferences tend to focus more on possible job losses when hospitals have to close 
down and on decreased funding for training and working conditions (Eaton, 2007). 
It confirms the idea that a national health care system has less economic autonomy 
for physicians than the public-regulated systems in the Netherlands and Germany 
where physicians are often employed in private (not-for-profit) hospitals or self-
employed.    
 To summarize the preferences of the medical bodies in the three countries, 
the Dutch medical body supported the new payment system to a large extent, 
believing that it would have little negative effect on care for patients. The 
expectation is that self-regulation might decline due to the new responsibilities and 
measures for health insurers. In contrast, the German and British medical bodies 
did not support the new payment system. These organizations argue that the system 
will have adverse effects on care for patients. Although bureaucratization is cited as 
a problem by the medical bodies in all countries, the German bodies are particularly 
apprehensive of the consequences of the new payment system for their self-
regulation; they fear a loss of autonomy. 
5.6.2 From preferences to related behavior 
As stated above, the strategies of medical bodies are affected by their preferences 
and interests, their assumptions about the strategies of the government and their 
room to maneuver. Section 5.4.3 demonstrated that power dependencies vary 
across cases. While in Germany and the Netherlands, the medical bodies are veto 
players in the process – i.e. the government needs their cooperation to implement 
the system, the British government is able to act to a large extent unilaterally 
(Immergut, 1992a; Tsebelis, 2000).  
 Section 5.3 employed game theory to outline three possible medical 
strategies. First, parties are likely to act in a problem-solving manner if their main 
interest is to cooperate. Second, if actors are aware of their self-interest but are 
nevertheless willing to cooperate, their strategy is likely to bargain. Finally, actors 
focused only on defending their own interests are expected to take on an offensive 
strategy (Scharpf, 1998; Woldendorp, 2005).   
 Tables 5.7a-c delineate the interests and preferences of the medical bodies 
and governments in each of the countries on the basis of the preferences reflected in 
the different resources. Conflicting strategies are more likely to occur in the UK 
and Germany. In these countries, the medical bodies view the new payment 
systems as negatively affecting care for patients and self-regulation and rank these 
preferences relatively high. In the Netherlands, medical bodies evaluate the effect 
the new payment system has on care for patients in a more positive way, and the 
government is relatively indifferent about self-regulation of the medical bodies.  
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Tables 5.7 Lists of needs of medical bodies and governments based on the 
resources 
a. The Netherlands 
 Medical body Government  
Self-regulation medical profession 1 + 3 - 
Efficient health care system 3 2 
Care for patients  2 1 
 
b. Germany  
 Medical bodies Government  
Self-regulation medical profession 1+ 2 -  
Efficient health care system 3 1 
Care for patients  2- 3+ 
 
c. United Kingdom 
 Medical body Government  
Self-regulation medical profession 2+ 3- 
Efficient health care system 3 1 
Care for patients  1- 2+ 
 
 
The governmental ordering of preferences is based on the information provided in 
Chapter 4. Governments focusing on the centralizing tendencies of NPM consider 
reducing the self-regulation of the medical profession paramount. From its focus on 
centralizing elements of NPM, it can be argued that the German government has an 
offensive strategy with regard to the medical profession. Other scholars have 
underlined this; they have recognized the re-emergence of the Ministry of Health as 
key player in contemporary reforms (Altenstetter and Busse, 2005; Hassenteufel 
and Palier, 2007). The scholars consider the DRG reform as a dramatic change in 
the system. The minister even planned a federal ordinance in the implementation of 
the new payment system (Altenstetter and Busse, 2005: 138). 
 Regarding the strategies of the medical bodies, the British and German 
medical bodies have taken a more offensive approach compared to the Dutch one. 
In 2006, the BMA supported the pressure group ‘Keep our NHS public’ 
(www.keepournhspublic.com, October 2008), which particularly opposes the new 
hospital payment system. The situation concerning the power dependencies in 
Germany is somewhat more complex, as the SHI body has to orient its behavior 
toward the common good (gemeinwohlorientierte). In other words, it not only has 
to implement governmental policies but also has to make sure that its members are 
in compliance (Giaimo, 2002: 99). The strategies of the voluntary bodies have 
tended to differ from those of the SHI body, with the former usually adopting a 
more offensive posture (cf. Giaimo, 2002). Demonstrations by doctors and protests 
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against the governmental plans during the DRG reforms underline this (Rabbata, 
2002).  
 Self-regulation has played an important role in the Dutch strategy. The 
medical body has focused particularly on the income of medical specialists. In 
2004, for example, it had to set a specific hourly tariff for independent 
entrepreneurs. However, the tariffs varied to a large extent among specialties, and it 
was not until 2007 that members of the body finally compromised on the tariff. 
Meanwhile, tensions have occurred in the medical profession since the new 
payment system does not affect physicians in a similar way. Ophthalmologists and 
orthopedists, for instance, have many treatments that are subject of price 
negotiation, while other medical specialists have to get along with fixed prices for 
treatments (Medisch Contact, 2004).  
 Chapter 3 revealed that NPM was able to emerge relatively easily in the 
Dutch payment systems. According to the preferences of the medical body, it has 
employed a less offensive strategy than its counterparts in Germany and the UK. 
Other studies indicate that the medical body has hindered decision-making 
processes concerning new medical specialists fees (e.g. Lieverdink and Maarse, 
1995) yet supported decisions about demand-led care (e.g. Lieverdink, 2001). I 
argue that the medical body supports the course of the Dutch government, but it 
defends its self-interest. This corresponds with a bargaining strategy.  
 In sum, conflicting interactions - including strikes and federal ordinance - 
took place in Germany and the UK, while a bargaining interaction – small conflicts 
and cooperation - is evident in the Dutch policy process. Studies on previous 
reforms suggest that the strategies of medical bodies in the current reforms are 
comparable to those of the past. The German and British medical bodies have used 
more offensive strategies, while the Dutch had been more cooperative with regard 
to demand-led care (Giaimo, 2002; Lieverdink, 2001). Hence, preferences and 
related behavior have path-dependent characteristics. The next section shows how 
such strategies can be related to the variation of the new hospital payment systems.  
5.6.3 From strategy to outcome 
The main aim of this chapter is to address whether ‘politics matters’ by focusing on 
the interaction between medical bodies and the government. It compares the game-
theoretical interaction with the preferences and strategies actors used in the policy 
process of the new hospital payment system. Hood (1995) shows that four 
outcomes are possible in NPM reforms regarding the different interests of public 
service workers and the government (see Table 5.3): 1) the NPM system runs 
smoothly, 2) the government exploits the public sector, 3) the public sector exploits 
the government; or 4) implementation of NPM induces high transaction costs. The 
‘chicken game’ pay-off matrix can be applied in the German and British case, while 
in the Dutch case the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ matrix shows the payoffs of the 
outcomes (see Tables 5.4a-c).  
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 Outcome 2 (the government exploits the medical profession) is the most 
likely result in the British case. Although the medical body is not a veto player and 
a top-down challenge seems to have an ongoing place in British health reforms, the 
government must embrace a professional ‘conscience’ and cannot simply focus on 
contracting and oversight (Stevens, 2004: 41-42). However, due to the power 
dependencies, the medical profession might even adopt an uncooperative strategy 
(e.g. go on a long strike) without risking outcome 4 and the government can further 
– particularly in comparison to the other counties - the new payment system to a 
large extent unilaterally.    
 As in Britain, the medical bodies in Germany have used offensive strategies. 
A key difference, however, is that the German medical bodies are veto players. 
Hence, if both the government and the medical bodies employ offensive strategies, 
there will likely be a shift to outcome 4 earlier than in the British case. As noted, 
the German government has used a remarkably offensive strategy, making it 
unlikely that the German SHI body will adopt a strong posture, since it cannot 
breach the accommodation with the government. Furthermore, an offensive 
strategy might lead to a larger individual utility loss, making outcome 2 likely. 
Thus far, the government has been able to reduce the self-regulation of the medical 
profession. However, transaction costs are relatively high as many complain about 
bureaucratization. In addition, the law has been altered several times9 to adjust to 
the problems that occurred (see Table 5.6)  
 One possible explanation for the somewhat unexpected finding that NPM 
emerged relatively easily in the Dutch payment system is the conditional 
cooperation between the government and the medical bodies. The prisoner’s 
dilemma pay-off matrix most accurately represents the Dutch situation. As outlined 
above, none of the actors in the Dutch case used an offensive strategy, but the 
medical body did not act completely cooperative. They have consistently defended 
their self-interests, which has led to conflicts. The Dutch government, however, has 
not breached its contract with the medical bodies nor has it threatened to use a form 
of ordinance, as in the case of the German government. This can be explained by 
the involvement of the medical profession in the development of the new hospital 
payment system which makes it difficult for the medical body to defect the 
bargaining with the government. Interaction between the medical bodies and 
government does not take place in isolation. Since the game is repeated over 
several years, a smooth running hospital payment system (Outcome 1) is possible.  
 However, this does not necessarily mean that the system is a complete 
success in the Netherlands. Indeed, all of the sources indicate that bureaucratization 
is a prominent problem of the new system, suggesting that it is less ‘smooth 
running’ than Hood (1995) anticipated in a scenario in which two parties cooperate. 
In addition, several respondents to the expert questionnaire stated that the Dutch 
payment system is a typical compromise; it serves the specific interests of the 
government and the medical bodies. The ordering of preferences of the medical 
                                            
9
 See table 2.3 
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body and the government confirm that cooperation could be expected (see Table 
5.7a). The need for self-regulation is important for the medical body, while the 
government remains relatively indifferent on this issue during the policy process of 
the new hospital payment system. In addition, the medical profession has not 
considered that the care for patients is affected by the new system, as the German 
and British bodies.  
5.7 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 illustrated that the political and health care system cannot sufficiently 
explain variation in the hospital payment systems. To what extent can the strategies 
of the medical profession in the specific institutional settings explain the variation? 
Scholars studying the interactions between governments and interest groups (e.g. 
unions) have distinguished three negotiation styles based on game theory. These 
negotiation styles are related to specific policy outcomes (cf. Scharpf, 1997, 1998; 
Woldendorp, 2005).  
 In the Netherlands, NPM elements have been able to emerge to a greater 
extent and in a specific way in the new payment system because the medical body 
and the government had a bargaining strategy based on conditional coordination. 
The interaction between actors and institutions show why the government could 
further its preferences in the new payment system in a “veto-ridden” environment. 
The British government acted unilaterally, irrespective of the medical strategy, thus 
furthering its preferences in the new payment systems. In comparison, complaints 
about bureaucratization suggest that the more confrontational strategy adopted by 
the medical profession in Germany has led to a sub-optimal outcome and delays.  
 Moreover, the strategies of SHI bodies seem not in accordance with their 
preferences. Although I have characterized the German situation as a chicken 
game, the institutional context of the SHI body suggests that an outside 
enforcement probably played a role as well. It shows that the government can use 
the specific ‘room of maneuver’ provided by the specific institutional context to 
further its preferences in the payment system.  
 The fact that Dutch medical bodies support the course of action taken by the 
government and the British and German medical bodies do not, shows, that it is 
important to study actors within their institutional context rather than focusing on 
the specific characteristics of the health care and political system. In addition, the 
confrontational position of the German medical profession is in accordance with 
the controversy of health care policy in the political arena. As noted in Chapter 4, 
the red-green government demonstrated little to no support to the decentralizing 
elements of NPM. Its primary focus was on the shift to transparent quality. Hence, 
it does not come as a surprise that the medical profession felt especially threatened 
by the focus on cost containment and the influence of the federal government. This 
fear was further exacerbated when the government threatened the medical bodies 
with an ordinance. It seems that in Germany health care is a more politically 
sensitive policy domain than in the other countries.  
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 In sum, this study has clearly highlighted that medical strategies are 
embedded in specific institutional and interest configurations typical of individual 
national states. It has illustrated that medical strategies matter in health reforms, but 
only if related to the specific context. The results have also shown that specific 
institutional settings influence the preferences of medical bodies. However, it is 
important to note that the specific institutional position does not determine the 
preferences of actors. However, institutions affect preferences in a more complex 
way than argued by rational institutionalists in their ‘calculus approach’ (cf. Hall 
and Taylor, 1996).   
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6. TOWARDS A NEW BALANCE IN HEALTH CARE? 
6.1 Introduction 
The focus of this dissertation has been on how actors and institutions have 
intervened in reforms that introduce principles of the private sector to improve the 
performance of health care policy, i.e. the emergence of NPM in DRG-based 
hospital payment systems. This chapter, first, provides a summary of the findings, 
arguing that actor preferences in interaction with institutional settings are necessary 
to explain variation in how NPM has emerged in new hospital payment systems. 
Chapter 3 has shown that formal political institutions appear to be relevant only 
indirectly. Moreover, the preferences of political parties in interaction with their 
specific institutional setting, i.e. the party system and the national health care 
system, on the one hand, and the negotiation strategies of the medical bodies in 
relation to their specific (veto-)position, on the other hand appear to do a better job 
of explaining variation in the payment systems.  
 Second, I relate my findings to welfare state reforms in general. As noted in 
Chapters 1 and 2, many contemporary welfare state studies have focused on 
retrenchment, i.e. changes which reduce social entitlements, for example, by 
lowering social benefits, tightening eligibility rules and shortening entitlement 
periods (Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002; Green-Pedersen, 2007). However, health 
care reforms are rarely taken into account in these welfare state studies. One reason 
for this is that health care reforms are often characterized as restructuring and not as 
retrenchment. I have argued, however, that a new hospital payment system may 
result in retrenchment, since the balance between the main health care goals – 
accessibility, quality and cost containment – shifts to the latter. For this reason, I 
contend that any answer to the question of whether politics matters in welfare state 
reforms is incomplete if health care reforms are ignored.  
 Third, I elaborate how my findings contribute to claims found in the NPM 
literature. The aim of this study has not been to explain NPM, per se, but to show 
which factors account for variation in its emergence in health care policy reforms. 
The analysis has demonstrated that NPM matters, but that it does not emerge as a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. I contend that actors ‘pick and choose’ among the 
various elements of NPM. This study has also provided a relatively detailed 
account of political competition in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, which is 
useful to better understand cross-national variation in NPM driven reforms.   
 Finally, I outline how this dissertation is related to other studies that employ 
a new institutionalist approach. The main argument driving this study was that the 
interaction between actors and institutions is necessary to explain variations. I use 
institutionalist theory, but as a framework of interpretation to understand how and 
to what extent the interaction between actors and institutions is related to the 
specific emergence of NPM in the hospital payment systems. This study appears to 
confirm the ideas set forth in the institutionalist approaches of Scharpf (1997) and 
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Peters et al. (2005). I have demonstrated by means of comparative case studies 
design – allowing for in-depth analysis – that actor preferences should be studied as 
a separate category and evaluated in conjunction with the formal political 
institutional context and health care system.  
6.2 Summarizing the findings 
Since the 1980s, NPM has been considered a solution for many public sector 
problems, particularly for problems between the government (principal) and public 
service providers (agents). NPM has been defined as lessening or removing 
differences between the public and private sectors and shifting the emphasis of 
governance from process accountability towards a greater element of accountability 
in terms of results to improve the performance of the public sector (Hood, 1995; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 8). NPM is a fascinating topic to study since it is an 
ideational stream close to neo-liberalism, which affects the health care sector. 
Though it has been studied extensively, it is seldom related to welfare state politics.  
 The aim of this dissertation has been to explain variation in the DRG based 
payment systems. I have argued that the emergence of NPM in the new hospital 
payment systems would demonstrate how and to what extent public governance has 
shifted to private governance and how (institutional) relationships between health 
care actors have changed in curative medicine. By exploring to what extent and 
how NPM elements have indeed emerged, it is possible to ascertain this variation. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, NPM can take shape in DRG-based payment systems but 
this is not a forgone conclusion. In some cases, the systems have been mainly 
symbolic, inducing little real change in the way the hospital sector is governed, 
while in other cases they have provided the basis for the privatization of the health 
care sector.  
 Studying the variation in new hospital payment systems from a political 
science perspective starts from the idea that to understand reforms it is necessary to 
understand political processes. Moreover, as many scholars of new institutionalism 
have shown, these processes do not take place in a vacuum. There is a certain 
system of rules in any historically-given society that not only organizes and 
regulates social behavior, but also makes it understandable – and in limited 
conditional sense – predictable for those sharing knowledge of the rules (Scharpf, 
1997: 40).  
 Health care systems and health care policy and are known for their 
tremendous rigidity in the countries in this study. The dominant structures have 
existed since the Post-War Era. Consequently, similar to studies of other welfare 
state sectors, health care policy studies are frequently analyzed in a historical 
institutionalist perspective (cf. Immergut, 1992a). However, historical 
institutionalism has difficulties explaining small, but often relevant, changes. Peters 
et al. (2005: 1277) suggest that historical institutionalism would gain from 
introducing some form of agency. This dissertation has assessed how far new 
institutionalist explanations can travel by analyzing to what extent and how the 
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interaction of actors and institutions account for variation in reforms. As outlined 
further below, I have explored the preferences and related behavior of political 
parties and the medical profession within specified institutional settings and 
compared these across three countries. In doing so, I have not treated preferences as 
exogenous and given, but I have derived them from their specific context. Hence, 
this study has analyzed to what extent NPM can be seen as an ideational feature 
that, with pressing economic problems, creates a critical juncture. Furthermore, it 
has analyzed the extent to which actors have the capacity to forward their 
preferences in similar reform initiatives in different institutional contexts.  
 The research question driving this dissertation was: To what extent is the 
variation between new hospital payment systems in Germany, the Netherlands and 
the UK a result of preferences about NPM, related behavior of political parties and 
medical bodies, and institutional characteristics of the political and health care 
systems? The study was designed as a comparative case study to understand which 
interactions between actors and institutions are instrumental for explaining changes 
in different institutional settings. Such an approach facilitated a study of 
interactions at different levels of analysis and an examination of variation in the 
payment systems, i.e. the emergence of NPM elements, in a qualitative way. The 
main conclusion is that the preferences of governmental parties and the negotiation 
strategies of the medical bodies in interaction with the specific institutional setting 
are particularly relevant for understanding variation in the emergence of NPM in 
DRG-based payment systems. Though constrained by their specific room to 
maneuver, actors are able to further their preferences, which are shaped by specific 
national contexts.   
 To map the variation in new hospital payment systems, the first sub-question 
addressed in this dissertation was: To what extent and how has variation occurred 
in the emergence of NPM elements in the new hospital payment systems of 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? The results have shown that elements of 
NPM are visible in each of the new hospital payment systems. However, NPM does 
not emerge as coherent ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. Variation is particularly visible 
in the specific focus of the policy measures of the new payment systems in the 
three countries. The focal point is on transparency and efficiency in Germany, on 
competition and marketization in the Netherlands, and on patient choice and 
contracting in the UK.  
 Explanations for variation in outcomes of reforms are often sought in 
specific institutional settings. I have argued that if institutional settings are decisive 
for the way NPM emerges, institutions that determine the extent of formalized 
‘power-sharing’ between actors will be most decisive. Hence, the following 
hypothesis was put forward: NPM emerges to the largest extent in the English 
payment system, which has the fewest veto-points; it emerges to a moderate extent 
in the Netherlands, and it emerges to a smaller extent in Germany, which has a 
federal and corporatist political system. In addition, I have argued that the state 
tradition in the UK, i.e. the organizational features and the forms of procedures in 
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state organizations, is particularly receptive to NPM (cf. Resen, 1998). This made it 
likely that NPM would emerge more extensively in the UK than in the Netherlands 
or in Germany.  
 The findings indicate that NPM did indeed emerge to a large extent in the 
UK. However, the fact that NPM also developed extensively in the Dutch payment 
system and the fact that different elements of NPM are emphasized in the two 
countries demonstrate that institutional settings provide an insufficient explanation 
of variation in the payment systems. Some variation could be explained from the 
specific institutional context, for example the introduction of ‘patient choice’ in the 
English payment system and the focus on efficiency in the German case. This is in 
accordance with Peters et al.’s (2005: 1296) argument that a historical 
institutionalist framework is useful but that it needs some form of agency to 
understand how ideas, as embodied in NPM, are shaped in policy domains. In 
addition, Scharpf (2000) has argued that preferences of actors must be analyzed as 
a separate factor in comparative research. For this reason, I have examined the 
preferences of political parties and the medical bodies in interaction with specific 
institutional settings, i.e. the way the health care system and political system 
regulate their ‘room to maneuver’.  
 The first category of actors examined was political parties. Several welfare 
state scholars have discussed the role of political parties  in reforms (cf. Keman, 
Vis, and Van Kersbergen, 2006; Starke, 2006; Vis, Van Kersbergen, and Becker, 
2008). The preferences and behavior of political parties are also identified as 
factors for explaining NPM reforms (Green-Pedersen, 2002b). In this dissertation, I 
have studied policy preferences in two phases of political competition, electoral 
competition and parliamentary decision-making, in order to analyze the interaction 
of preferences within these specific institutional settings, i.e. party configuration 
and health care system. The second sub-question considered in this dissertation 
was: To what extent and how are policy preferences about health care goals and 
NPM related to the variation in the new hospital payment systems of Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK? 
 I argued that the preferences of social-democratic parties are related to the 
variation in the hospital payment systems. However, the results have shown that 
governmental parties’ attention to specific NPM elements better explains the 
emergence of these elements in new hospital payment systems. This demonstrates 
that ‘politics matters’, since governmental parties are able further their preferences 
into policy. In addition, Chapter 4 illustrated a clear interaction between actor 
preferences and the specific institutional setting.  
 Party configurations and health care systems are central to understanding the 
preferences of political parties concerning the new payment systems. The role that 
health care has in political competition is different across the countries: it is far 
more of a positional issue in Germany than in the Netherlands or the UK. In 
addition, the German federal and corporatist political system may not have a direct 
effect on the hospital payment system, for instance, but it influences the preferences 
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and the distinctions between parties with regard to health care. The expectation is 
that in Germany parties cannot find consensus easily during the decision-making 
phase, since the health care goal accessibility is positional.  
 The results have also shown that NPM is influential in the three payment 
systems but that its elements take on different shapes given the variation in political 
processes. In both the Netherlands and Germany, NPM is a positional issue in the 
political phases, while it is a valence issue in the UK. The strong focus on the 
quality dimension in the German case can be explained by the fact that the SPD had 
less ‘room to maneuver’, since, for instance, the SPD formed a coalition with the 
Green-Party and since there has been greater political controversy surrounding the 
implementation of NPM in health care in Germany. Substantial support for NPM in 
the Dutch political arena has resulted in more ‘room to maneuver’ for governmental 
parties, facilitating political consensus for the NPM ‘dimension’ marketisation and 
competition. In the UK, health care goals and particularly NPM are valence issues, 
meaning that specific governmental preferences are less contested and thus more 
easily shaped into policy. The significant support of the Labour party for NPM, 
however, concentrates less on marketisation and competition than in the Dutch 
case.  
 In sum, the results have shown that NPM elements are supported insofar as 
they fit into the political ideologies of parties. The support can be understood partly 
from left-right differences between parties and partly from the specific institutional 
setting in which parties operate. Party preferences and related behavior seem 
particularly relevant for variation in the new payment systems. Despite specific 
party configurations and different forms of political competition, governmental 
preferences are furthered in the new hospital payment system in all three countries. 
This is a somewhat remarkable finding, since in Germany and to some extent in the 
Netherlands, governments share decision-making power with other actors, i.e. 
medical bodies.  
 The influential role of the medical profession is often cited as important in 
health care policy-making (Freeman, 2000; Freeman and Moran, 2000). Hence, I 
have studied medical bodies to gain better insight into how their preferences and 
related behavior are connected to variation in the new hospital payment systems. 
The specific sub-question considered was: To what extent are the negotiation 
strategies of the medical bodies related to variation in the new hospital payment 
systems of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? The results indicate that 
strategies and preferences, in interaction with the specific institutional position of 
the medical profession, explain variation in payment systems. Chapter 5 has shown, 
for example, that the Dutch medical strategy of ‘cooperation’ resulted in a change 
in the hospital payment system, i.e. a shift towards private governance. The 
institutional position of the medical profession and its large involvement in the 
development of the new payment system made it less ‘rational’ to take another 
negotiation strategy. Moreover, the preferences of the medical bodies and the 
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government were parallel in this case (cf. Czada, 1998). Hence, conflict was not the 
game to play.  
 In the UK and Germany, the non-cooperative negotiation strategies have 
affected the payment systems in different ways, which can be explained by taking 
both actors and institutional structures into account. In both countries, the non-
cooperative strategy resulted from conflicting preferences between the medical 
body and the government. However, in the UK the negotiation strategy has done 
little to constrain the government’s ‘room of maneuver’ in furthering its 
preferences. In Germany, the ‘confrontation’ negotiation strategy has led to severe 
measures by the government to preserve its preferences in health care policy. It has 
curtailed the medical bodies’ ‘room to maneuver’ and resulted in delays in the 
policy process and multiple policy adjustments.  
 The confrontational position of the German medical profession is in 
accordance with the controversy surrounding health care policy in the political 
arena. In Germany, health care seems to be a more politically sensitive policy 
domain compared to the other two countries. Yet, retrospectively, the strategy of 
the German medical bodies is difficult to understand given their powerful position 
in the system. When one considers the preferences of the government and the 
medical bodies as well as the specific ‘room to maneuver’, it seems irrational for 
the actors to act non-cooperatively. I contend that alone Germany’s veto-ridden 
political system cannot explain the small extent and the specific way NPM 
emerged; rather, one must consider the interaction between preferences, behavior 
and the specific institutional setting (cf. Schmidt, 2002). Similarly, the extensive 
emergence of NPM in the Dutch case is better understood by taking into account 
governmental preferences and the strategies of the medical bodies as they interact 
with the specific institutional setting.  
 In conclusion, this dissertation has shown that NPM elements emerge in 
DRG-based hospital payment systems. However, the variation of these payment 
systems across countries demonstrates that the extent to which NPM develops and 
how it matters varies considerably across the cases. As with other ideational 
streams, NPM is shaped by the particular political and economic circumstances 
occurring at critical junctures. The extant political and health care institutional 
settings and the self-interested behavior of political and health care actors account 
for the variation in new hospital payment systems; in other words, institutions and 
politics matter. In addition, my results have shown that institutions are central to 
explanations of variation in payment systems and cannot simply be considered 
rules/inducements influencing individuals’ attempt to maximize their own utilities 
(cf. Keman, 1999b; North, 1990; Peters, 2005; Weingast, 2002). The particular 
institutional settings or ‘paths’ in a policy domain are relevant for understanding 
how – in this case – NPM has emerged in policy. Moreover, actor preferences and 
behavior are crucial features for understanding the specific emergence of an 
ideational feature in policy.  
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6.3 Relating this study to contemporary welfare state studies 
Welfare state studies and health care policy studies have developed along separate 
paths. While comparativists studying reforms in income maintenance tend to link 
their work to the broader welfare state literature, health care scholars seldom relate 
their findings to research on other welfare state reforms. According to Hacker 
(2004: 724), health care should have a more prominent place in comparative 
political analysis. He argues that much of the work on health care reform is too 
focused on policy details to be helpful for welfare state research, which tends to 
center on income-replacement programs (i.e. social security programs) or on labor 
market incentives (cf. Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 2006; Starke, 2007; Vis, 
Van Kersbergen, and Becker, 2008).  
 A number of scholars have criticized the recent focus on retrenchment in the 
reform literature, and several have suggested alternatives to concentrating solely on 
the traditional sectors when studying the welfare state (cf. Bonoli, 2007; Jessop, 
1999; Sol and Westerveld, 2005). Giaimo and Manow (1999), for example, argue 
that three types of reform should be examined to understand changes in the welfare 
state: shifts in social provision, the introduction of market forces in the welfare 
state and the privatization of social (if not ‘new’) risks. Others have distinguished 
between welfare state retrenchment, i.e. reducing welfare state generosity, and 
restructuring, i.e. changing institutional rules (cf. Clasen and Van Oorschot, 2002; 
Green-Pedersen, 2007).  
 This study contributes to the broader literature on welfare states by 
considering whether explanations for reform differ when health care policy reforms 
are taken into account. As noted, NPM shifts the balance among health care goals 
to cost containment and leads to a public-private shift in health care affecting health 
care entitlements. Applying NPM ideas to the welfare state is thus a means of 
welfare state restructuring and may result in retrenchment. This implies that health 
care reform is as politically sensitive as other welfare state reforms. I argue that 
health care policy is part and parcel of welfare state studies and therefore must be 
taken into account when addressing the question of whether ‘politics matters’ in 
explaining developments (whether positive or negative) in the welfare state. 
 An important discussion in the contemporary welfare state literature is to 
what extent specific institutional characteristics, path-dependency and political 
actors should be taken into account in explaining reforms. As argued in Chapter 2, 
the health care sector differs from other welfare state sectors in three respects:  the 
quality aspect, the role of the medical profession and the large public support. 
Accordingly, one would expect explanations to be different as well.  
 Explanations of welfare state retrenchment often point to institutional 
characteristics and path dependency (cf. Pierson, 1994); such factors are also 
mentioned in explanations of health care reforms (Hacker, 2004). Others have 
stated that actor preferences and strategic behavior within contexts are more 
relevant for explaining welfare state reforms (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2002a; Vis, Van 
Kersbergen, and Becker, 2008). The results of this research confirm the latter. 
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Governmental parties can further their preferences in health care reforms. In 
addition, this study indicates that the strategies of medical bodies vis-à-vis 
governments matter. Hence, explanations of health care reforms are not altogether 
different from those of other welfare state reforms, although the specific interaction 
between the medical bodies and the institutional context is characteristic of the 
health care sector. I contend that health care should be included more often in 
welfare state studies.  
 This dissertation has also shown that the political controversies related to 
health care are weaker than sometimes argued (cf. Pierson, 1994). Health care 
seems to be politically sensitive only in the German case, where there were 
significant differences between parties’ positions. In the other cases, health care 
policy appears to be a valence issue. The implication is that governmental parties 
will be evaluated on their performance in health care policy and not on their 
specific preferences. This may explain why consensus over NPM could be found 
among Dutch parties and why patient choice and quality have been particularly 
emphasized in the UK.  
 As argued in Chapter 2, comparative case studies have advantages and 
disadvantages. Many scholars argue that qualitative studies should not only analyze 
many aspects of one phenomenon in a single case but also aim to provide 
knowledge over variety of cases. For this reason, I selected cases that were as 
diverse as possible in their political and health care institutional settings. A 
qualitative research design has been an excellent choice for this study from a 
theoretical and conceptual point of view, but how useful are the findings for the 
general welfare state debate? The main contribution of this study to the broader 
welfare state literature is to establish the relationship between governmental 
preferences and reform. A key finding is that in similar initiatives (each triggered 
by cost containment problems and an ideational stream), governmental preferences 
in interaction with a specific institutional setting were quite relevant for the 
reforms.  
6.4 Studying NPM from a political science perspective 
In Chapter 1, I mentioned the book “If Disney Ran Your Hospital: 9 ½ Things You 
Would Do Differently” (Lee, 2004) as an example of the search for the ultimate 
solution to challenges in health care services. Although several contemporary 
studies have shown that NPM is not a panacea for problems in the public sector, I 
have shown that it nevertheless matters, since elements of NPM are recognizable in 
the new hospital payment systems in the three cases.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, one avenue of research would be to compare 
why rather different countries have converged to a similar type of payment system. 
I have argued that similar ways of ‘framing the problem’ and similar intellectual 
underpinnings of the proposed solution offer possible explanations (cf. Harrison, 
Moran, and Wood, 2002). In a review article, Common (1998) lists several reasons 
for the international diffusion of NPM: 1) NPM as a missionary goal; 2) the 
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internationalization of privatization; 3) the role of international relations, and 4) 
increasing policy transfer activity. Policy transfer has been particularly well-studied 
(cf. Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Greener, 2004; Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer, 
2005). Common (1998) also emphasizes the idea that NPM can be viewed as a 
product of ‘modernization’, i.e. the international pressures and changes in corporate 
governance make a reorganization of the public sector inevitable. Finally, the focus 
on NPM in the international field (e.g. OECD) could also explain its popularity.  
 However, others argue that NPM is already outdated. Several contemporary 
articles, for instance, deal with post-NPM changes in public sectors and other forms 
of shifts in governance (cf. Dent, 2005). I would argue that NPM is indeed no 
longer a missionary goal for consultants and policy advisers, but its elements 
remain influential for new hospital payment systems (cf. Ferlie and Steane, 2002). 
First, as I have argued NPM usefully characterizes the public-private shift in the 
different hospital payment systems. Second, this study had highlighted the paradox 
of considering NPM as an apolitical toolkit that emerges in the wake of specific 
socio-economic pressures versus viewing it as a conscious choice of political 
parties. I have shown that NPM elements have not only become part of the policy 
options available to political parties but are also shaped by political parties. Third, 
it is noteworthy that, according to the existing NPM literature, NPM does not 
emerge as a coherent package and that policy-makers, i.e. governmental parties, 
tend to ‘pick and choose’ among NPM elements. The political ‘translation’ of NPM 
is important to understand its heterogeneous introduction.  
 Although researchers have demonstrated that there is cross-national and 
temporal variation, most have attributed it to specific national characteristics or to 
the evolution of NPM (cf. Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; Ferlie and Steane, 
2002). I, however, have provided a detailed account indicating that there is a 
linkage between specific partisan preferences and NPM. Political parties do not see 
NPM as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, but emphasize specific elements as shown in 
Chapter 4. In other words, they have incorporated NPM in their ‘party ideologies’ 
but in a way that seems to fit their overall political complexion.  
6.5 New institutionalism and health care reforms 
I have argued that including agency and preferences into a historical-institutionalist 
framework is useful to understand health care reforms. In addition, I relate my 
findings to the new institutionalist literature by discussing the interpretations of 
Hacker (2004), Immergut (1992) and Pierson (2004). As outlined in Chapter 2, I 
have used historical institutionalism and rational institutionalism as complementary 
frameworks to interpret my findings. A rational institutionalist perspective is 
helpful but insufficient for understanding reforms in health care policy, while a 
historical institutionalist perspective suffers from overly broad assumptions about 
the relationship between preferences and institutions. Hence, I have chosen to study 
preferences as a separate category (Scharpf, 2000) and to relate them to specific 
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institutional contexts. I have also drawn from rational institutionalism to 
conceptualize the negotiation strategies of the medical bodies.  
 The results of this study have shown, first, that preferences of actors are only 
understandable if their specific institutional context is taken into account. As 
argued above, this is visible in the NPM preferences of social-democratic parties 
and even more clearly in the preferences of the medical bodies. Second, although 
governmental attention towards centralizing or decentralizing tendencies seem to 
explain the negotiation strategy of medical bodies to a certain extent, it is difficult 
to understand why the German and British medical bodies feared that the new 
hospital payment system would affect care for patients, while the Dutch medical 
bodies did not. Third, I found that the strategies of the medical bodies were 
relatively similar compared to earlier health care reforms in these countries, 
indicating that systemic features are important. Fourth, retrospectively, it is 
questionable whether strategies of the medical bodies have optimal given their 
specific ‘room to maneuver’.  
 By reconstructing the policy processes, I have shown that preferences have 
not been formed exogenously and that actors have not always acted as rationally as 
would be expected. The German bodies, for instance, had a conflicting strategy, 
which ran counter to what should be expected from their specific position in the 
decision-making process but which is understandable with regard to their specific 
preferences. This is likely related to the particular role health care plays in the 
political process. Hence, this study has underlined the ideas advanced by Peters et 
al. (2005) and Scharpf (1997; 2000) that agency and preferences are relevant to 
understanding outcomes of reform and that these elements should be analyzed in 
tandem with the specific institutional settings.  
 In Chapter 1, I compared different views on how changes might occur. Three 
possibilities were distinguished: 1) Reforms depend as much on historical 
‘accident’ as on the inventiveness of actors (Immergut, 1992b), i.e. actors and 
context interact. 2) Market reforms tend to occur more often in centralized political 
and health care systems than in decentralized systems, where governments often 
‘bring the state back in’ (Hacker, 2004). This perspective emphasizes the specific 
institutional setting for an instrumental explanation for reform outcomes. 3) Initial 
steps in a particular direction may encourage further movement along the same path 
(Pierson, 2004). This last perspective argues that reforms often continue in the 
same direction as the original setting. I outline below that although I find evidence 
that the specific context is important for understanding reforms, my findings are 
most in line with Immergut’s (1992) conclusions.  
 The present study does not confirm Hacker’s (2004) observation. I find little 
evidence that the emergence of NPM can be sufficiently explained by the way the 
health care sector was organized previously. In addition, variation in party support 
for NPM indicates that party preferences matter and are obviously not completely 
shaped by the health care system as such. Yet, I agree with Hacker’s (2004) 
assumption that market failures are likely to compel governments to bring the state 
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back in, while bureaucracy problems are likely to provoke reforms through 
marketisation. Moreover, political actors would continue to seek optimal health 
care performance by implementing public-private shifts. However, my study has 
shown that large waiting lists and high costs together with a neo-liberal ideational 
stream, can be seen as critical junctures, but are also given shape by political parties 
and consequently lead to different results in different institutional contexts. Though 
such results are affected by the old institutional settings, they cannot be sufficiently 
explained by them.  
 Pierson’s (2004) idea that initial steps in a particular direction may 
encourage further movement along the same path has been proven to be relevant in 
this study. Indeed, the way NPM has emerged in the new payment systems is 
related to the existing systems, and none of the countries has demonstrated a clear 
cut preference for either a private health care sector or a system-wide reform, i.e. a 
preference for a shift from national health service towards a (private) insurance-
based scheme or vice versa. As argued in Chapter 2, the relationships between 
actors (principal-agent) have been altered by the shift to more performance 
accountability. However, Pierson’s (2004) view cannot explain why similar 
reforms take place in diverse health care systems. This dissertation has shown that 
similar reforms can take place in different health care systems and that such 
reforms will have varying results, as the initiatives are mediated by the interaction 
between actors and specific institutions.  
 Finally, Immergut’s (1992) view coincides with the idea that agency should 
be introduced into new historical institutionalism. Immergut is known as a 
historical-institutionalist with a clear ‘calculus approach’ with regard to the 
relationship between actors and institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The 
inventiveness of actors is indeed as relevant as the institutional settings to 
understand how a critical juncture is given shape in specific contexts. However, 
this dissertation has demonstrated that the emergence of NPM - although a critical 
juncture – is not an historical accident, since it is to varying extents embedded in 
the preferences of political parties. To understand variation in the way NPM has 
emerged in the new hospital payment systems, it is therefore necessary to consider 
the interaction between actors and institutions.  
6.6 Has a balance been found?  
The title of this dissertation, ‘seeking a balance’, refers to three things: 1) a balance 
between specific policy preferences and interests of political actors in the health 
care sector; 2) a balance in public-private governance, and 3) a balance between 
different health care goals. As I have shown, different balances are discernable in 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Moreover, these differences can be 
explained by the interaction between the preferences of political parties and the 
medical profession and the institutional setting. The implementation phases of the 
new payment systems took place during the time period when this dissertation was 
written. Numerous newspaper articles have questioned whether the performance of 
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the health care sector has indeed improved. Hence, in a speculative way: What do 
the results of this dissertation mean for health care policy more generally?  
 There is no easy answer to this question. First, it is debatable whether the 
different policy ideas and measures that I distinguished in Chapter 3 will ever be 
met in their full extent. It is also too early to establish whether the new payment 
systems should be characterized as ‘reform without change’ (Hacker, 2004). 
Although the new payment systems appear to be functioning poorly at the moment, 
it is important to recall that the old payment systems had serious problems as well. 
However, the longer the convergence phases of the new payment systems take, the 
greater the chance that no structural reforms will emerge. Indeed, the systems may 
not change the financial outcomes of the health care sector at all.  
 A possible explanation is that introducing NPM elements does probably not 
lead to an ‘optimal solution’ for the specific PA-problems that occur in health care 
policy. Based on the results of this dissertation, one could argue that policy-makers 
are unable to choose the most optimal solution for two reasons. First, a bounded 
rationality, i.e. their choices are formed in a complex setting affected both by the 
specific (problems of the) health care system and by the ideological features of 
their particular political party. This means that their choices are neither driven by 
purely rational nor purely ideological considerations alone. Second, every change 
in health care policy, even those presented as ‘more value, less money’, will have 
its trade-offs and therefore will be limited in scope. In addition to its potential 
effects on accessibility and quality, NPM has triggered questions about the role of 
the state and the market in health care. Hence, the extent to which NPM elements 
are the perfect solution depends on the institutional context and the political will 
and skill exhibited by the actors (cf. Scharpf, 1997).  
 The fear of being punished by voters might also explain why reforms often 
do not induce real change. Particularly in the Netherlands and the UK where health 
care and NPM are mainly valence issues, political parties are at the end of the day 
‘punished’ or ‘awarded’ for their choices. For instance, voters will decide whether 
or not the trade-offs of NPM are acceptable as a new balance in health care. It will 
then become clear whether regulating health care in a NPM way affects citizen’s 
individual preferences about the accessibility and quality of health care, which is a 
highly valued good, and about the specific public-private balance.  
 This latter preference points to a larger political and scholarly debate about 
the relationships between the government, public services and the individual 
citizen. While introducing choice and competition in health care enables patients to 
vote with their feet, it may actually reduce their influence via the democratic 
process on health care state services. This relates to two topics frequently addressed 
by political scientists and law scholars, i.e. democratic accountability and 
responsiveness (e.g. Budge, Hofferbert, Keman, McDonald, and Pennings, 2002; 
Vonk, 2003). As I have shown in this dissertation, NPM elements matter in health 
care reforms, involve public-private shifts and are, in some cases, wholeheartedly 
supported by the main political actors.  
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A. ATLAS.TI PREDEFINED CODING SCHEME 
 
1) Accessibility/Equity 
Direct reference towards accessibility, equity,  
Reference to negative consequences of co-payments  
References to health status of different groups of citizens (for instance social-
economic classes) 
Reference to geographical spreading of health services  
References to solidarity of the health care system  
 
2) Benchmarking (part NPM) 
Direct reference to benchmarking (for instance ‘star rating system’) 
Reference to ways of compare hospitals or insurance companies on performance  
 
3) Bureaucracy  
Direct reference to bureaucracy  
Reference to high administrative costs  
Reference to ‘too many regulation or rules’ 
 
4) Contracting (part NPM) 
Direct reference to agreements and contracts between government, health care 
providers, insurance companies, PCTs 
Reference to ‘commissioning’  
 
5) Corporatism  
Reference to agreements of government with other partners in health care 
Reference to consultation of interest organization by government  
 
6) Cost containment_N  
Reference to negative consequences of cut backs 
Reference to the need of more resources in health care (for instance ‘investments 
needed, more personal needed) 
 
7) Cost containment_P  
Reference to the need of cutbacks in health care 
Reference to direct means of cost saving  
 
8) DRG_N 
Direct reference to negative consequences of DRG based hospital payment system  
  
Seeking a balance?! 
130 
 
 
9) DRG_P 
Direct reference to the need of a DRG based hospital payment system 
Reference to the need of new hospital payment system based on rewarding output 
and demand-side demands instead of a payment system based on budgets or 
supply-side demands  
 
10) Primary care 
References to primary care/general practioners  
 
11) Efficiency (part NPM) 
Direct reference to efficiency or equivalents (e.g. doelmatigheid, value for money)  
 
12) Fraud 
Direct reference to fraud 
References to ‘perverse incentives’, gaming, lack of integrity, upcoding 
 
13) Hospitals  
Direct reference to health care providers  
 
14) Hospitals_small  
Direct reference to small-scale health care provision 
 
15) Information MA 
Reference to the gathering of information in the hospital sector  
Reference to the need of public information about the performance of organizations 
in the health care sector  
 
16) Insurance companies  
Direct reference to insurance companies  
 
17) Managerial accountability_n (part Pro State) 
Reference to the negative consequences of more authority, control or freedom of 
health care organizations (usually hospitals, medical profession, insurance 
companies, pct’s) 
Reference to lower the authority, control, freedom of health care organizations 
 
18) Managerial accountability_p (part NPM, pro Market) 
Reference to the positive consequences of more authority, control or freedom of 
health care organizations (usually hospitals, medical profession, insurance 
companies, pct’s) 
Reference to strengthen the authority, control, freedom of health care organizations 
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19) Informal care 
Direct reference to care of patients by family 
 
20) Marketisation_n (part Pro State) 
Direct reference to the negative consequences of concurrence, marketisation or 
competition in health care  
Reference to means to reduce competition, concurrence and marketisation 
 
21) Marketisation_p (Part NPM and proMarket) 
Direct reference to the positive consequences of concurrence, marketisation or 
competition in health care  
Reference to means to increase competition, concurrence and marketisation in 
health care  
 
22) Medical profession  
Direct reference to medical profession without value judgment about their role  
 
23) Medical profession_n  
Direct reference to the medical profession in a negative way (for instance in 
relation to costs and effectiveness or power) 
 
24) Medical profession_p 
Direct to the medical profession in a positive way (for instance their knowledge, 
quality, opposite to management etc) 
 
25) Old system  
References to health care system in historic perspective  
 
26) Patient choice (part NPM) 
Direct reference to patient choice 
References to demand-side (for instance money should follow the patients) 
 
27) Patients 
Direct reference to patients or citizens in health care system 
 
28) Political accountability  
Reference to the role of government/state in health care without value judgment  
 
29) Political accountability_n (part NPM, part pro Market) 
Reference to the negative consequences of state involvement in health care 
Reference to means how to reduce the role of state/government in health care   
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30) Political accountability_p (part pro State) 
Reference to the positive consequences of state involvement in health care 
Reference to means how to increase the role of state/government in health care   
 
31) Prevention 
Direct reference to prevention  
Reference to different prevention programs  
 
32) Privacy 
Reference to consequences of medical technological development for privacy  
 
33) Privatisation_n (pro State) 
Reference to negative consequences of privatization of health care organizations 
Reference to negative consequences of profit-making of health care organizations 
Reference to direct means to reduce profit-making or privatization 
 
34) Privatisation_p (part pro Market, part NPM) 
Reference to positive consequences of privatization of health care organizations 
Reference to positive consequences of profit-making of health care organizations 
Reference to direct means to increase profit-making or privatization 
 
35) Quality (part NPM) 
Direct reference to quality  
Reference to qualifications as ‘improvement of service’  
 
36) Regional/decentralization  
Reference to decentralization or devolution 
Reference to the regional organization of services  
Reference to means of decentralization  
 
37) Home care  
Direct reference to home care workers or institutions  
 
38) Transparency (part NPM) 
Reference to transparency of health care organization or performance  
Reference to means to improve transparency  
 
39) Triangle  
Reference to the dilemma to improve accessibility/equity, quality and efficiency at 
once 
 
40) Insurance package_n 
Reference to downsizing the services provided by the health care system (in 
sickness funds, basic insurance or national health service) 
Appendix A Atlas.ti predefined coding scheme 
133 
 
41) Insurance package_p  
Reference to expand the services provided by the health care system (in sickness 
funds, basic insurance or national health service) 
 
42) Waiting lists  
Reference to waiting lists  
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B. MEANS AND MEDIANS IN PARTY MANIFESTOS AND PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 
Table B.1 Attention to health care goals in party manifestos and parliamentary debates  
 
   Party manifestos (1986-2006) Parliamentary debates (1998-2006)  
Health care 
goals 
 Party N Mean % Std dev Median N Mean % Std dev Median 
Equitable 
accessibility  
UK Conservatives 5 2.87* 2.17 2.56 15 7.00 10.97 0.00 
  Labour 5 4.69 2.44 5.13 6 6.37 5.62 2.41 
  Lib.Democrats 5 8.07^ 3.70 7.50 6 6.36 7.62 4.44 
  Total  15 5.21 3.45  27 6.72 9.06  
 GER Grünen 6 15.36* 9.00 14.59 5 3.65 4.20 2.65 
  PDS/Die 
Linke 
5 38.68^ 18.22 41.18 4 11.59 9.29 9.73 
  SPD 6 22.54 17.21 19.09 9 5.70 5.49 4.76 
  FDP 6 7.94*  4.83 8.51 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  CDU 6 12.96*  8.11 11.40 10 9.13 9.89 8.40 
  Total  29 18.83 15.47  32 6.48 7.70  
 NET Groen Links 5 13.77 10.05 11.11 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  SP 6 22.39*  8.26 22.37 6 2.08 4.01 0.00 
  PvdA 6 7.84^ 5.27 7.19 6 1.63 2.52 0.00 
  VVD 6 3.94^ 3.14 5.21 6 0.98 2.40 0.00 
  D66 6 4.75^ 3.33 5.11 4 2.11 2.44 0.00 
  CDA 6 7.52^ 2.32 7.69 7 3.38 5.35 0.00 
  Total  35 9.93 8.51   1.77 3.35  
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(Table B.1 continued)
   Party manifestos 
(1986-2006) 
  
Parliamentary debates 
(1998-2006) 
Health care 
goals  
 
 Party N Mean  Std dev Median N* Mean  Std dev Median 
Cost 
containment 
UK Conservatives 5 0.25 0.57 0.00 15 10.46 13.31 6.25 
  Labour 5 1.40 1.47 1.33 6 8.52 8.80 2.41 
  Lib.Democrats 5 0.22 0.50 0.00 6 3.78 4.22 4.44 
  Total  15 0.63 1.05  27 8.54 11.01  
 GE
R 
Grünen 6 1.59 1.83 1.25 5 7.04 8.88 2.70 
  PDS/Die Linke 5 0.45 1.02 0.00 4 7.33 9.72 4.41 
  SPD 6 9.86 10.46 8.17 9 7.03 9.13 2.63 
  FDP 6 7.32 9.27 5.70 4 15.95 10.65 16.23 
  CDU 6 9.22 9.61 8.09 10 16.22 15.96 14.26 
  Total  29 5.87 8.22  32 11.06 12.11  
 NET Groen Links 5 3.74 3.15 2.94 5 12.13 11.38 16.67 
  SP 6 5.98 5.54 4.29 6 7.46 6.93 7.50 
  PvdA 6 6.64 3.32 6.62 6 2.71 3.25 1.79 
  VVD 6 7.32 6.41 7.84 6 5.73 9.13 0.00 
  D66 6 6.28 3.71 4.93 4 9.46 7.12 0.00 
  CDA 6 3.83 1.74 3.58 7 6.14 4.89 3.51 
  Total  35 5.67 4.21  34 6.97 7.40  
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(Table B.1 continued) 
 
Party* differs significantly from party^ ( p < 0.05) 
N = interventions of party in debates (at least five sentences coded), statements of minister are not coded 
   Party manifestos 
(1986-2006) 
Parliamentary debates 
(1998-2006) 
Health care 
goals 
 
 Party N Mean  Std dev Median N Mean  Std dev Median 
Quality UK Conservatives 5 9.01 3.18 8.51 15 4.44 5.63 4.76 
  Labour 5 14.21 3.25 14.29 6 4.91 3.03 3.45 
  Lib.Democrats 5 7.11 6.47 4.26 6 4.85 5.53 0.00 
  Total  15 10.11 5.24  27 4.64 4.98  
 GER Grünen 6 6.85 7.06 6.69 5 11.88 9.15 10.81 
  PDS/Die Linke 5 8.63 11.25 5.88 4 12.01 8.13 15.05 
  SPD 6 7.93 7.84 8.17 9 4.62 7.62 7.69 
  FDP 6 3.87 3.42 4.51 4 6.94 13.89 0.00 
  CDU 6 11.20 9.26 6.27 10 6.53 7.31 6.11 
  Total  29 7.66 7.84  32 7.57 8.65  
 NET Groen Links 5 4.27 3.20 4.71 5 1.60 3.58 0.00 
  SP 6 4.08 4.89 2.57 6 3.08 4.12 1.25 
  PvdA 6 5.82 4.49 6.62 6 2.50 6.12 0.00 
  VVD 6 7.63 6.68 7.84 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  D66 6 3.25 2.20 4.93 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  CDA 6 4.60 3.61 3.58 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Total  35 4.96 4.36  34 1.22 3.39  
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Table B.2 Attention to health care goals in party manifestos  
  Party manifestos 
(1986-2006) 
Parliamentary 
debates 
(1998-2006)  
Health care goals  N Mean % N1  Mean % 
Equitable 
accessibility  
Netherlands 35 9.93 49 1.33* 
 Germany 29 18.83* 36 6.44^ 
 UK 15 5.21^ 34 5.74^ 
Cost containment Netherlands 35 5.69* 49 5.41 
 Germany 29 5.87* 36 10.12 
 UK 15 0.63^ 34 7.63 
Quality Netherlands 35 4.96* 49 0.94* 
 Germany 29 7.66 36 8.69^ 
 UK 15 10.11^ 34 5.24^ 
Country* differs significantly (p < 0.05) from country^ in specific type of resources.  
1N = interventions of parties in debates (including interventions of the minister) 
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Table B.3 Attention to state and market regulation of parties in manifestos (1986-2006)  
 Code  Party N Mean Standard-
deviation 
Median N*  Mean Standard-
deviation 
Median 
UK Pro state Conservatives 5 0.47* 1.04 0.00 15 12.72 9.87 14.29 
  Labour 5 9.61^ 7.60 14.29 6 18.48 7.63 17.98 
  Liberal 
Democrats 
5 2.04 1.99 2.50 6 10.74 11.80 10.00 
  Total 15 4.04 5.92  27 13.56 9.91  
 Pro 
market 
Conservatives 5 15.46* 5.55 12.82 15 13.02 13.98 8.33 
  Labour 5 6.82^ 5.39 6.41 6 6.07 6.39 4.88 
  Liberal 
Democrats 
5 8.46 1.25 7.87 6 9.06 8.33 7.32 
  Total 15 10.24 5.71  27 10.60 11.62  
GER Pro state Grünen 6 4.29 4.70 4.17 5 7.60 15.44 0.00 
  PDS/Die 
Linke* 
5 9.57*  4.65 6.82 4 14.12 10.38 16.70 
  SPD 6 3.93 4.34 2.63 9 11.15 9.05 10.91 
  FDP 6 0.71^ 1.13 0.00 4 4.96 6.75 2.78 
  CDU 6 1.06^ 1.76 0.00 10 5.69 4.88 5.29 
  Total 29 3.72 4.56  32 8.49 9.17  
 Pro 
market 
Grünen 6 2.58 2.56 2.31 5 4.80 4.68 5.41 
  PDS/Die 
Linke*  
5 0.91*  2.03 0.00 4 1.96 2.47 1.35 
  SPD 6 9.29 5.98 8.54 9 9.77 15.81 5.00 
  FDP 6 30.77^ 5.05 30.08 4 14.37 10.55 16.23 
  CDU 6 8.71^ 7.53 10.33 10 3.48 4.55 0.91 
  Total 29 10.78 11.90  32 6.63 10.09  
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NET Pro state Groen Links 5 9.31 7.92 8.33 5 22.51 14.46 22.33 
  SP 6 20.48* 3.67 19.74 6 6.94 9.09 2.50 
  PvdA 6 13.32 8.04 12.44 6 7.45 9.46 5.10 
  VVD 6 3.59^ 2.94 4.46 6 17.92 17.53 9.52 
  D66 6 14.56 14.11 10.27 4 9.46 7.12 11.41 
  CDA 6 9.16 4.74 8.70 7 5.57 6.44 3.23 
  Total 35 11.81 9.04  34 11.27 12.28  
 Pro 
market 
Groen Links 5 5.95 5.20 7.32 5 3.33 7.45 0.00 
  SP 6 0.72* 0.80 0.64 6 5.06 5.82 2.50 
  PvdA 6 6.41 4.53 6.81 6 11.78 12.19 9.52 
  VVD 6 16.31^ 12.19 16.43 6 16.48 18.39 10.52 
  D66 6 7.59 7.21 6.14 4 4.33 6.29 2.00 
  CDA 6 12.76 3.77 12.17 7 16.81 17.65 10.34 
  Total 35 8.36 8.03  34 10.34 13.37  
Party* differs significantly from party^ (p < 0.05) within a country on a specific code.  
* N = Intervention of a party in a certain debate excluding the minister (at least five sentences coded)  
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Table B.4 Attention to NPM in the party manifestos and parliamentary debates 
 
 Party N Mean Standard-
deviation 
Median N1 Mean Standard-
deviation 
Median  
UK Conservatives 5 19.95 5.46 20.93 15 25.44 17.68 22.22 
 Labour 5 12.04 7.26 13.56 6 23.15 7.26 22.65 
 Liberal 
Democrats 
5 12.41 7.44 10.00 6 21.09 18.94 18.08 
 Total 15 14.80 7.32  27 23.96+ 15.84  
GER Grünen 6 9.24* 5.85 7.59 5 21.06 18.88 14.29 
 PDS/Die Linke 5 8.14* 6.04 7.14 4 5.35 5.53 4.29 
 SPD 6 13.44* 7.91 9.17 9 16.28 20.19 12.24 
 FDP 6 36.79^ 9.35 32.21 4 14.07 4.89 15.48 
 CDU 6 12.24* 11.31 10.29 10 4.11 6.09 1.19 
 Total 29 16.24 13.37  32 11.58- 14.56  
NET Groen Links 5 12.56 3.10 12.94 5 5.21 3.28 6.67 
 SP* 6 2.35* 2.32 2.15 6 13.59 11.73 15.89 
 PvdA 6 12.83 7.47 11.41 6 26.07 20.38 15.83 
 VVD 6 22.57^ 10.62 23.41 6 23.62 16.50 21.65 
 D66 6 16.38^ 7.88 15.88 4 14.24 10.96 15.14 
 CDA 6 18.83^ 4.64 17.19 7 22.26 18.13 25.00 
 Total 35 14.30 9.03  34 18.19 15.76  
Party* differs significantly from party^ (p < 0.05) within a country on a specific code.  
Country+ differs significantly from country- 
1N = party interventions in debates (excluding the interventions of ministers 
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Table B.5 NPM dimensions in party manifestos and parliamentary debates  
  
   Manifestos (1986-2006) Parliamentary debates (1998-2006) 
   N Mean Std 
dev 
Median N Mean Std 
dev 
Median 
Individual 
responsibility UK Conservatives 5 11.73 8.10 7.69 15 2.31 4.80 0.00 
  Labour 5 4.12 4.69 2.27 6 7.74 8.81 4.98 
  Lib 
democrats 
5 3.92 3.01 3.19 6 3.81 6.09 0.00 
  Total 1
5 
6.59 6.59  27 3.85 6.27  
 GER Grünen 6 4.22 6.51 1.47 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  PDS 5 0.71* 1.60 0.00 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  SPD 6 5.47 5.67 5.17 9 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  FDP 6 15.41^ 10.44 15.39 4 1.79 3.57 0.00 
  CDU 6 3.89 4.33 3.55 10 0.14 0.43 0.00 
  Total  2
9 
6.12 7.88  32 0.27 1.28  
 NET GroenLinks 5 4.00 4.32 2.44 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  SP 6 0.71* 1.13 0.00 6 1.43 2.26 0.00 
  PvdA 6 2.78 3.85 1.28 6 2.71 3.25 1.79 
  VVD 6 8.20 5.33 7.94 6 0.51 1.24 0.00 
  D66 6 8.61^ 4.18 8.29 4 3.22 4.22 2.00 
  CDA 6 5.48 4.63 3.58 7 0.24 0.64 0.00 
  Total 3
5 
4.99 4.78  34 1.25 2.39  
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   Manifestos (1986-2006) Parliamentary debates (1998-2006) 
   N Mean Std dev Median N Mean Std dev Median 
Competitive 
contracting  UK Conservatives 5 8.57 3.77 7.69 15 14.61 12.52 13.33 
  Labour 5 7.53 4.67 9.09 6 5.70 5.74 4.91 
  Lib 
democrats 
5 7.08 2.26 6.74 6 7.79 10.66 2.22 
  Total 15 7.73 3.49  27 11.12 11.36  
 GER Grünen 6 2.58* 2.56 2.31 5 5.80 6.32 5.41 
  PDS 5 0.91* 2.03 0.00 4 2.69 2.10 2.82 
  SPD 6 8.32* 6.20 8.17 9 10.31 15.54 7.27 
  FDP 6 22.01^ 9.30 20.77 4 10.50 8.54 11.90 
  CDU 6 4.42*  5.42 2.22 10 0.69 2.18 0.00 
  Total  29 7.88 9.46  32 5.67 9.73  
 NET GroenLinks 5 6.41 4.95 7.32 5 2.87 3.95 0.00 
  SP 6 0.50* 0.79 0.00 6 7.48 6.26 8.75 
  PvdA 6 7.02 4.28 6.81 6 12.67 13.73 8.33 
  VVD 6 12.14^ 9.99 12.30 6 18.74 18.60 13.46 
  D66 6 5.38 4.37 8.29 4 3.78 5.24 2.00 
  CDA 6 12.12^ 4.47 11.76 7 17.42 15.23 15.25 
  Total 35 7.29 6.58  34 11.32 13.12  
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   Manifestos (1986-2006) Parliamentary debates (1998-2006) 
   N Mean Std 
dev 
Median N Mean Std 
dev 
Median 
Sector 
accountability UK Conservatives 5 4.76 4.76 3.92 15 3.87 7.46 0.00 
  Labour 5 0.27 0.60 0.00 6 4.44 5.80 3.12 
  Lib 
democrats 
5 1.66 1.09 2.13 6 3.70 5.74 0.00 
  Total 15 2.23 3.27  27 3.96 6.55  
 GER Grünen 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 0.54 1.21 0.00 
  PDS 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  SPD 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 9 0.80 1.77 0.00 
  FDP 6 4.22 5.81 1.06 4 2.08 4.17 0.00 
  CDU 6 3.43 5.00 1.11 10 2.92 4.11 1.54 
  Total  29 1.58 3.77  32 1.48 2.98  
 NET GroenLinks 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 3.33 7.45 0.00 
  SP 6 0.21 0.52 0.00 6 0.40 0.97 0.00 
  PvdA 6 0.59 1.44 0.00 6 0.60 1.46 0.00 
  VVD 6 3.53 3.65 3.05 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  D66 6 1.90 3.01 0.56 4 0.56 1.11 0.00 
  CDA 6 1.02 1.75 0.00 7 3.06 6.78 0.00 
  Total 35 1.24 2.36  34 1.36 4.19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B Means and medians in party manifestos and parliamentary debates 
145 
 
 
 
= 
   Manifestos (1986-2006) Parliamentary debates (1998-2006) 
   N Mean Std 
dev 
Median N Mean Std dev Median 
Transparent 
quality UK Conservatives 5 9.47 8.10 9.30 15 4.72 5.49 4.17 
  Labour 5 14.72 4.69 14.29 6 6.19 4.21 6.35 
  Lib 
democrats 
5 8.73 3.01 7.14 6 5.59 5.03 5.67 
  Total 15 10.97+ 6.47  27 5.24 4.99  
 GER Grünen 6 8.53 8.68 8.16 5 25.60 28.82 16.22 
  PDS 5 9.09 12.19 5.88 4 12.65 8.82 15.05 
  SPD 6 8.56 9.16 8.17 9 6.76 8.62 5.00 
  FDP 6 8.06 5.64 7.66 4 6.94 13.89 0.00 
  CDU 6 12.80 8.65 11.06 10 7.33 7.97 7.04 
  Total  29 9.42+ 8.48  32 10.64 14.74  
 NET GroenLinks 5 4.27 3.20 4.71 5 3.94 5.60 0.00 
  SP 6 4.08 4.89 2.57 6 4.31 4.78 3.75 
  PvdA 6 6.48 5.62 3.87 6 5.71 9.04 0.00 
  VVD 6 8.26 6.58 5.16 6 3.07 3.95 1.52 
  D66 6 3.59 2.48 4.45 4 1.56 1.94 1.11 
  CDA 6 5.35 4.26 3.96 7 1.38 2.49 0.00 
  Total 35 5.37- 4.75  34 3.36 5.09  
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   Manifestos (1986-2006)  Parliamentary debates (1998-2006) 
   N Mean Std 
dev 
Median N Mean Std dev  
Efficiency UK Conservatives 5 1.32 1.93 0.00 15 6.90 7.38 6.67 
  Labour 5 0.68 1.52 0.00 6 6.18 3.46 7.33 
  Lib 
democrats 
5 0.45 1.00 0.00 6 9.33 15.54 3.45 
  Total 15 0.81 1.47  27 7.28 8.91  
 GER Grünen 6 0.77 1.20 0.00 5 1.00 2.24 0.00 
  PDS 5 6.06* 4.60 5.88 4 2.02 2.49 1.47 
  SPD 6 0.42^ 1.02 0.00 9 3.45 5.21 2.04 
  FDP 6 0.89 2.19 0.00 4 3.57 7.14 0.00 
  CDU 6 3.20 3.79 2.21 10 2.35 3.50 0.00 
  Total  29 2.14 3.35  32 2.56 4.19  
 NET GroenLinks 5 2.15 3.25 0.00 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  SP 6 1.14 1.52 0.65 6 3.06 4.76 0.00 
  PvdA 6 1.87 1.20 1.91 6 8.07 6.30 6.35 
  VVD 6 2.96 2.96 2.13 6 1.30 2.09 0.00 
  D66 6 2.38 2.38 1.76 4 5.68 6.07 5.68 
  CDA 6 1.45 1.14 1.98 7 2.76 2.87 3.23 
  Total 35 1.99 2.30  34 3.43 4.71  
Party* differs significantly from party^ (p < 0.05) within a country on a specific code.  
Country+ differs significantly from country- 
1N = party interventions in debates (excluding the interventions of ministers) 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Op zoek naar balans?! De doorwerking van Nieuw Publiek Management in 
nieuwe ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen in Duitsland, Nederland en het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk  
 
Bestaat er een perfecte oplossing die zowel zorgt voor kortere wachtlijsten in de 
zorg, als bijdraagt aan de garantie voor een betaalbare, toegankelijke en 
kwalitatieve zorg? Nieuw Publiek Management (NPM) wordt sinds de jaren tachtig 
gezien als een oplossing voor uiteenlopende problemen die zich voordoen in de 
publieke sector, maar voornamelijk voor problemen tussen de principaal – de 
overheid, en de agent – de zorgverlener. Problemen die vooral ontstaan doordat er 
geen duidelijke informatie is over de prestatie van de zorgverlener en de kosten 
daarvan. Door een pakket aan sturingsinstrumenten, afkomstig uit de private sector, 
dat enerzijds de verschillen tussen de publieke en private sector opheft en 
anderzijds de nadruk legt op de verantwoordelijkheid van de dienstverlener, zou de 
‘performance’ van de gezondheidszorg moeten verbeteren. Het primaire idee is dat 
sturingsmechanismen uit de private sector beter werken dan bureaucratische 
controlemechanismen.  
Vaak wordt gesuggereerd dat administratieve veranderingen – zoals een 
ander ziekenhuisbetalingssysteem – niet van politiek belang zijn. De vraag of 
politieke voorkeuren er toe doen voor verschillen of overeenkomsten in 
gezondheidszorghervormingen is dan ook niet bevredigend beantwoord in eerder 
onderzoek. In mijn proefschrift beargumenteer ik dat invoering van NPM principes 
geen ultieme oplossing is voor de problemen van de oude 
ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen in de gezondheidszorg. Wel kan het zorgen voor meer 
nadruk op kostenbeheersing wat waarschijnlijk leidt tot versobering van ofwel de 
kwaliteit dan wel de toegankelijkheid van de zorg. Beleidsmakers moeten op zoek 
naar balans tussen efficiëntie, kwaliteit en toegankelijkheid van de zorg. De 
implementatie van NPM in de gezondheidszorg verandert dan ook het antwoord op 
de belangrijke politicologische vraag ‘who gets what, when and how?’. Een nieuw 
ziekenhuisbetalingssysteem met NPM principes is geen pure administratieve 
verandering.  
 De onderzoeksopzet van dit proefschrift is vergelijkend. Het heeft niet als 
doel om per casus precies uiteen te zetten hoe de hervormingen tot stand zijn 
gekomen, maar het zoekt naar factoren en patronen die de hervormingen kunnen 
verklaren voor meerdere casussen. Er zijn drie landen onderzocht die een nieuw 
ziekenhuisbetalingssysteem hebben ingevoerd dat gebaseerd is op het zogenaamde 
‘DRG principe’. Ziekenhuiszorg wordt ingedeeld in zorgproducten die ieder een 
eigen prijs krijgen. In dit betalingssysteem kunnen NPM sturingmechanismen 
voorkomen, maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs. Daarnaast verschillen de landen in hun 
formele politieke instituties en gezondheidszorgsysteem.  
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De belangrijkste hypothese is dat zowel actoren en instituties moeten worden 
onderzocht om variatie tussen casussen te verklaren. Op basis van de bestaande 
literatuur, zijn ‘politieke partijen’ en ‘de medische professie’ als centrale actoren 
gekozen in het onderzoek. In de welvaartsstaatliteratuur is er geen eenduidig beeld 
van de rol van politieke partijen in hervormingen. Daarnaast hebben juist 
gezondheidszorgbeleidwetenschappers de rol van de medische professie in de 
beleidsvorming benadrukt. Om deze redenen is de hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek 
“In welke mate kan variatie in de nieuwe ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen van 
Nederland, Duitsland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk worden verklaard door 
preferenties van actoren over NPM en de formele politieke instituties en het 
gezondheidszorgsysteem?” 
 De variatie die wordt onderzocht is vooral variatie waarin 
sturingsmechanismen, die typerend zijn voor NPM, zichtbaar zijn in de nieuwe 
ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen. De eerste deelvraag van dit proefschrift is: In welke 
mate en op welke manier is er variatie waarneembaar in de wijze waarop NPM 
elementen zijn doorgedrongen in de ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen in Duitsland, 
Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk? Dit onderzoek laat zien dat NPM zichtbaar 
is in de drie betalingssystemen, maar in verschillende gradaties en met 
verschillende nadrukken. In Nederland, ligt de focus duidelijk op competitie en 
marketisering; in Duitsland op transparantie en efficiency; en in de UK, op de 
sturende rol van de patiënt en kwaliteit.  
 De tweede deelvraag van dit onderzoek is: In hoeverre kan de variatie in 
nieuwe ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen worden verklaard vanuit de staatstraditie, 
formele politieke instituties en het gezondheidszorgsysteem? Vaak wordt 
gesuggereerd dat het aantal ‘veto-punten’ of de mate waarin macht wordt gedeeld 
door actoren de mate van verandering bepaalt. Vanuit de NPM literatuur is 
‘staatstraditie’ als belangrijke verklarende factor aangedragen. Volgens deze 
onderzoeken zou NPM het meest herkenbaar zijn in het Engelse betalingssysteem 
en het minst in het Duitse. Deze conclusie zou betekenen dat mijn hypothese dat 
actoren ook nodig zijn om verschillen te verklaren moet worden verworpen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 laat echter zien dat de variatie waarin NPM terug te vinden is in de 
nieuwe betalingssystemen niet door formele instituties kan worden verklaard. 
Nederland lijkt daarvoor te veel op de UK, en te weinig op Duitsland. 
 In hoeverre politieke partijen een rol spelen in de welvaartsstaats- en 
gezondheidshervormingen is onduidelijk. In vergelijkende studies zijn er 
verschillende antwoorden gegeven. Case studies laten vaak wel een effect van 
politieke partijen zien, kwantitatieve studies leggen meer nadruk op formele 
instituties. De deelvraag die is beantwoord in hoofdstuk 4 is: In welke mate en op 
welke manier zijn partijpreferenties over NPM gerelateerd aan de variatie in de 
nieuwe ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen? De resultaten laten zien dat de variatie in de 
betalingssystemen gerelateerd is aan de nadrukken die regeringspartijen geven aan 
NPM. In Nederland krijgen de NPM elementen competitie en marketisering veel 
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aandacht van de (rechtse) regeringspartijen. In Duitsland is vooral de liberale FDP 
een voorstander van NPM, de Duitse regeringspartijen benadrukken vooral het 
element ‘transparantie’. In vergelijking met Nederland en Duitsland is de politieke 
gevoeligheid van NPM anders in de UK. Tussen de Britse partijen zijn geen 
significante verschillen te vinden in de aandacht die wordt besteed aan de 
verschillende NPM elementen. De mate waarin de regering de verschillende NPM 
elementen benadrukt is in grote mate terug te vinden in het nieuwe Britse 
ziekenhuisbetalingssysteem.  
 Hoewel in alle landen partijpreferenties terug te vinden zijn in het specifieke 
ziekenhuisbetalingssysteem, verschilt het politieke debat tussen de landen. Mijn 
onderzoek heeft laten zien dat deze verschillen samenhangen met de positie van de 
sociaaldemocratische partij in de partijconfiguratie, en met het type 
gezondheidszorgsysteem. Het blijkt dat actoren en instituties beiden nodig zijn om 
de variatie in ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen te begrijpen. 
 De rol van de medische professie is vaak aangehaald als belangrijke 
verklaring voor de mate waarin hervormingen konden worden doorgevoerd. De 
formele machtsverdeling tussen de overheid en de medische professie kan, zoals 
aangetoond in hoofdstuk 3, de variatie waarin NPM doorwerkt in de 
betalingssystemen niet verklaren. In hoofdstuk onderzoek ik of de variatie wel 
verklaard kan worden als er gekeken wordt naar de interactie tussen actoren en 
instituties. De deelvraag die beantwoord wordt, is: In welke mate en op welke 
manier zijn de strategieën van de artsenorganisaties te relateren aan de variatie in 
de nieuwe ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen? Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat strategieën van 
artsenorganisaties niet direct gerelateerd zijn aan de hervormingen in de nieuwe 
betalingssystemen, maar dat deze strategieën samen met de positie van de 
artsenorganisaties in het systeem en de preferenties van de overheid de variatie in 
de ziekenhuisbetalingssystemen kunnen verklaren.  
 De coöperatieve strategie van de Nederlandse artsenorganisaties kan worden 
verklaard uit de nadruk van de regering op deregulering en competitie. Door deze 
nadruk werd de interesse van de artsen niet per se negatief geraakt door het nieuwe 
ziekenhuisbetalingssysteem. De coöperatie tussen de Nederlandse regering en 
medische professie heeft ervoor gezorgd dat in een systeem met redelijk wat veto-
momenten en deling van macht, de regeringpreferenties over NPM zichtbaar zijn in 
het de hervorming. Zowel in Duitsland als de UK, waren artsenorganisaties in 
conflict met de regering, de uitkomsten zijn echter verschillend door de 
institutionele omgeving. In Duitsland leverden de conflicten aanpassingen en 
vertraging op in de implementatie van het betalingssysteem door de gedeelde 
macht. In de UK kon de regering de starre houding van de medische organisatie 
juist naast zich neer leggen vanwege de gecentraliseerde macht. 
 Dit onderzoek laat zien dat zowel actoren en instituties van belang zijn om 
variatie te verklaren. Instituties kunnen belemmerend of bevorderend werken voor 
bepaalde actoren. Preferenties van zowel politieke partijen en artsenorganisaties 
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kunnen niet volledig los worden gezien van de context waarin ze worden gevormd, 
maar kunnen niet worden verklaard door het type gezondheidszorgstelsel. De 
vorming van preferenties is complexer.  
 Hoe een bepaald ziekenhuisbetalingssysteem er uiteindelijk uit komt te zien 
en in welke mate kostenbeheersing ten koste kwaliteit en toegankelijkheid zal gaan, 
moet gezien worden als een politieke keuze. Of deze keuze moeilijk of makkelijk 
zal kunnen worden doorgevoerd in een politiek systeem wordt bepaald door de 
formele instituties, zoals de verdeling van macht tussen artsen en de regering en het 
politieke systeem. De politieke keuze zelf wordt echter niet bepaald door het 
politieke stelsel of het gezondheidszorgsysteem. ‘Politics matters’.  
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